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What history will say about who won and lost
Opinion piece from the Times (UK) by Anatole Kaletsky Long but insightful
When Tony Blair flew to America yesterday to meet President Bush and Kofi Annan, he clearly felt that history was looking over his shoulder. It may seem extravagant to compare this week’s meetings in Camp David and New York with Bretton Woods, Potsdam or Yalta. But to judge by the Prime Minister’s extraordinary lucidity and frankness at his press conference on Tuesday, he understands as well as did Churchill that the world will never be the same again after the Iraq war. Mr Blair said in another of his moments of supreme eloquence, shortly after September 11, that the kaleidoscope of history had been shaken and nobody could say where the pieces would fall. Today, the state of the world seems even more chaotic than 18 months ago. Yet amid the confusion, new shapes and outlines are starting to form.

While nobody can predict exactly how events will unfold in Iraq in the coming days, weeks or even months, some long-term consequences of this conflict are almost as clear as the military outcome. Just as it is predetermined that the US will win, at least in a military sense, and Saddam Hussein will be overthrown, it is now inevitable that many global relationships will change dramatically in the years ahead. Some changes are obvious enough. It is clear, for example, that America’s relations with France and Germany will never be the same. As Mr Blair stated grimly on Tuesday: “There is at the end of this going to be a reckoning about relations between America and Europe.”

It was equally clear from Mr Blair’s comments that Britain’s relations with Europe will permanently change. When a tireless Euro-booster such as Mr Blair uses the emotional word “reckoning” about relations with Europe, it is likely that he has arrived at a personal moment of truth. This becomes undeniable when he looks directly at the camera and portentously adds, not once but twice, that what he is about to say is “probably undiplomatic, but I will say it nonetheless”. Mr Blair’s frustration was understandable enough. He feels, with a great deal of justice, that his efforts to reconcile American and global interests were sabotaged by France. He very nearly managed to integrate US military power into the UN system, thereby strengthening and legitimising both. One could readily imagine the depth of his resentment towards the French and German “partners” who sabotaged this potentially historic task. And to what purpose, since the collapse of UN diplomacy only accelerated the war which the French and Germans supposedly wanted to stop?

But rather than endlessly raking over the blunders and misunderstandings which brought international relations to this sorry pass, it may now be more interesting to try to imagine some of the consequences of the new global alignments. Which countries and institutions, for example, might be long-term winners or losers? Some of the losers are easy enough to identify. Nato and the UN have both been permanently weakened. While the UN will doubtless continue to operate as a humanitarian organisation and a global debating society, Nato will probably cease to exist in its present form. Since Nato’s original purpose — to protect Western Europe from communism — has been fulfilled, it is hard to see any benefit for America or Britain in continuing a military alliance with France, Germany and Belgium.

The countries which will most obviously lose out are Germany, which will suffer from the withdrawal of US troops, and of course France. France will find its crucial aerospace, defence and electronics industries consigned to permanent technological obsolescence since they will be frozen out of joint ventures and partnerships in which the Pentagon plays any role. Belgium will suffer from the closure or relocation of Nato’s Brussels HQ. But what will be much more damaging for this “old Europe” axis than such visible signs of US distrust will be the broader economic and social effects of the transatlantic cleavage. The gulf between the continental and Anglo-Saxon economic models will probably widen. This may prove reassuring to Europe’s ageing voters, whose prime concerns today are stability and secure retirement, rather than creating opportunities for the next generation. But flows of capital and trade across the Atlantic will diminish, as American companies and investors focus increasingly on Asia, rather than Europe. European investors, meanwhile, will be more anxious than ever to get their capital out of Europe as the economic opportunities evaporate.

Beyond Old Europe, some other clear losers are easy enough to discern. Russia and Turkey have both played strong hands extremely badly. And while Turkey may well be “forgiven” because its co-operation is essential for stability in the Middle East, Russia is likely to suffer significantly, though not as disastrously as France and Germany, from ending up on the wrong side. Not only will Russia lose a substantial part of its financial stake in Iraq. More importantly, it has damaged its hopes of rapid integration into the world economy by establishing normal trade relations with the US and gaining early membership of the World Trade Organisation.

The cold warriors in Russia’s foreign ministry may be congratulating themselves about undermining Nato by tempting France and Germany into a new triple alliance, but this strategy will backfire in the long run, as America tightens its military links with Poland, Hungary and the Baltic States, all countries inherently hostile to Russia. Even worse, the shift of American allegiances from Western Europe to the Middle East and Asia could revive the ultimate Russian nightmare — a further strengthening of the US-Chinese relationship, already the world’s most important economic partnership. Another big and unexpected loser may be Israel — at least the militantly expansionist Israel defined by Ariel Sharon. Once the war is over, the priority for the Bush Administration will be to try to stabilise the Middle East. Since further serious trouble in Iraq after the war is won would destroy Mr Bush’s chances of re-election in November 2004, this priority will override all others, including the fanatical attachment to aggressive Zionism among many of Bush’s neo-conservative supporters. As a result, the Sharon Government could suddenly find itself friendless in Washington if it continues to obstruct progress towards peace. The outcome could be an unexpected flexibility in Israeli attitudes to Palestinian statehood, a collapse of the Sharon Government, or an implosion of the Israeli economy as the US withdraws its support. Whichever of these happened, it would be a supremely ironic case of the law of unintended consequences. For the most fervent supporters of Mr Sharon’s hardline Middle East policy in Washington were also the most vociferous advocates of war.

Turning from losers to winners, there seems to be only one country that will undeniably gain from the confusing events of the past few months. That is Iraq. Even if this war proves far bloodier than the 1991 campaign (which is, as yet, by no means certain) the vast majority of Iraqis will soon find themselves incomparably freer and better off than at any time in the past 50 years. Once Saddam is overthrown, the Bush Administration will spare no effort to make its liberation of Iraq “work” and, judging by the experience of other Middle Eastern countries, the combination of unlimited sums of money with a strong security presence is likely to succeed in stabilising Iraq, at least for a few years. The only other obvious winners from the Iraq crisis are less inspiring. They are the governments of Iran, North Korea and other rogue states. After this unexpectedly difficult war in Iraq — and the even more difficult occupation — America is most unlikely to be able to summon up the political will, the money, or the military resources to attack any of its other perceived enemies.

Finally, what about the main protagonists in this drama, America and Britain? Will they end up as winners or losers? I have left this question until last because it is impossible to answer. Neither Britain nor America will gain anything from the weakening of Europe, the straining of relations with Russia or the huge expenditures that will now be needed to reconstruct Iraq. But if the Middle East could be stabilised and Iraq did turn into a beacon of democracy for Muslims, the whole world would obviously gain.
Posted by: kgb 2003-03-27
http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php?ID=11970