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Al-Qaeda profile and threat assessment
Link to the full document, but here are some key excerpts. Gunaratna is cited prominently ...However, bin Laden and Zawahiri are not widely believed to be in Afghanistan proper; they reportedly escaped from their redoubt in the Tora Bora mountains (near the city of Khost) during the war and, according to most assessments, fled into Pakistan. Central Intelligence Agency paramilitary officers and other U.S. personnel (some as contractors) in Pakistan are dedicated to this search, assisting Pakistani forces and agents. Acting on the assumption that bin Laden and Zawahiri are in remote areas of Pakistan rather than in or around urban areas, in March 2004, Pakistan deployed about 70,000 troops against suspected Al Qaeda hiding places in the South Waziristan region, but failed to find the two, or any other major Al Qaeda figures. Current Pakistani military operations are centered around North Waziristan. There are very few indications of their whereabouts, but, in Time Magazineâs June 27, 2005 issue, Director of Central Intelligence Porter Goss said that the United States had an âexcellent ideaâ where bin Laden was, but he did not specify any exact location. White House spokesman Scott McLellan subsequently clarified the Goss comment to reflect less certainty than Goss indicated. ... Some other senior figures are apparently beyond U.S. reach. Al Qaeda spokesman Suleiman Abu Ghaith, operations planner Sayf al-Adl, and bin Ladenâs son Saad are believed to be in Iran. Iran has acknowledged publicly that it has some senior Al Qaeda figures âin custodyâ â without naming them specifically â but Iran has refused to transfer them to their countries of origin for interrogation and trial. Many doubt the degree of constraint, if any, that Iran has placed on them, and the Bush Administration has publicly alleged that the three were responsible for planning the May 2003 suicide attacks on a housing complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. If true, this would suggest that the three are in contact with Al Qaeda operatives outside Iran. Some might argue that, if these three senior figures are able to communicate with bin Laden and Zawahiri, a major portion of the core of the Al Qaeda leadership as it existed on September 11, 2001 is still operating and possibly in control of ongoing operations. Those who take this view tend to believe that the United States should exert greater efforts to capture bin Laden and Zawahiri on the grounds that they remain pivotal leadership figures and that their capture would greatly deflate the organization. Posted by: Dan Darling 2005-09-02 |
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