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End of the Special Relationship
Long, but worthwhile Executive Summary from a much longer and even more depressing paper at the link. At least the Brits can't say they didn't realize what was happening, just like losing the Common Law. The next question is when the special relationship in intelligence sharing should end. It really sickens me to think that the Brits may bind fast to the France-Germany-China axis.
One of the most significant â yet largely unreported â political developments of recent years is the move being made by the United Kingdom to integrate its armed forces with those of the European Union.
The nature of this new military relationship with our EU partners will make it increasingly hard for the UK either to fight independently or to co-operate militarily with the US. The âspecial relationshipâ which has been the cornerstone of British defence policy from the time of the Second World War will be at an end.
What is even more alarming is the extent to which the British Government has been at pains to conceal and even to deny its true military and political agenda in this respect, by insisting that its new relationship with its EU partners does not prejudice its continued participation in Nato.
However, the key to appreciating how rapidly the UK and the US are moving apart lies in the pattern of the procurement policy now being followed by the UKâs Ministry of Defence (MoD).
The political cue for this parting of the ways was Tony Blairâs agreement at St Malo in 1998 that Britainâs armed forces should be integrated with those of the EU as part of an autonomous EU defence effort, capable of operating outside Nato. This led the following year to the EUâs decision to establish a multi-national âEuropean Rapid Reaction Forceâ (ERRF) as the centrepiece of its new military ambitions.
The repercussions of this decision are made infinitely greater by the fact that both the US and the EU stand today on the edge of a technical revolution in warfare, centred on satellites, electronics and a new generation of vehicles, unmanned aircraft and weapons systems (ânet-centric warfareâ). So closely co-ordinated will the forces of the future need to be through their technology that it will be virtually impossible for forces working under different systems to work alongside one another.
Until recently the UK and the US were still working in close partnership in developing the technology required to achieve this revolution in the nature of warfare. Most notably they were equal partners in what was known as the Future Scout and Cavalry System project (FSCS), until Britain withdrew, leaving the US to carry on to develop its more advanced Future Combat System (FCS).
In the past year or two, the MoDâs procurement policy has shown a similar shift away from co-operation with the US towards closer dependence on Britainâs EU partners. Almost across the board, the MoD is now turning its back on joint defence projects with the US, even where these involve British firms. Instead the MoD is purchasing equipment supplied or developed by firms in France, Germany, Italy and Sweden. The pattern of this dependence implies a state of technical and doctrinal integration with the EUâs defence effort so complete that collaboration with the US will eventually not be feasible.
The key to co-ordinating future warfare will lie in satellite systems, such as the US GPS/Navstar system on which Nato currently depends. The cornerstone of the EUâs autonomous defence effort lies in its plans to establish three, largely French-built systems, led by Galileo, set up as a direct rival to the GPS system and due to be in place by 2008, and directed from the EUâs satellite control centre in Spain.
From there, almost every aspect of Britainâs future defence planning would rely on equipment supplied or being developed by her EU partners. British troops will no longer be transported by US-built C-130 and C-17 aircraft, but by the A400M âEurolifterâ. The UKâs successor to FSCS will rely on armoured fighting vehicles supplied by Sweden, with French guns and ammunition.
Joint US-British bids to supply £1.1 billion-worth of sophisticated trucks were in 2004 rejected in favour of trucks built by the German firm MAN Nutzfahrzeuge, adding the name of a former British firm, ERF, to imply some British contribution. US and other non-EU reconnaissance vehicles were rejected in favour of an obsolescent and much more expensive version made by the Italian firm Iveco, although their origin is again to be disguised behind the name of the British firm BAE Land Systems.
A joint project with the US to develop a 155mm howitzer has been abandoned in favour of a French gun firing German-designed shells. Battlefield radar systems are being built in Germany and Sweden. Development of unmanned aircraft is being led by France, while the RAFâs main strike aircraft will be the Eurofighter, firing French-made missiles.
Three aircraft carriers are to be shared between the Royal Navy and France, with the French firm Thales playing a central part in their design and construction. The UK has even abandoned its capacity to manufacture small arms, so that the British armyâs future rifles are likely to be supplied by Belgium.
The one consistent pattern in recent MoD procurement policy has been that, wherever possible, US firms are now being excluded, even where this means excluding British firms associated with them.
As a result, the MoD is often buying inferior or more costly equipment than that which Anglo-US contractors could supply. The potential cost is estimated at £14 billion.
The nature of the equipment now being bought for the UKâs armed forces, and the âEuropeanâ or ânon-Natoâ standards now being laid down by the new European Defence Agency in Brussels, imply not just a growing technical divergence between the ERRF and Nato but also a doctrinal conflict with established US and Nato practice. This will make it increasingly difficult for forces on each side of this divide to work together, or even to share the same battlezones.
Almost the most startling feature of this immense political and military transformation is the extent to which it is moving ahead behind the scenes without being publicly explained or acknowledged, not least by the British Government. Nor has it yet been effectively challenged by the Opposition.
The situation is compounded by the EUâs formal co-operation with China, a strategic rival of the US. This includes the Galileo satellite global positioning system, in which the UK is an equal partner. Because of potential technology leakage from the EU to China, the US is increasingly reluctant to share its technology with Britain. The problems of UK-US cooperation are therefore being exacerbated further.
It will shortly be too late to reverse this trend. The Commission is now also proposing to control intra-EU movements of military products, thereby making the actions of the British Army dependent on her EU partnersâ consent. The UK would no longer be able to operate alongside the US as a military ally. It would be irreversibly committed to operating within a framework defined by European Union interests. The âspecial relationshipâ would be over.
Posted by: Hupoter Chaiter7505 2005-10-14 |
