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Understanding al-Libi
SENATOR CARL LEVIN recently declassified a DIA document from February 2002 that appears to cast doubt on the claims of Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi. Al-Libi, a senior al Qaeda camp commander and a member of bin Laden's inner circle, had maintained, until early 2004, that Iraq had assisted al Qaeda in its chemical and biological weapons efforts. As a result of the document Levin released (and other information circulating) the conventional view which has developed is that the administration knew that al-Libi was lying about Iraq, al Qaeda, and WMD but chose to set aside this knowledge because it conflicted with their preferred narrative concerning pre-war intelligence on Iraq. As to why al-Libi said what he did, conventional wisdom has settled on the storyline that al-Libi told interrogators what they wanted to hear because he was tortured.

Such a narrative is both convenient and attractive. But it only tells half the truth.

To begin with, the portions of the DIA document from February 2002 that Senator Levin had declassified reads as follows:

This is the first report from Ibn al-Shaykh in which he claims Iraq assisted al-Qaida's CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear] efforts. However, he lacks specific details on the Iraqis involved, the CBRN materials associated with the assistance, and the location where training occurred. It is possible he does not know any further details; it is more likely this individual is intentionally misleading the debriefers. Ibn al-Shaykh has been undergoing debriefs for several weeks and may be describing scenarios to the debriefers that he knows will retain their interest.

So the document that Levin regards as having definitively established al-Libi as a liar also states that he may in fact have known that Iraq assisted al Qaeda in its unconventional weapons experts, but little else. But there are other bits of information to consider, which paint a fuller picture.

For instance, according to the June 21, 2004 issue of Newsweek:

With al-Libi, too, the initial approach was to read him his rights like any arrestee, one former member of the FBI team told NEWSWEEK . . . Al-Libi's capture, some sources say, was an early turning point in the government's internal debates over interrogation methods. FBI officials brought their plea to retain control over al-Libi's interrogation up to FBI Director Robert Mueller. The CIA station chief in Afghanistan, meanwhile, appealed to the agency's hawkish counterterrorism chief, Cofer Black. He in turn called CIA Director George Tenet, who went to the White House. Al-Libi was handed over to the CIA. "They duct-taped his mouth, cinched him up and sent him to Cairo" for more-fearsome Egyptian interrogations, says the ex-FBI official.

And according to Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the U.N. Security Council, at some point al-Libi's statements became far more specific. More than vaguely claiming that Iraq had assisted al Qaeda on unconventional weapons, al-Libi recounted that:

. . . Bin Laden and his top deputy in Afghanistan, deceased Al Qaida leader Muhammad Atef, did not believe that Al Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable enough to manufacture these chemical or biological agents. They needed to go somewhere else. They had to look outside of Afghanistan for help. Where did they go? Where did they look? They went to Iraq.

The support that describes included Iraq offering chemical or biological weapons training for two Al Qaida associates beginning in December 2000. He says that a militant known as Abu Abdullah Al-Iraqi had been sent to Iraq several times between 1997 and 2000 for help in acquiring poisons and gases. Abdullah Al-Iraqi characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful.

And according to Phase I of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report on pre-war Iraq intelligence (which was endorsed by all of the Democrats serving on the committee including Senator Levin):

Conclusion 103. The information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency for the terrorism portion of Secretary Powell's speech was carefully vetted by both terrorism and regional analysts.

Conclusion 104. None of the portrayals of the intelligence reporting included in Secretary Powell's speech differed in any significant way from earlier assessments published by the Central Intelligence Agency.

CIA Director Tenet likewise repeated al-Libi's claims without caveat during his February 11, 2003 testimony to Senate Select Intelligence Committee, stating that "Iraq has in the past provided training in document forgery and bomb-making to al Qaeda. It has also provided training in poisons and gases to two al Qaeda associates. One of these associates characterized the relationship he forged with Iraqi officials as successful."

All of this would seem to suggest that the U.S. intelligence community's understanding of al-Libi and his claims changed and evolved considerably in the year between February 2002 when the partially declassified DIA document was written, and February 2003 when al-Libi's statements became part of Secretary Powell's presentation to the United Nations. This would seem to square with the fact that, according to Secretary Powell's chief of staff Larry Wilkerson, no dissent was ever received with regard to the section of his presentation dealing with al-Libi.

OF COURSE there were reasons to believe that al Libi might be providing credible information: It appears he had done so before. Indeed, as the Washington Post reported in August 2004, "under questioning, al-Libi provided the CIA with intelligence about an alleged plot to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Yemen with a truck bomb and pointed officials in the direction of Abu Zubaida, a top al Qaeda leader known to have been involved in the Sept. 11 plot."

From what is known about the chronology of both the capture of Abu Zubaydah and the thwarting of one of many plots against the U.S. embassy in Yemen, it is entirely reasonable to surmise that al-Libi was providing viable, actionable intelligence that resulted in the foiling of an al Qaeda plot and the capture of one of its most senior leaders in the same time frame in which he recounted information concerning Iraqi assistance to al Qaeda. Moreover, as discussed at length on pages 329 to 333 of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report, al-Libi's claims appear to have fit within the context of what the September 2002 intelligence document Iraqi Support for Terrorism described as "The general pattern emerges is of al-Qa'ida's enduring interest in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) expertise from Iraq."

So, when exactly was it determined that Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi was not telling the truth with respect to his claims of Iraqi ties to al Qaeda? It's hard to say. The July 2004 Newsweek article that first broke the news of al-Libi's recanting (an act that the 9/11 Commission report attributes to no later than February 2004) quoted a U.S. official as saying that al-Libi had "subsequently recounted a different story" and noted that "It's not clear which version is correct. We are still sorting this out." The August 2004 Washington Post article featured a similar caveat, this one being that "the senior intelligence official cautioned that al-Libi's later contention that Iraq provided no help or training to al Qaeda could not be verified and that the CIA did not know whether he was telling the truth."

Yet none of these statements have surfaced in the most recent reporting on al-Libi, suggesting that the intelligence community now regards his denials as credible. There is now an interesting question to be asked as to what prompted this shift, given that the intelligence community was unable to come to a conclusion concerning the veracity of al-Libi's statements between February and August of 2004. Has some new information come to light, or is al-Libi's recanting now being accepted as credible because "everyone knows" that Iraq had no connection with al Qaeda?

Recently, the New York Times reported on December 9 that al-Libi stated that he fabricated his more detailed claims made while in Egyptian custody in order to "escape harsh treatment," but the same article also quoted a government official as stating that al-Libi's claims about being coerced into making his statements "had not been corroborated." While certainly interesting, this information provides little insight into the questions of how the US intelligence community was able to verify al-Libi's later contentions if they were not even able to verify that he was coerced to begin with or why al-Libi waited until early 2004, long after he had been released from Egyptian custody, to retract statements that were made in early to mid-2002.

In any event, one of the problems with understanding al-Libi is that much of the information about him has become available only as the result of press leaks. The relevant sections on him in Phase I of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee report and much the DIA analysis cited by Senator Levin are both classified, leaving the public with little authoritative context within which to place his claims. Perhaps both the administration and its critics should press for the full declassification of his statements concerning Iraqi ties to al Qaeda so that the public can see what he said, when he said it, and what criteria were used for determining the truth or falsity of his statements. Perhaps Senator Levin will be willing to address these issues in the four other intelligence reports that the New York Times reports that he is now attempting to declassify, rather than simply cherry-picking portions of intelligence reports which he believes will assist his political arguments.

Dan Darling is counter-terrorism consultant for the Manhattan Institute Center for Policing Terrorism.
Posted by: Dan Darling 2006-01-04
http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php?ID=138957