"We're Writing Pyongyang, But We're Thinking Tehran"
Russia Should Count Its Cards in This Game of Nuclear Poker
by Sergey Strokan
The Korean crisis has temporarily diverted general attention away from Iran. But that does not mean that the Iranian nuclear problem can be put aside for good. The unpredictable Kim Jong-il messed with President Bush's hand, derailing this fall's decisive offensive against Iran. But this situation, which is so annoying for the United States, doesn't change anything: the American "fatwa" against the Islamic regime in Iran has been delivered, and like all fatwas, this one is irrevocable. Those in Iran, where everyone knows what a terrifying thing a fatwa is for those under its sentence, understand this perfectly well. The situation concerning Iran, though it has been relegated to backstage, is looking ever more critical and dramatic. Thus, the current agenda of world politics can be summed up in a single phrase: "We're writing Pyongyang, but we're thinking Tehran."
It is possible to talk for a long time about the coincidence of two outcast countries, both of which are governed by regimes hostile to the West, ending up in the same boat. But the most important thing is to see the principle difference between them. It is particularly important for Russia to understand that difference.
North Korea is basically lost to Russia. How and when Moscow lost it is another story. But, as they say, what's fallen from the truck is lost forever. By virtue of how North Korea presents itself today, the idea of Russia occupying some sort of lofty trade or economic heights or rolling out grandiose projects by Minatom or Gazprom is not only unrealistic it's in the realm of the fantastic. The political dividends from "special relations" with Pyongyang also do not promise Moscow anything good. Even if we had brought Kim Jong-il into the fold, even if we had taken extra care with his special train and brought him bread and salt [the traditional Russian greeting] at every Siberian way station, he would have still exploded his device, spitting on "special relations" with Moscow. But even if he didn't do that, Moscow would reap no benefits from having special relations with Pyongyang, which wields no influence whatsoever with other countries or in the region.
Iran is a completely different matter. In the first place, Moscow is on track to retain the victory wreath in the struggle for the spot in the sun in Iranian atomic energy. Secondly, projects for oil and gas partnerships are nothing to sneeze at. Another important thing is partnerships in military technology. Finally, in a geopolitical sense Iran is not only Iran itself but also everything "Iran-centric" and "Iran-inspired" in the Near and Middle East. And that in itself is more than enough.
In general for Russia, Iran is much more interesting than North Korea. This means that, in the vote in New York concerning a UN Security Council resolution on North Korea, Moscow can make the West pay a dear price for something that costs Russia itself practically nothing. Russia can "show adherence to principle" and support, if not fully, sanctions against Korea. But do so on one condition: to gain the right to say to the West, don't even think about sanctions against Iran.
A typically cynical viewpoint from Russia. Mr. Strokan's photo pose shows him to be a man of deep thoughts. Simon & Schuster, he's ready for his close-up!
Posted by: ryuge 2006-10-12 |