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Iraqi resistance takes on a new face
Away from the chaos and anarchy of other parts of Iraq, in relatively peaceful Sulaimaniya, experts are assessing the possible consequences of the death of Uday and Qusay on the four facets of resistance in the country. The groups are:- Different groups from among the ranks of the Ba'ath Party who have formed small pockets. They are well coordinated and well equipped, with rocket-propelled grenades and small missile launchers. They are spread all over the north of Iraq (aka the Arabian belt) and target US convoys and installations in particular.
- Small pockets of Arab tribes who have been left out of the current interim setup and who see no hope of ever being represented. They are not well organized and launch random attacks on US forces.
- A few thousand Arabs who arrived in Iraq before the US-led invasion who have joined hands with different resistance groups. They include Afghans.
- Independent groups of gangsters who have taken advantage of the lawless situation in the country to establish fiefdoms, especially in the regions of Khals and Kirkuk in the north. They also randomly attack US troops.
Those in the first group - Baath Party stalwarts - would clearly have been jolted by the deaths of their two main coordinators. This leaves only Saddam himself - wherever he might be - as the only real binding force for the remnants of the party, and it would be difficult for him to single-handedly manipulate events without the help of his two trusted lieutenants. Coincidentally (or not?), an audio tape purportedly from Saddam urged Iraqis on Wednesday to fight US forces, saying that the war was not over. "Our will will not surrender and won't be defeated. The battle is not over yet," the tape, addressing the Iraqi armed forces, said. It was aired by Dubai-based al-Arabiya television, and dated July 20, two days before the death of his sons. Nevertheless, this element of the Iraqi resistance faces possible disintegration, or at least a serious loss in capabilities. The fact that Saddam was not with his sons at their death is not surprising. Throughout his bloody dictatorship he adopted a separate strategy for himself, including his own hideouts, and he was a past master at covering his trail and keeping his whereabouts a secret. Thus, even though a number of former colleagues close to him have been arrested by US authorities, they have not been able to provide information on his hideouts.
The resistance of the Arab tribes in the northern belt, meanwhile, is gradually changing shape. Virtually every day there is a declaration from a new Islamic group calling for jihad against US forces. These groups are, in fact, drawn from the tribes, who are attempting to give their struggle an ideological touch and broaden their influence. Their position, nevertheless, is in a state of flux, and while they are a force at present, they would need to become more organized in the future.
The foreign Arab fighters are essentially a volunteer force totally dependent on their local allies for support, and for them it will likely be a case of united they stand, divided they fall once the going gets a bit tougher.
Similarly, if the US forces fail to develop a strategy to set up a strong indigenous political system, the gangsters and looters are likely to elevate themselves as warlords - much like in Afghanistan - and they may develop links to militant groups fighting against the US for reasons of expediency.
Posted by: Fred Pruitt 2003-07-30 |
