|
Army Commanders Felt Iraq Ammo Was Short
Any ex-quartermasters here? EFL.
Soldiers with the Armyâs 3rd Infantry Division charged into Iraq in April short of the ammunition their commanders had said was necessary to invade, according to the divisionâs postwar evaluation of the fighting. It was one of a number of supply problems encountered by the 3rd Infantry before and during its 21-day dash to Baghdad from Kuwait, according to the internal review, a 293-page after-action report created by the divisionâs senior officers and troops.
| This'll be al-Guardian reading through the Army's "lessons learned" and potshotting... |
During the run-up to the war, division commanders requested additional ammunition be delivered to front-line units. The request was approved, but the troops could not obtain all the ordnance despite months of war preparations. ``Every attempt to gain the ammunition assets resulted in some agency or another denying requests, short-loading trucks or turning away soldiers,ââ the report said. ``The entire situation became utter chaos. ... The division crossed (into Iraq) short the ammunition it had declared necessary to commit to combat.ââ
| It was so totally FUBAR'd that we lost the war... |
The report, whose authors were not identified by name, catalogued serious problems with supply, security and the handling of prisoners of war. It blamed many problems on higher headquarters or other parts of the military, although it did point out some places where the division could train its own soldiers better. A spokesman for the division, Maj. Darryl Wright, characterized the report as a candid effort to pinpoint problems and refine tactics so the division fights better next time. He said the report, obtained by The Associated Press and other outlets, had not yet been finalized.
| It's that "candid" part that provides the red meat for the press... |
The report praised the divisionâs troops, leaders and front-line fighting gear, particularly the M-1 Abrams tank and the M-2 Bradley fighting vehicle. ``The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) moved farther and faster than any other ground offensive operation in history,ââ the report claimed. Yet the division had serious problems receiving supplies while on the move, including vehicle parts, ammunition, fuel and medical supplies. Had the division been required to move beyond Baghdad, or had it required more time to reach the city, its advance would have stalled, the report suggested. ``Most units literally spent 21 days in continuous combat operations without receiving a single repair part,ââ the report said. ``Shortages of predictably high-demand repair parts and vehicular fluids had the most lasting effect on fleet readiness.ââ
It goes on to document various problems.
Posted by: Steve White 2003-11-28 |
