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Hezbollah's Open War
Hassan HaydarAl-Hayat Whoever assassinated Imad Mughniyeh, and the suspicion is basically pointing at Israel and its security agencies until the the promised Syrian investigation confirms this, has given Hezbollah the opportunity to declare that the war of July 2006 is still "continuing and open" and hence far from over. This response may be seen as a stunned and angry reaction to the harsh blow that targeted one of the party's leaders who as revealed for the first time that Mughniyeh was the head of the Jihad (military) Council in Hezbollah, but the evidence indicates otherwise. Hezbollah has recently withdrawn its recognition of UN Security Council resolution 1701 and denied its approval of the seven-point plan that ended the war despite audiovisual documentation of this approval as chief negotiator Prime Minister Fouad Siniora put it. In this context, the announcement implies that party has decided it is time to override the practical implications of the resolution on the ground, that is, the closing of the South Lebanon front that resulted from the deployment of international forces alongside the Lebanese Army. Some interpreted Nasrallah's comments to imply that the party will probably resort to other "battlefields" since the south Lebanon front is now closed, especially since it perceived that Israel has violated the geographic framework of the conflict. Most likely, however, the response to Mughniyeh's assassination will only come in Lebanon and through its borders by means of an assault that will transcend local and international obstacles to prove that Lebanon remains the party's open battlefield for confrontation with Israel regardless of the consequences. This response would also reactivate the Syrian-Iranian strategy since both powers considered the closing of the South Lebanon front a harsh punishment that their ally had to concede under the pressure of temporary circumstances that are no longer present. Hezbollah will not resort to a strike outside its preferred "battlefield" because for a quarter century it has been keen to refuse to acknowledge Mughniyeh's membership in the party or that the fact that he was fighting and moving in its name. First, Mughniyeh was linked directly to the central leadership in Tehran beyond the party hierarchy of command. Secondly, the party wanted to deny any suspicion that it was involved in terror in the eyes of the world, especially Europe which still disagrees over classifying Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. In fact, a few in Europe have repeatedly tried to justify the continued dealing with Hezbollah or at least refraining from taking toward it a radical position similar to the American stance. Consequently, the party disclosed the significant role and considerable stature of Mughniyeh only after his death. Hence, while the assassination has forced Hezbollah to acknowledge Mughniyeh, it will not compel it to abandon its keenness on maintaining bridges, even if weak, with part of the west. The second chief reason is that closing the south Lebanon front has weakened the Syrian-Iranian alliance and its dependents because it isolated developments in Lebanon from those in Gaza, where another ally, Hamas, is suffering from the international and Arab isolation which has gotten worse following the recent violation of the Egyptian border. Hamas now faces an Israeli decision to respond with continued and violent military action that would squeeze it in a difficult corner since it has no practical means to make a qualitative response to ease the grumbling of its besieged supporters. At the same time, Hamas is unable to end the disaffection with Mahmoud Abbas' Palestinian Authority otherwise it would be admitting the failure of its coup in Gaza and would be forced to give up any gains it made from it. With the obstruction of the council of ministers and parliament, the paralysis of the central district of the capital, and the imposed and extended presidential void, reactivating the Lebanese front still requires "neutralizing" the only remaining domestic element that can prevent dragging the country into the affairs of regional alliances, namely the Lebanese army. This path however was already started at Nahr Al-Bared, continued with the events in Mar Mikhail, and will continue with the attempts to preoccupy the army and exhaust it with the street fights and the wars of burning tires. Posted by: Fred 2008-02-22 |
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