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Nuclear Program in Iran Tied To Pakistan
Somewhat EFL
Evidence discovered in a probe of Iranâs secret nuclear program points overwhelmingly to Pakistan as the source of crucial technology that put Iran on a fast track toward becoming a nuclear weapons power, according to U.S. and European officials. The serious nature of the discoveries prompted a decision by Pakistan two weeks ago to detain three of its top nuclear scientists for several days of questioning, with U.S. intelligence experts allowed to assist. The scientists have not been charged with any crime, and Pakistan continues to insist that it never wittingly provided nuclear assistance to Iran or anyone else.
| They're claiming to be witless? |
Documents provided by Iran to U.N. nuclear inspectors since early November have exposed the outlines of a vast, secret procurement network that successfully acquired thousands of sensitive parts and tools from numerous countries over a 17-year period. While Iran has not directly identified Pakistan as a supplier, Pakistani individuals and companies are strongly implicated as sources of key blueprints, technical guidance and equipment for a pilot uranium-enrichment plant that was first exposed by Iranian dissidents 18 months ago.
The way I see things, is that the decision to trade nuclear weapons with North Korea, and the possibility of doing the same with Saudi Arabia, likely came from the very top of Pakistanâs government, since those 2 countries are allies of them. However, the offer of Nuclear tech to the Taliban and Iran was more likely done by âroguesâ acting from an ideological or financial motive. Pakistan and Iran are not very friendly countries, and the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran paralleled the rise of anti-shia sectarianism in Pakistan. Although the fact that there seem to be so many âroguesâ in the nuclear program is not very reassuring, especially since the father of Pakistanâs nuclear program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, has been spotted at Lashkar-e-Taiba conventions.
While American presidents since Ronald Reagan worried that Iran might seek nuclear weapons, U.S. and allied intelligence agencies were unable to halt Iranâs most significant nuclear acquisitions, or even to spot a major nuclear facility under construction until it was essentially completed. Although the alleged transfers occurred years ago, suggestions of Pakistani aid to Iranâs nuclear program have further complicated the relationship between the United States and Pakistan.
| The Talibs were the genesis of our "close" relations with Pakland. Those relations with evaporate when Perv goes, unless they manage to clone him. |
In documents and interviews with investigators of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iranian officials have offered detailed accounts of how they obtained sensitive equipment from European, Asian and North American companies. Much of the equipment was routed through a transshipment hub in the Persian Gulf port city of Dubai to conceal the actual destination. China and Russia also made significant contributions to the Iranian program in the past, IAEA documents show. By far the most valuable assistance to Iran came from still-unnamed individuals who provided top-secret designs and key components for uranium-processing machines known as gas centrifuges.
| My guess would be that the names will feature a lot of Khans and Chaudry's and a few Kims and Paks... |
The blueprints, which the IAEA has reviewed, depict a type of centrifuge that is nearly identical to a machine used by Pakistan in the early years of its nuclear program, according to U.S. officials and weapons experts familiar with the designs.
| Hellofa coincidence, isn't it? |
The plans and components, which were acquired over several installments from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, allowed Iran to leapfrog over several major technological hurdles to make its own enriched uranium, a necessary ingredient in commercial nuclear fuel and nuclear weapons. Iran, which insists it has never made highly enriched uranium, admitted receiving substantial foreign help, including numerous secondhand centrifuge components that were imported from an unnamed country.
| Burma? Uruguay? Albania, maybe? |
Officially, Iranâs leaders maintain that they bought the components on the black market, and they still donât know where the parts came from.
| "I dunno. Somebody left 'em here." |
But to the inspectors and independent experts on centrifuge design, the machines offer abundant clues. The draft report by Albrightâs group, based on experts familiar with the Iranian machine, describes it as a modified version of a centrifuge built decades ago by Urenco, a consortium of the British, Dutch and German governments. The machine is about six feet high and is made of aluminum and a special type of high-strength steel. The design is one of several known to have been stolen in the 1970s by a Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, who later became known as the father of the Pakistani bomb.
| "Stolen in the 1970s". That's a good description of Islamic research. Almost a thumbnail description, in fact... |
Pakistan modified the Urenco design and manufactured a number of the machines before abandoning the centrifuge for a sturdier model. The blueprints obtained by Iran show "distinctive" modifications similar to the ones made by Pakistan. Traces of highly enriched uranium on centrifuge components in Iran indicated they had been used before. Most of the contaminants are of a type of highly enriched uranium believed to be "consistent with material produced in Pakistan," Albright said. The evidence collectively supports a view widely held among nuclear experts and nonproliferation officials that Iran obtained castoff parts and designs from a centrifuge that was no longer needed by Pakistan, said Gary Samore, a former adviser on nonproliferation on the Clinton administrationâs National Security Council. "The particular machine that Iran is using is not the mainstay of the Pakistani program," said Samore, now the director of studies at the Institute for International Strategic Studies in London. "Pakistan had these used aluminum-rotor machines that it no longer needed. The most plausible explanation for what happened is that Pakistan sold its surplus centrifuges, which have now turned up in Iran."
| Sure sounds plausible to me... |
Much of Iranâs basic nuclear infrastructure — from research reactors to lasers used to manipulate uranium atoms — was supplied by U.S. companies before Islamic revolutionaries deposed the shah in 1979. U.S. officials later discovered that the shah, a staunch U.S. ally, was conducting his own secret nuclear weapons research before he was overthrown.
I guess itâs a good thing the revolution wasnât delayed a couple years.
Posted by: Paul Moloney 2003-12-22 |
