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Philip Stephens: Europe clings to past
EFL and paid subscription required, Financial Times A constitution derailed, institutions at war about economic management, a nagging rupture over the transatlantic alliance: times are not easy for admirers of the European Union. This year was supposed to have been a celebration of the new Europe of 25. Instead it risks turning into a painful lament for the old certainties of a divided continent. Clinging to the past, the politicians are recoiling from a different future. There is more to all this than the pique of a weakly-led and soon-to-depart European Commission. ... The complex paradox of this unique supranational institution is that the Union is strong when the constituent governments are strong; and weak when they are weak. When Germany, France and the rest are brimming with confidence, the pooling of sovereignty in Brussels is seen as adding to their national authority: the national and supranational are mutually reinforcing. When governments are weak, though, the EU is cast as a zero sum game. Any gain in the Unionâs authority is seen as a diminution of precious national prerogatives. Well, yes - it is. Duh. So the explanation of the present crisis of confidence starts with the poor economic performance of the past few years, above all within the eurozone. You can take your pick of the explanations. A myopic European Central Bank, the refusal of governments to embrace economic reform, ageing populations and a culture of complacent contentment are on most peopleâs list. The political impact, though, is incontrovertible. Weak economies sap the authority of national leaders; imagination and courage make way for an obsession with political survival. The Union is hardly blessed anyway with strong leaders. Franceâs Jacques Chirac, dismayed by the Unionâs new geography, is as mercurial as he is self-regarding. Gerhard Schröder seems one of those leaders for whom being there touches the limits of ambition. As for Silvio Berlusconi, well, Italyâs premier-cum-media magnate speaks eloquently for himself. There was a time when Tony Blair might have claimed Europeâs leadership. But, for all that he has made Britainâs case in Europe, the prime minister has failed to make Europeâs case in Britain. We knew the moment had passed when he greeted the collapse of last monthâs Brussels summit with the relief of a leader running scared of the Eurosceptics. The frailties of the leaders have been amplified by the destabilising impact of enlargement. The entry of the former communist states has shifted the centre of gravity eastwards. No one quite knows how this shift in the continentâs political geometry will play out. What seems certain - and this explains the deep insecurity in Paris - is that the Franco-German motor is no longer a sufficient source of political energy. Hence Mr Chiracâs enthusiasm for trilateralism, even if it means bringing Mr Blair into the Franco-German fold. Others talk of a still closer Franco-German union as the basis for a new The change in the transatlantic partnership with the US makes this all the more complicated. The divisions over Iraq spoke to a shift that began more than a decade earlier with the end of the cold war. There had always been differences about the relationship with Washington - Franceâs Gaullism co-existed with German Atlanticism. But the alliance was firmly rooted in the US security guarantee and in a common understanding that Americaâs interest lay in a united Europe. The disappearance of the Soviet menace and the preference of the US administration for coalitions of the willing over fixed alliances have shattered the old understandings. in other words, we wonât let you hobble us in quite the old way anymore. Mr Schröder has slipped Washingtonâs reins, while the entry of the former communist states of central Europe has brought into the Union a new, hard-edged Atlanticism. Mr Blair and Mr Chirac offer competing visions of Europeâs place in a global system defined by the American hyper-power. None of Europeâs challenges is insuperable. But neither are they susceptible to institutional fixes. The Union needs its new constitution, not least to give coherence to foreign and security policy. But see below - why does the union need a single foreign and security policy? It must also rebuild the authority of the European Commission. But, much more importantly, Europeâs leaders must come to terms with the Unionâs present purpose. The original ambition - to reconcile Germany and France and to shut out the communist bloc from the continentâs prosperity - belongs to another age. That in itself testifies to the Unionâs success. On this argument, there is no need for the union any longer. ... The Union eventually will agree its new constitution. But what it really needs is political leadership. Stephens almost grasps the problem, but then backs away quickly. Posted by: rkb 2004-01-16 |
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