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Whither Afghanistan?
by Steve WhiteWill America cut out on Afghanistan? In a report leaked to the Guardian, the American commander of forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant-General Stanley McChrystal, states that our current strategy in that unhappy land is not working. As he wrote in the report, "The situation in Afghanistan is serious, but success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort." That sounds suspiciously like General-speak for, simply, what we're doing isn't working, so we need to do something else, something else that we're not doing and don't know how to do right now. Some in the blogosphere and media, left and right, are questioning whether this means that we will or should abandon Afghanistan. While blessedly few pray for a repeat of helicopters flying from the roof of the American embassy in Kabul, there is, to borrow an old New York Times phrase inappropriately applied to President George Bush in late 2001, "a stench of failure" surrounding our current strategy. The Taliban are launching new attacks in areas previously considered to be out of their reach. There are more, and more frequent, western military casualties. Civilians continue to die. The economy, such as it is, remains a wreck in those areas that the Taliban can control or threaten. Some suspect President Barack Obama will pull us out of Afghanistan, despite his 2008 campaign rhetoric arguing that it was Afghanistan, not Iraq, that was central to our effort to defeat terrorism. Liberal Democrats such as Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold are now calling for a "flexible timetable" for a withdrawal, and current public opinion polls show increasing concern over events in that unhappy country. The more trouble Afghanistan becomes, the more likely Obama is to wash his hands of the affair, blaming it (along with most every other troubling issue before him) on his predecessor. Before we castigate President Obama for a withdrawal, however, a question must be answered: What's the goal in Afghanistan? Answer that and you know whether or not we are failing. Answer that and you know what to say to General McChrystal. George Bush, that misunderestimated man, articulated our goals for our operations in Afghanistan in late 2001 -- First, to destroy as much of al-Qaeda as we could and deny them the use of Afghanistan as a base of operations for their large-scale terror and insurgency campaigns. Second, to remove the Taliban from power as a punishment for supporting al-Qaeda. We did destroy much of al-Qaeda, and while we didn't capture Osama bin Laden (a fact that Democrats subsequently seized upon as an American "failure"), he doesn't have the ability today to use Afghanistan as a base of operations. We removed the Taliban from formal power and reduced the territory they hold from 90% to, today, about 20% of the country. We certainly cannot claim "Mission Accomplished" in its entirety but we did what George Bush set out to do, and seven years later we have the responsibility to determine what to do next. So what is the goal in 2009? Are we there for "nation building"? Good luck with that; Afghanistan is firmly rooted in the 10th Century (AD or BC is a fair question) with the thinnest veneer of 20th century life in the cities. The people there are more tribal than on just about any patch of land on the planet. There is no nation to build. If nation-building a single Afghan republic within the current borders is our goal, we have already failed and will continue to fail for the next century. Having gone through our own nation-building in the Americas and Europe over the last five centuries we many times fail to understand that large swaths of Asia simply are not, and will not be for a long time, inhabited by people with a sense of national identity. Are we there to prevent the Taliban from seizing power again? If so the mission is to train those in that country who would oppose the Taliban. We are currently doing that by training the "Afghan National Army". But as just noted there is no nation, and so a "national army" is simply a first-derivative idiocy. If we had generations of time and a background of a more enlightened society, one could build a national army and nation just as our own country built West Point and, over time, a nation. That begs the question of whether there is a nation to build and a sufficient number of people who believe in it to provide critical mass. In Afghanistan today there is not. What might work instead is training the tribal militias so that they could, alone or together, fight the Taliban. That is what the various Tadjik, Uzbek and Herara tribes tried and failed to do before 9/11, but what we helped them to do successfully in the months afterwards. We could re-implement that strategy so as to have them fend off the Pashtun-based Taliban. The risk to that strategy is that these tribes might fight each other as much or more than the Taliban. Such a proposed policy not only rankles our own sense of how the world should be but also puts us in the position of favoring one tribe over another with the potential for blood on our hands. It also reminds us that tribal favoritism was a favored strategy of European colonial powers, perfected in places like the Congo, Rwanda, Burma and the Ivory Coast. But a more enlightened policy of favoritism would be a substantial carrot to dangle to the northern and western tribes in Afghanistan, and one that over time might build a series of proto-nation-states. One could couple military and civil aid to tribes that not only form a bulwark against terrorism and terror-friendly tribes but also commit to peace with tribes that do not threaten them (or us) and, over time, to more Western ideals. Such a strategy would require an intimate knowledge of the people and customs but is not beyond our ability. A realistic policy then would be to work with, train and arm the tribes that are friendly to us and are willing to side with us against terrorists and terror-friendly tribes in Afghanistan. That would require us to abandon the notion of an Afghan nation-state but would allow us to spend our time hunting down al-Qaeda elsewhere in the world. This might require an international mandate: someone would have to speak for the tribes at the international level. A protectorate might be established, much as the one established to look after Micronesia after the Second World War with its many islands and tribes. A NATO mandate would involve enough partners to ensure that no one nation, particularly Pakistan, took advantage of the Afghan tribes. Loose ends might remain: how one might regulate trade in the region, for example, and what one might do about opium poppies grown within the traditional regions of the participating tribes. Over time those problems could be managed as relative peace and prosperity took hold. A confederated government of tribes might stand for the tribes in international affairs. The role of neighbors such as Pakistan and Iran, both of whom would undoubtedly oppose such arrangements, would have to be settled, if necessary by threat of force. No solution is possible until we recognize that Afghanistan as we presently know it is not, and will never be, a nation-state. If we are not willing to acknowledge that cold reality, then we will end up leaving Afghanistan with our self-image and prestige in tatters, much like after Vietnam, and we will contend with yet another generation of thugs, tyrants and terrorists who, unlike us, have learned another lesson about the United States and the West. Posted by: Steve White 2009-09-01 |
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