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McChrystal's Very Human Wired War
McChrystal praised the "aggressive use of technology" that the rest of the conference celebrates. But "by far the hardest part" of networked warfare, he said, was "to create a culture" that gets different military and civilian units linked up by technology fighting as a team. In other words, the technical network won't work without the social one."You don't give a senior leader a Blackberry or an iPhone and make them a digital leader," McChrystal said. Today's commanders might spend endless hours on video conferences talking to their subordinates around the world. But without a "shared consciousness and purpose" across team members who come from very different backgrounds, they might as well close their Skype windows. Reaching the height of its influence under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, net-centric war proponents like the late Vice Adm. Arthur Cebrowski argued that linking troops with better communications and information-tech tools would create a faster, lighter and more efficient military. But those thinkers warned that the gear wouldn't work without an internal cultural shift; some proponents even proposed junking the armed forces' hierarchy to accommodate a new, information-age military. The problem was, the networks were closed loops, and inward-facing. They neglected the need for a military to understand the distinct cultures of populations they interacted with. Without that, the best-connected troops were still hobbled by ignorance. That oversight contributed mightily to the United States' troubles in Iraq and Afghanistan. And it allowed a new generation of military theorists to rise to prominence: the counterinsurgents, who argue that local knowledge and cultural understanding is the best asset a military can cultivate. That, and fighters and ROEs that let the locals know who the strong horse is in no uncertain terms. Posted by: gorb 2011-01-27 |
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