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We’re firing blanks in the war against piracy
In the autumn of 1816, Admiral Lord Exmouth arrived off the port of Algiers with five ships of the line, and orders to use nothing but shot to negotiate with the city’s pirates. In the battle that followed, the British lost 128 men, and their Dutch allies 13. But casualties among the enemy were monumentally greater, as Algiers’s fleet was destroyed and its fortifications levelled. Even though the corsairs of the Barbary coast continued to prey on merchant ships until 1830, when the French occupied Algiers, their backbone was broken – and tens of thousands of lives that would have been lost to the slave trade were saved.

This week, it has emerged that 17 Somali pirates captured by HMS Cornwall in February were given meals, medical check-ups and cigarettes (or, in one case, a nicotine patch) before being set free after the captain was advised that Britain had no legal framework to prosecute them.

It seems incredible, yet it is symptomatic of a far graver problem. Ever since 2008, almost 30 navies have been jointly operating against Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean – a level of international co-operation that has no precedent. Even Iran has a warship in the area. Yet little is being achieved. Jack Lang, the United Nations’ special adviser on piracy, has admitted that nine out of 10 of the hundreds of pirates captured have been released because of legal issues.

The problem, however, is getting worse. Last year, the number of hostages taken rose to 1,065, up from 867 in 2009, 815 in 2008 and just 165 in 2007. Ships are being captured ever further from the Somali coast, and there are disturbing signs that the pirates have become more efficient. Even though the number of unsuccessful attacks fell from 170 in 2009 to 154 last year, successful attacks rose from 48 to 65.Figures published by the International Maritime Bureau show that 587 sailors are now being held, along with 28 ships. This year alone, 14 ships have been hijacked, and 250 hostages taken.

The strange thing, however, is the lack of concern. There’s been none of the outcry we’d have seen if even a tenth of that number of pilots were being held at Mogadishu airport. It’s hard to see why, given that 92 per cent of Britain’s trade is conducted by sea, and piracy adds no small amount to the price of the fuel that heats our homes, the goods we export and the food we eat. Anna Bowden, a maritime expert, has estimated that the total cost to the world is as much as £7.5 billion a year – up to £2 billion in extra insurance premiums, another £2 billion or so to re-route ships through safer waters, £1.5 billion for security equipment, and some £1.25 billion to maintain international forces in the Indian Ocean.

Somalia’s pirate cartels have their roots in a failed state: the country has had no government or law enforcement since 1991. Its administration, besieged by the powerful jihadist group al-Shabaab, has no influence outside Mogadishu, the capital. Communities, administrators and even less-than-scrupulous bankers have been seduced by the cash the cartels have brought into port towns such as Haradhere, Eyl, Garard and Ras Asir – £108 million last year. Earlier this month, for example, the Thai-owned Thor Nexus and its 27 crew, hijacked 350 miles off the coast of Oman on Christmas Day, were ransomed for £3 million; last year, £5.75 million was paid for a South Korean ship.

The central problem is that where nation states break down, international law just doesn’t have a structure for dispensing large-scale justice. Kenya and the Seychelles have been hosting trials of pirates, but they simply can’t cope with the numbers. Last year, a court in the United States handed down convictions in the first piracy trial the country had seen in two centuries. A subsequent trial, though, has been delayed until November because of issues over evidence. Similar problems have been seen in India, while South Korea fears that the five pirates it is now trying could even press a claim for asylum after completing their sentence.

On Monday, the UN Security Council agreed to set up special courts to try pirates, but there is no consensus on where they will operate and how prosecutions will be handled. And patience is running out. Last summer, Russian special forces stormed the Moscow University oil tanker, killing one of the 11 pirates holding the ship. The authorities claimed to have released the rest of the pirates, but then mysteriously reported that “they could not reach the coast and, apparently, have all died”. Dmitry Medvedev, Russia’s president, gave some indication of what that meant when he said the country would “have to do what our forefathers did when they met the pirates until the international community comes up with a legal way of prosecuting them”. Ship-owners, for their part, have been deploying armed guards, who can charge up to $50,000 per voyage, and hardening defences for their crew.

Ultimately, however, no amount of warships and arrests are going to solve the problem. In March, the US government said a naval analysis had “estimated that 1,000 ships equipped with helicopters would be required to provide the same level of coverage in the Indian Ocean that is currently provided in the Gulf of Aden –an approach that is clearly infeasible”.

That leaves just one option, which no one so far has wanted to take: punitive action against the pirates’ bases on the Somali coast. As in 1816, the risks are considerable. But it is increasingly clear that the easier, softer way is leading nowhere.
Posted by: 2011-04-14
http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php?ID=320403