Dissension Grows In Senior Ranks On War Strategy
EFL
Deep divisions are emerging at the top of the U.S. military over the course of the occupation of Iraq, with some senior officers beginning to say that the United States faces the prospect of casualties for years without achieving its goal of establishing a free and democratic Iraq. Their major worry is that the United States is prevailing militarily but failing to win the support of the Iraqi people. That view is far from universal, but it is spreading and being voiced publicly for the first time. Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., the commander of the 82nd Airborne Division, who spent much of the year in western Iraq, said he believes that at the tactical level at which fighting occurs, the U.S. military is still winning. But when asked whether he believes the United States is losing, he said, "I think strategically, we are."
Too bad he doesnât provide any details, because his comment doesnât track well with whatâs going on across Iraq, and his region has always been the major problem.
Army Col. Paul Hughes, who last year was the first director of strategic planning for the U.S. occupation authority in Baghdad, said he agrees with that view and noted that a pattern of winning battles while losing a war characterized the U.S. failure in Vietnam. "Unless we ensure that we have coherency in our policy, we will lose strategically," he said in an interview Friday.
Again, generalized blather that doesnât track with observed reality. He doesnât see the coherence of current strategy? Perhaps current strategy is flawed, but how about some specifics -- no, make that LOTS of specifics -- on exactly how, and exactly what he suggests as alternative.
The emergence of sharp differences over U.S. strategy has set off a debate, a year after the United States ostensibly won a war in Iraq,
(ostensibly?!!! The ability to write and publish sentences like this is what has made modern elite journalism the laughable product it is)
about how to preserve that victory. The core question is how to end a festering insurrection that has stymied some reconstruction efforts, made many Iraqis feel less safe and created uncertainty about who actually will run the country after the scheduled turnover of sovereignty June 30. Inside and outside the armed forces, experts generally argue that the U.S. military should remain there but should change its approach. Some argue for more troops, others for less, but they generally agree on revising the stated U.S. goals to make them less ambitious. They are worried by evidence that the United States is losing ground with the Iraqi public.
Translation: we donât really have any ideas, except to ditch our objectives and settle for something less.
Some officers say the place to begin restructuring U.S. policy is by ousting Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, whom they see as responsible for a series of strategic and tactical blunders over the past year.
(specific list, please?)
Several of those interviewed said a profound anger is building within the Army at Rumsfeld and those around him.
(thatâs nice, now how about some ideas that make sense?)
A senior general at the Pentagon said he believes the United States is already on the road to defeat. "It is doubtful we can go on much longer like this," he said. "The American people may not stand for it -- and they should not."
(if our military were generally made of stuff like this, weâd perform like the Iraqi Army of old -- pathetic!)
Asked who was to blame, this general pointed directly at Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz. "I do not believe we had a clearly defined war strategy, end state and exit strategy before we commenced our invasion," he said. "Had someone like Colin Powell been the chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], he would not have agreed to send troops without a clear exit strategy. The current OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] refused to listen or adhere to military advice."
What a load of hooey. "If only we had Colin charge". We had a clearly defined war strategy -- which worked brilliantly despite your objections, pal, and with only 2/3 of even Rummyâs plan due to the 4th ID sitting on ships while the fighting was going on. "Exit strategy" is a concept for journalists and academics. Success is the concept we expect of public officials. We always have the option of adjusting our acceptable end-state. Again, exactly what "exit strategy" would this genius have incorporated in the ignored advice, and how would it be any different than conquer, pacify, stabilize, and adapt as you do so?
"Thereâs no question that weâre facing some difficulties," Wolfowitz said. "I donât mean to sound Pollyannaish -- we all know that weâre facing a tough problem." But, he said, "I think the course weâve set is the right one, which is moving as rapidly as possible to Iraqi self-government and Iraqi self-defense." Wolfowitz, who is widely seen as the intellectual architect of the Bush administrationâs desire to create a free and democratic Iraq that will begin the transformation of the politics of the Middle East, also strongly rejected the idea of scaling back on that aim. "The goal has never been to win the Olympic high jump in democracy," he said. Moving toward democratization in Iraq will take time, he said. Yet, he continued, "I donât think the answer is to find some old Republican Guard generals and have them impose yet another dictatorship in an Arab country."
But Wolfie doesnât understand -- all US objectives must be achieved instantly, painlessly, and in a way that ensures an expansion of the budget for Army heavy divisions. Geez, what a rube he must be.
The top U.S. commander in the war also said he strongly disagrees with the view that the United States is heading toward defeat in Iraq. "We are not losing, militarily," Army Gen. John Abizaid said in an interview Friday. He said that the U.S. military is winning tactically. But he stopped short of being as positive about the overall trend. Rather, he said, "strategically, I think there are opportunities." The prisoner abuse scandal and the continuing car bombings and U.S. casualties "create the image of a military thatâs not being effective in the counterinsurgency," he said. But in reality, "the truth of the matter is . . . there are some good signals out there"...
Much more at the link...
The anger and bitterness of the Army is never explained. Vague and sometimes obviously ill-founded gripes about strategy hardly explain it. Is there anything more at work here than the fear of Rummy changing the service most in need of dramatic change? Was the Crusader cancellation an unforgivable assault on the establishment? Is it the frustration of having been proved spectacularly wrong about both Afghanistan and Iraq, where the decision to discard much of the consensus professional advice was vindicated?
With all due respect to the Army, most of which helps make our armed forces the best and most admirable ever fielded, there seems to be a group of officers who are strategically clueless, parochial, whiny, and spineless. Itâs hard to imagine this sort of crew in WWII -- weâd have reconsidered the war after Kasserine Pass, and one week of Okinawa would have been "game over" for these guys.
Itâs eerily appropriate that Tom Ricks did this article for the WaPo. He wrote the infamous "quagmire" article last March, arguably the dumbest war article ever published in the modern era. Seems he went to many of the same "sources" for this -- the whiny, apocalyptic, vague, substance-free bitching sounds familiar.
Posted by: Verlaine 2004-05-09 |