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Al Qaedaâs Next Strike
No link yet, so posting it all
Summary
Al Qaeda likely has a number of sleeper cells still embedded in the United States, and logic dictates that Houston, Texas, is high on their target list.
Analysis
In our last Terrorism Intelligence Weekly, Stratfor discussed improvements in intelligence-gathering efforts that have aided the ability of Western governments to predict or pre-empt attacks. At the same time, however, the threat within the continental United States -- where al Qaeda is likely to attempt a major strike before the presidential elections -- also has intensified. Logic dictates that Washington, New York, Dallas, Houston or Austin, Texas, could be targeted in an attack that quite possibly would involve a "dirty bomb." Continuing with this line of reasoning, Houston appears to be the most likely target.
Sleeper Cell Tactics
Concerns over the safety of U.S. citizens are legitimate. Well- placed U.S. government counterterrorism sources have confirmed the presence of al Qaeda "sleeper cells" within the country. Although it is not known how many cells could be in place, intelligence indicates that militant operatives are in place, to be deployed for the next Sept. 11- or Madrid-style attacks. Analysis leads us to believe that a cell could be in place in Houston.
Sleeper cells are difficult to ferret out -- with profiles that do not differ greatly from those of the rest of the public. Like the Sept. 11 attackers, militant operatives do not hesitate to violate Islamic custom by shaving, dressing and behaving so as to blend into their temporary communities. As a group, they are overwhelmingly male, they are typically physically fit, and they often practice martial arts -- sometimes in formal school settings. Their identities may be false, but not always. However, it is their actions -- not their appearance, ethnicity or religion -- that can expose sleeper cells and help intelligence and law enforcement agencies to disrupt attacks.
First, these militant units are not totally independent: Courier services are used to send money and orders to operatives, whose leaders frequently have had contact with members of other cells. If one operative is arrested, pocket litter and phone records can lead authorities to other cells. And there certainly are opportunities for arrests. Sleeper cells fund some of their activities through credit card and financial fraud, and members often use false identification documents. Elements of these crimes are much easier than terrorism charges to prove in court, which gives police and federal officials some traction in disrupting attack planning. Other activities also provide clues: The premier example, of course, is that the Sept. 11 team had to learn how to fly airplanes -- but more universally, virtually all terrorist attacks follow a period of eyes-on surveillance of the target.
At the tactical level, counterterrorism experts have observed that members of al Qaedaâs sleeper cells carry out many duties within their units -- which increases the chances that an arrest could throw off a planned attack. For example, analysis of past attacks has revealed that the same members tasked with carrying out preoperational surveillance for a strike also work on the logistics and attack teams. Operationally, this places them at greater risk than groups who use highly trained, specialized cells for each function. Moreover, a study of past al Qaeda attacks and training manuals reveals that the group carries out extensive preoperational surveillance. This renders militants vulnerable to detection by countersurveillance teams, who could trail them back to the rest of their cells -- the bomb-makers and attack teams. For intelligence and law enforcement agencies, this is the best time to pre-empt a terrorist attack: If one militant can be caught conducting preoperational surveillance, the entire cell can be uncovered and destroyed. In the two-and-a-half years since the Sept. 11 attacks, the efforts of the FBI and CIA to root out these cells have paid dividends. FBI Director Robert Mueller asserts that federal officials have disrupted dozens of planned attacks, and sleeper agents have been uncovered and deported. However, we do not believe that all of al Qaedaâs sleeper cells have been identified or crippled. In addition to pre-existing cells, al Qaeda also has had plenty of time to infiltrate more operatives into the United States.
In the span since Sept. 11, al Qaeda also has had opportunities to conduct surveillance of its next target, plan out the attack and fine-tune operational details. In the past, al Qaeda attacks have occurred at a particular pace: Stratfor on several occasions has noted a two- to three-year span between major actions by "al Qaeda prime," interspersed with numerous, smaller strikes that likely are carried out by affiliated groups, with or without al Qaedaâs support. Within those operations, there also are predictable patterns of activity. The pre-operational surveillance period is the most effective phase in which to interrupt an attack -- but few law enforcement and corporate security agencies have the expertise to take advantage of this weakness.
Why Houston -- and How?
For the next major al Qaeda strike, preoperational surveillance is likely under way. The timing for an attack within the United States is nearly perfect: while Americans are engrossed with Iraq, presidential politics and the rising price of oil. Logic dictates that cells are in place and awaiting a signal to act; as in the recent attack in the Saudi city of Yanbu, operatives could have had time to infiltrate the potential target, observing the lay of the land and the routines of security forces. Although Stratfor believes that strikes could be carried out against multiple targets of opportunity, certain factors -- including time and al Qaedaâs targeting criteria -- lead us to conclude that Houston, Texas, is near the top of the list. Not only is it home to much of the nationâs oil infrastructure, which carries significant economic implications, but it also is a city of 5 million people -- and the home of former President George H.W. Bush. A strike here would lend a personal nature to the attack that would send a clear message across the desk of President George W. Bush.
In our view, the strike would be sophisticated and spectacular. It likely would involve either a dirty bomb deployed within the city, or a conventional attack against oil infrastructure, carried out on the scale of Sept. 11. In this case, we believe a truck bomb is the most likely delivery mechanism -- perhaps a stolen delivery van, helping to mask the driverâs intentions. This scenario was discussed by a sleeper cell in New York City before the first World Trade Center attack in 1993, and al Qaeda has shown a tendency to return to previous attack plans. The assailants might use a ramming car to break through perimeter fences while either shooting or running over security guards. However, it also is feasible that they could use legitimate company identification cards in order to slip past the guards. Once near the target, the explosive would be detonated, killing the attack team. A truck bombing would succeed in taking out only a small portion of an oil complex, whereas a stolen or hijacked airplane could cause much greater damage. At an oil processing facility, this type of strike would have a psychological impact on the American public -- creating a smoky explosion that would be broadcast far and wide.
Strikes against supertankers also are plausible. Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden recognize that oil drives the U.S. economy. Returning again to proven tactics, they could choose to strike at platforms in the Houston Ship Channel -- much like the successful strikes against the French tanker Limburg and the USS Cole, and the failed attempt against the USS The Sullivans. This scenario is a classic asymmetrical operation: The sleeper cell, roused to activity, will operate as a military unit and will overcome the immediate response by police or security forces. A short time is all the militants will need. Because it is asymmetrical, the strike will target and overcome security forces at their weakest point. It would be over before a strong response could be mounted.
This forecast is not cheerful, but if corporate security forces can learn new skills -- quickly -- that allow them to disrupt attacks early in the surveillance stage, this outcome could be thwarted.
Posted by: tipper 2004-05-22 |
http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php?ID=33663 |
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