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BRAVERY, BLOOD & LIES
Excerpt...... Each confrontation has its own requirements in Iraq. In Fallujah, we had an opportunity to strike swiftly and eliminate several hundred terrorists. Instead, the decision was made to hand the city over to our enemies to achieve a "peaceful solution." The result? Ambushes and roadside bombs continue to kill Marines in the Fallujah area - Marines who fought bravely and well, only to see victory snatched from their hands by their own superiors. In the broader insurgency led by the renegade Shia cleric Sadr, the military task was more complex. With outbreaks of violence in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, as well as in a teeming Baghdad slum, the Army faced the risk of alienating the greater Shia population if sacred shrines were violated or civilian casualties soared. But our commanders on the ground also had advantages, which they seized. Sadr's thugs had no deep support - on the contrary, local people wanted them to leave their neighborhoods and stop misusing sacred sites. No senior cleric supported Sadr, a vainglorious junior mullah. And we had good intelligence - some of it coming from the population Sadr pretended to represent. The Army couldn't just blast its way into downtown Najaf or Karbala, given the religious sensitivities involved. Instead, troops from our 1st Armored Division, "Old Ironsides," methodically peeled away one layer of resistance after another. Shrines weren't violated. Civilians were spared. Damage was minimized. Yet, thanks to the skill of our soldiers and their leaders, Sadr's gangsters were slaughtered by the hundreds. In some Shia areas, Sadr's "uprising" proved to be much ado about nothing and swiftly collapsed. Elsewhere, fighting raged. In Sadr City, the Baghdad slum, our soldiers promptly moved to take control - recognizing that Sadr had drawn most of his recruits from its fetid alleys. Meanwhile, battalion task forces from the 1st AD cordoned the holy cities. With precision and patience, they avoided traps set by the militiamen that would have profaned the sacred tomb complexes. Fighting door-to-door and through a vast cemetery, they staged lightning raids in the hours of darkness, keeping the enemy under pressure. Whenever Sadr's militiamen made the mistake of coming out to fight, the soldiers from the "First Tank" efficiently helped them achieve martyrdom - with remarkably low friendly or civilian losses. As weeks of skillful fighting approach a climax, Sadr's thugs have been driven from Karbala, Najaf has quieted and our forces have punched deep into his stronghold of Kufa. His militia has been broken. His deputies have been arrested or killed. And Sadr himself is cornered, physically and politically. Now comes the most dangerous phase of the operation. With our troops on the verge of bringing Sadr to justice, the only thing we have to fear is yet another intervention by the guys in ties. If we snatch defeat from the jaws of victory again by letting Sadr off the hook, we will throw away the textbook example of success our Army just delivered. Sadr needs to come out of his hiding place in handcuffs or in a shroud. Writing for my fellow soldiers 10 years ago, I warned that one of the consistent American weaknesses in the future would be the impulse of our own diplomats to rush to the rescue of our enemies just when our military had them on the ropes. It happened in Fallujah. We can't afford to let it happen again. Don't worry about making a martyr out of Sadr. Even his fellow Shias want him dead. Posted by: tipper 2004-05-26 |
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