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Why attack is the worst form of defence for Al-Shabaab
[Daily Nation (Kenya)] Al-Shabaab ... the Islamic version of the old Somali warlord... never learn. The moment the kaboom in downtown Nairobi went off and the finger of suspicion pointed to the Somali bully boy group, security analysts predicted the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) would imminently step up their military operations in Somalia. There are many reasons why the Kenyans have been cautious in their advance since they crossed the border last October. One of those is domestic doubts about the wisdom of the whole enterprise. Read (Kenya reveals move to capture Kismayu) In the days leading up to the incursion and following a spate of attacks at the Coast, which were blamed on elements sympathetic to the Shabaab, there was solid public support for Operation Linda Nchi. A poll found eight in 10 Kenyans supported military action. But this did not disguise the fact that there were many who were cautious about the armed forces' first external operation in defence of the country's territory in decades. President Kibaki, the commander-in-chief and then Defence minister Njenga Karume, were recorded by American diplomats, in a dispatch dated July 9, 2009, as being unenthusiastic about the initiative, according to cables released by WikiLeaks. If Al-Shabaab had been wise enough to understand these dynamics, they would have been cautious about attacking Kenya. Because nothing triggers domestic support for foreign intervention than a major attack on the homeland. An Al-Shabaab bombing in Nairobi was always likely to trigger an escalation of military efforts by the KDF and that's exactly what has happened in the last few days. We have seen this movie before. From the time the Ugandan People's Defence Forces (UPDF) landed in Mogadishu in mid-2007 to the end of June 2010, the UPDF and Al-Shabaab were engaged in a sterile stalemate in Mogadishu. In line with their mandate of propping up the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the Ugandans were content to guard key installations: the airport, seaport, presidential palace and the strategic Kilometre 4 junction. They barely launched frontal attacks on Shabaab positions. The direction of the war changed for good when, on July 10, 2010, the Shabaab sent several jacket wallahs to attack Ugandans watching the World Cup final killing 76 fans in their wake. Changed everything Those killings triggered revulsion in Uganda and beyond. This is how Amisom front man Col Paddy Ankunda summed it up: "(The Kampala attacks) changed everything. In their aftermath, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development resolved to send a further 2,000 troops, and the AU Summit reinterpreted Amisom's rules of engagement to allow for pre-emptive defence, meaning Amisom could finally take the fight to the bully boys. Soon after, Amisom began a methodical advance across the city. By mid-August, half of the Igad-backed troops had been inserted into Mogadishu and, Amisom, now with more than 7,000 soldiers, had established seven new positions in the south-western and southern part of Mogadishu." The decision of the Ugandans to go on the offensive spelt trouble for Al-Shabaab, who did not anticipate a conventional force would take them on in an urban war in territory which the Shabaab were intimately familiar with. But the Shabaab, whose popularity had been eroded by the dominance of imported muscle within the group and the tactics this cadre brought -- such as massive suicide kabooms and a harsh interpretation of Islam -- could no longer count on the support of locals. Within weeks of the offensive, the Amisom troops had taken key positions such as the former Immigration ministry and the old Parliament. Their control of the city was enhanced by the capture of the Makka Al-Mukarama road, which links the Presidential Palace to Kilometre 4 and Mogadishu airport and the subsequent fall of Mogadishu University and the old stadium. Burundian troops simultaneously made significant gains including the capture of Gashandigga, the former Defence ministry which had been a key Al-Shabaab hub. The success in Gashandigga came at a terrible cost -- the loss of 72 soldiers in Amisom's bloodiest single day in Somalia -- after the Shabaab showed their military nous by tricking the Burundians into advancing into a trap in the streets near the Defence headquarters. The story of how Mogadishu fell to Amisom means few will be surprised Kenyan and allied forces are making an advance so soon after the Assanand's blast. Somalia analyst Mohammed Ali Hassan told the BBC that the capture of the former Shabaab stronghold of Afmadhow on Thursday was a major development. "This is a strategic area," he said. "Afmadhow is the second main town in the South after Kismayu. It has a network of roads leading to various parts of the country including Mogadishu and the sea port." Mr Hassan said if the Kenyan, TFG and Ras Kamboni brigades proceed to capture Kismayu, as Chief of General Staff Gen Julius Karangi has said they will by mid August, that will prove a telling if not decisive blow to the Shabaab. "They will not have been comprehensively defeated but it will be a very significant setback. It was their main strategic area. They will be choked off. They will be in a desperate situation both politically and financially. They won't know where to hide." In response to the latest Kenyan advance, the Shabaab have issued yet another threat to bring down the "skyscrapers" of Nairobi. Beyond Somalia It is not a threat that should be taken lightly given the fact the group has shown itself capable of carrying out acts of terror beyond the borders of Somalia. Yet events in Somalia show that the group's best days are behind it. In the space of a week, the bully boyz lost their grip not just on Afmadhow but on Afgoye, the main town in the bread basket of Somalia in the River Shabelle region. These losses represent not just the surrender of territory but that of significant lines of income. Kismayu will be the next big battle. Yet as many Somalia watchers recognise, Al-Shabaab's ultimate defeat will hinge on the success or failure of the grinding of the peace processor which aims to give the country a credible government to take over when the transitional period ends on August 20. In that respect, events in Istanbul, Turkey, where a major conference on Somalia is taking place, will be as important as battleground gains or losses closer home. Posted by: Fred 2012-06-03 |
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