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Russia's Syrian Base: A Potemkin Port?
According to media reports, Russia pays $2 million per year in leasing fees for its base at Tartus. In comparison, in 2009 Moscow provided a $2 billion aid package to Kyrgyzstan to encourage the country’s leaders to shut down the U.S air base at Manas (though the Kyrgyz government ultimately permitted the base to reopen). This would have been enough to cover the fees in Damascus for a millennium. Moreover, even with its low costs and with a military budget that doubled in the decade from 2001–2011, Russia’s Defense Ministry has allowed its Tartus facility—the only Russian military base outside the former USSR—to fall apart. While Russian officials have in the past announced plans to modernize and expand the country’s presence at Tartus, it is difficult to know whether the plans were serious even before Syria’s protests spiraled into civil war. Whatever Moscow’s original intent, however, upgrading the base now seems like a remote prospect. The base has minimal military value—it can host high-profile visits by a few ships and allow them to spend a little more time in the Mediterranean Sea but probably could not sustain any extended or large-scale military operation.

Some commentators look at the limited benefits that Tartus offers to Russia’s military and draw the erroneous conclusion that Russia has little at stake in Syria. This is superficial and foolish. Rather than looking to Russia’s access to Tartus as irrelevant or, conversely, seeing it as the driving force behind Moscow’s policy, those striving to understand Russian objectives in Syria would do well to consider using a little nuance and common sense.

First, national interests are subjective rather than objective. Second, symbolism can be an important national interest. Credibility and the perception of strength are almost as important as real power and often can spare nations the expense of exercising their power, something especially desirable to those who may in fact have little of it to employ.

It’s not so much that Tartus is Russia’s only military base outside the former Soviet region but that the Middle East is the only region outside the former USSR where Russia continues to enjoy visible influence. If Russia were to abandon Syria, or to suffer a political defeat, officials may fear losing influence in the Middle East peace process and in international discussions of Iran’s nuclear program. Without visibility on those two issues, Russia’s international profile would be much reduced.
Posted by: 2012-07-20
http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php?ID=348772