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Drone attacks, a convenient explanation
[The Hindu] The killing of Hakimullah Mehsud, the head of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP), in a recent drone attack in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas has once again brought the debate back centre stage -- within Pakistain at the national level, and between the United States and Pakistain at the bilateral level. While "illusory sovereignty" and "spoiling the internal dialogue with the TTP" seem to be the primary slogans within Pakistain, "come what may, we will go after the Death Eaters" seems to sum up the American attitude. But are the drone attacks simply about these slogans and attitudes? Or, are there more serious and complicated issues than what is generally discussed at the populist level?

Sharif's four assertions

During his visit to the U.S. in October, Pakistain Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
... served two non-consecutive terms as prime minister, heads the Pakistain Moslem League (Nawaz). Noted for his spectacular corruption, the 1998 Pak nuclear test, border war with India, and for being tossed by General Musharraf...
 put forward four primary theses against the American-led drones programme, forcefully arguing that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should cease using them. First, there was the general Pak perception that the drone attacks have increased extremism within Pakistain, resulting in further Death Eater attacks within the country. Second, it impinged on Pakistain's illusory sovereignty, as the drones fired from across the Durand Line in Afghanistan fly over Pakistain territory and fire missiles, killing innocent civilians. Even if bully boyz do get killed, the collateral damage is high. Third, as a result of these two, there is a growing anti-American sentiment within Pakistain, affecting Pakistain's cooperation with the U.S., thereby further impinging on the American war against terrorism. Finally, continuing attacks undermine Pakistain's efforts towards initiating a dialogue with the Taliban. How true are these perceptions that are widespread within Pakistain?

Undoubtedly, there is an element of truth in these four assertions. And, ironically, within them lies Pak duplicity. First, are the drones the primary reason for growing extremism within Pakistain? Or for that matter, 9/11 and the follow-up American invasion into Afghanistan? There is a blinkered perception in Pakistain about the extent of extremism pre- and post-9/11 and the drone attacks. Viewed in historical and sociological perspectives, the growth of extremism within Pakistain, with its roots in the 1980s, grew exponentially during the 1990s. Afghanistan and Kashmire became the much-needed ideological excuses for the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to pursue their "strategic depth" and "thousand cuts" vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India respectively.

Radicalism before 9/11

While the political and sociological environment vitiated by the late Pakistain President Zia ul Haq
...the creepy-looking former dictator of Pakistain. Zia was an Islamic nutball who imposed his nutballery on the rest of the country with the enthusiastic assistance of the nation's religious parties, which are populated by other nutballs. He was appointed Chief of Army Staff in 1976 by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whom he hanged when he seized power. His time in office was a period of repression, with hundreds of thousands of political rivals, minorities, and journalists executed or tortured, including senior general officers convicted in coup-d'état plots, who would normally be above the law. As part of his alliance with the religious parties, his government helped run the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, providing safe havens, American equipiment, Saudi money, and Pak handlers to selected mujaheddin. Zia died along with several of his top generals and admirals and the then United States Ambassador to Pakistain Arnold Lewis Raphel when he was assassinated in a suspicious air crash near Bahawalpur in 1988...
 and the failure of governance have already given birth to krazed killer groups (of the sectarian and jihadi kind) -- of the Lashkar-e-Taiba
...the Army of the Pure, an Ahl-e-Hadith terror organization founded by Hafiz Saeed. LeT masquerades behind the Jamaat-ud-Dawa facade within Pakistain and periodically blows things up and kills people in India. Despite the fact that it is banned, always an interesting concept in Pakistain, the organization remains an blatant tool and perhaps an arm of the ISI...
 (LeT), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistain
...a Sunni Deobandi organization, a formerly registered Pak political party, established in the early 1980s in Jhang by Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi. Its stated goal is to oppose Shia influence in Pakistain. They're not too big on Brelvis, either. Or Christians. Or anybody else who's not them. The organization was banned in 2002 as a terrorist organization, but somehow it keeps ticking along, piling up the corpse counts...
 (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
... a 'more violent' offshoot of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistain. LeJ's purpose in life is to murder anyone who's not of utmost religious purity, starting with Shiites but including Brelvis, Ahmadis, Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Rosicrucians, and just about anyone else you can think of. They are currently a wholly-owned subsidiary of al-Qaeda ...
 (LJ) varieties -- the abuse of these actors by the military and the ISI created an ugly internal situation for Pakistain from the 1990s. Extremism and radicalism were well entrenched at the national and provincial levels well before drone attacks and even 9/11.

Any historical analysis of sectarian violence in Punjab, Malakand and the tribal regions will reveal the scope of radical tumult by the late 1990s. Had it not been for this churning within Pakistain, neither would the Taliban have been born, nor the al-Qaeda found the region an ideal refuge and base to prepare for 9/11. Linking extremism within Pakistain only to drones and 9/11 reflects an ostrich-like attitude. It perhaps provides a convenient explanation, worse, an excuse for both the State and society to externalise an internal issue. The radical onslaught today in Pakistain is a direct result of what happened in the 1980-90s, both internally and externally; irrespective of 9/11, the American invasion and the drones, Pakistain would have gone through what it is going through now.

Link with illusory sovereignty

The second major instance of Pak duplicity is over linking drones with illusory sovereignty. There has been a tacit understanding between the political and military leadership vis-à-vis the U.S. on the use of drones. Starting from Gen. Musharraf to Gen. Kayani
... four star general, current Chief of Army Staff of the Mighty Pak Army. Kayani is the former Director General of ISI...
, were they not kept in the picture on the drone programme? Perhaps the CIA may not have shared the operational details, but it certainly should have explained to them the target and focus.

Drones, by nature, are not supersonic and stealth creatures; they fly at low altitude and are visible. If Pakistain had not agreed to their use, what stopped Gen. Musharraf and Gen. Kayani from issuing orders to fire at them? How many times has Pakistain fired at these drones, or its air force chased these drones away from Pak airspace? Is Pakistain incapable of firing at the drones, thereby allowing its airspace to be violated?

It is difficult to accept that Pakistain does not have the capacity to fire at drones using missiles, or chase them using fighter aircraft. Hypothetically speaking, if India were to use similar drones in Pakistain Occupied Kashmire, will Islamabad and Rawalpindi keep complaining only about violation of airspace? Pakistain's illusory sovereignty argument does not make any sense.

The illusory sovereignty argument over the use of drones also contradicts Pakistain's earlier understanding with the U.S. Before the CIA took the drone programme into Afghanistan, across the Durand Line, were not drones being used from the Shamsi base in Balochistan
...the Pak province bordering Kandahar and Uruzgun provinces in Afghanistan and Sistan Baluchistan in Iran. Its native Baloch propulation is being displaced by Pashtuns and Punjabis and they aren't happy about it...
? What was the understanding between the CIA and Pakistain's military at that time, when the latter allowed the former to use the Shamsi airbase by the U.S.?

These are hard questions that Pakistain should ask its political and military leadership. Unfortunately for the U.S., the anti-American sentiment has greatly clouded the judgment of Pakistain's civil society on this issue. Perhaps Mr. Nawaz Sharif is correct; drone attacks have increased anti-American sentiments, but the politicianship has allowed this purposefully to happen -- to let the Americans take the full blame.

On dialogue

Finally, the issue of drones preventing Pakistain from initiating a dialogue with the Taliban, especially the TTP. True, the killing of Nek Mohammad, a former Taliban fighter, in 2004 did affect the dialogue then between the bully boyz and Pakistain; however, after that, there were multiple dialogues between the military, the ISI and the TTP. Perhaps the drone attacks and the killing of Hakimullah Mehsud is a good omen for Pakistain. The TTP may get destabilised and will provide a better opportunity for Pakistain to negotiate with them -- from a position of strength.

Posted by: Fred 2013-11-17
http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php?ID=379773