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Russia's Syrian entanglement: Can the West sit back and watch?
 Longish article excerpted.[Brookings.edu] The composite air regiment on the no-frills airbase includes fighters and helicopters of at least five different types. That creates a logistical nightmare, since all supplies have to be shipped by the several naval transports from Novorossiysk and Sevastopol. Several transport aircraft can add only so much to this stretched supply line, so the intervention has to be aimed at achieving some tangible results as soon as possible. The deployment to Latakia of a squadron of Su-25 light fighter-bombers and a squadron of Mi-24 attack helicopters indicates that the main task of this force is not medium-range strikes on high-value assets (on which Russia has scant intelligence data) but close air support. Such a high-risk mission only makes sense if the government troops and Alawite militias launch an offensive operation, most probably aimed at securing the Latakia province from the attacks from the north, where the Nusra Front has been active. A key condition for such an offensive is that the government forces-together with Hezbollah troops-can stabilize the front around Damascus, where Russian squadrons dare not to show up. Damascus remains the center of gravity in this mutating civil war, even if Latakia is of particular importance as the home-ground for the Assad Alawi clan. What makes control over Damascus more precarious than ever is the possibility that Russian intervention would compel various opposition forces-who until now have focused on fighting one another as eagerly as they fight the government-to unite against the "infidels". The burning issue for the coming days is whether the lack of meaningful results from the air strikes would prompt the Russian leadership to deploy ground forces. Two obstacles stand in the way of such rapid deployment. Firstly, despite the effective ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, the best troops in the Russian army remain concentrated in or near the Donbass war zone. The approaching autumnal draft cycle will deliver the usual sharp decline in the combat readiness of the ground forces, as the better-trained half of soldiers in every unit goes home and raw recruits fill the ranks. Secondly, transporting and supplying tanks and heavy weapons for even one battalion tactical group of about 1,000 soldiers would be an extremely hard challenge for the already-stretched capabilities for strategic air and sea-lift. Counter moves. A series of terrorist attacks may shatter the security of the Latakia base, which makes it a very attractive target indeed. Rebels may also use Katyusha missiles for hitting the over-crowded airstrip. Objection. Leading the witness. Finally, the United States and its allies could deliver a series of airstrikes on the Hezbollah bands around Damascus. That would be less confrontational vis-a-vis Russia than hitting Assad's forces. Hezbollah has already suffered losses in the Syrian war and is not particularly motivated to stand with Assad to the bitter end, away from own home-ground in Lebanon. (Israel would appreciate such punishment, too.) Posted by: Sven the pelter 2015-10-10 |
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