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Back to the Bloody Future
The Iraqi Army is down to just five active divisions, but even those are less -- and in some ways more -- than they seem. One army division is now under informal militia command, according to U.S. and other Western military officers. Shi'ite paramilitary elements have taken at least partial control of the Interior Ministry, according to security officers, Iraqi politicians and U.S. military officials. The Iraqi government rejects that claim. The Shi'ite militias, which dominate most frontlines, say they support the government and pose no threat to Iraq's minority Sunni sect. The Popular Mobilisation Committee, or Hashid Shaabi, as the militias are collectively known, belongs "to the Iraqi government," said Naim al-Aboudi, a spokesman for the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia. "The Hashid doesn't represent a sect. It represents all Iraqis." But the militias make no secret of their independence from Baghdad. Militia leader Amiri warned in a televised interview last month that if the Shi'ite groups did not approve of U.S. military operations in Iraq, "We can go to Abadi and the government and ... pressure them: 'Either you will do this, or we will do that.'" Amiri did not specify what action his group would take. The first essential attribute of government is that it enjoys a monopoly on the legal use of force within its jurisdiction. Iraq fails this test, badly. Given Iranian meddling, ISIS firepower, U.S. fecklessness, and the boldness of the local militias, Baghdad seems unlikely to ever again fulfill that first essential function even if the fight against ISIS is ever won. ...If recent years in upper Mesopotamia are any indicator (and I believe they are), then the instability which allowed ISIS to thrive is likely to metastasize to the wider Arab world -- pushing my envisioned "steady-city-state" endgame even further into the future. Getting there, no matter how long it takes, requires a complete rethinking of our approach to the region. We need to shift our focus away from bogus capitals which pretend to govern bogus countries. Instead we must try working with (or against) the Arab equivalent of big-city ward heelers. And we'll need a White House, a State Department, and a Pentagon able to effectively and quickly apply our statecraft with flexibility, ingenuity, cynicism, and sometimes force to an ever-shifting landscape. Those are not typically American strengths, but we'd best learn them quickly. Posted by: g(r)omgoru 2015-10-23 |
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