|
Lessons from Israel's Success in War on Palestinian Terror
Rather than calling the terrorism assault a war, Israelis reflexively adopted the misleading Palestinian term intifada--implying an unarmed civilian uprising against an armed occupation. In fact, this was a war by armed Palestinians aimed mostly at Israeli civilians and launched after Israel had agreed to end the occupation--an anti-intifada. Meanwhile, European and even American leaders were still passionately courting Arafat. In one particularly degrading episode, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright literally ran after Arafat as he stormed out of cease-fire talks in Paris in October 2000 and begged him to return to the table. Washington didn't even place Hamas and Hezbollah on its list of terrorist organizations until November 2001. Rather, most of the international community held Israel responsible for weakening Arafat and his ability to restrain terrorism. Conventional wisdom insisted that the Fatah movement was different from Hamas and that "political" Hamas was different from "military" Hamas. This is the disaster Sharon faced when he assumed the premiership in March 2001. To respond effectively, he first had to convince Israelis that negotiating under fire would only encourage terrorism and that a military solution for terrorism did indeed exist. And so, one of Sharon's first acts in office was to meet with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) general staff and demand a plan for victory. Toughness, but... Still, he didn't immediately go to war. The Lebanon fiasco of the early '80s had taught him the danger of initiating a military campaign without the support of both the mainstream left and the U.S. administration. (By contrast, Sharon didn't waste time wooing France and other European Union countries that wouldn't support the war on terrorism no matter what Israel did.) This is the first lesson Sharon could teach democratic leaders facing a war against terrorism: Insure domestic consensus and the support of vital allies. ... intelligent distinctions between necessary allies and phony ones. And the vital importance of domestic support. Sharon imposed on himself a regimen of single-mindedness and patience. He concentrated almost exclusively on security, leaving the country's economy and its foreign relations--with the exception of relations with the Bush administration--to other ministers. Nor did he allow himself to be distracted by divisive domestic issues like the secular-religious divide. wouldn't that be helpful here as well? What's the point of fomenting domestic divisions when we're at war? By becoming the first Likud leader to endorse a Palestinian state, Sharon broke with his own party's ideology and recast himself as a consensus politician. And he established a national unity government with the Labor Party. He acted liked the leader of a nation at war, not a party at war. Amen. Let's hope Bush figures this out in Phase II. Biden, McCain, Hagel, George Will, WFBuckley et al must be on board this time around. Screw the Euroweenies; get your own party and moderate Dems on board. And recognize the vital importance of Russia and India in Phase II of this war. Posted by: lex 2004-09-22 |
| http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php?ID=43945 |