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A November showdown on Iran's nuclear program
By Emile El-Hokayem Special to The Daily Star Friday, October 01, 2004 (Right after Bush wins, Iran is going to become the issue.) Despite intense negotiations recently at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna, the Iranian nuclear challenge has remained very much unresolved. Delegates struggled to come up with a unified stance, but even their apparent unity was insufficient to get the Iranians to agree to minimal compliance with IAEA demands. While some approaches to the problem might buy time, the Iranians seem set on their course. Their most recent announcement that they would convert uranium into gas needed for enrichment was yet another threshold crossed by Tehran in its defiance of the IAEA. The assurances of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, a weakened leader who is set to leave office next year, that Iran would refrain from building nuclear weapons, had little if any credibility. Barring a dramatic shift on Iran's part, the stage is set for a showdown at the UN Security Council in November, after the American presidential election. Yet, the Security Council is unlikely to be the venue for reaching a viable solution. What the U.S. will seek in New York depends on whether President George W. Bush gets reelected. A second Bush administration will push for international sanctions, but wide-ranging agreement is needed for the sanctions to become effective. Without this consensus, the U.S. will be unable to achieve much. Indeed, if the use of force is taken off the table, Washington has little leverage over Tehran: the U.S. Congress and different American administrations have imposed all possible political and economic sanctions. Washington, therefore, needs unanimous European, Russian and Chinese endorsement of its views. The Europeans might be frustrated by Iranian tactics and deception, feel embarrassed by their own lack of success, and side with the U.S. But even with some European Union countries on board, new sanctions will require arduous negotiations and more American frustration with the UN process. Whether Bush can succeed in garnering international support for his plan is doubtful. Many countries remain distrustful of the U.S. and remember the strenuous negotiations over Resolution 1441 and subsequent debates over Iraq. And making the case for sanctions against Iran will be tough: With Iraq fresh in mind, questions as to the quality of intelligence and the wisdom of a coercive approach would come to dominate the debate. Moreover, Russia and China, who publicly, if quietly, opposed the Iraq war, are likely to actively resist the efforts of the U.S. and its allies. Both countries have massive economic and political interests in Iran and helped it develop its nuclear industry. With Iran now surrounded by American allies, both worry about U.S. designs for the region. Finally, the two countries do not share Washington's Middle East vision or its anxiousness over the direction being taken by Tehran. The Bush administration has not prepared the ground for a successful diplomatic outcome, and the trade-offs required to get Beijing and Moscow on board might come at too high a cost for Washington. The Democratic candidate John Kerry has articulated a daring strategy that would put Tehran to the test by guaranteeing fuel supply to Iranian nuclear plants, but also see to it that the fuel is reprocessed outside the country. The pluses of this approach are evident - Iran's intentions would be exposed, while it would also be given the benefit of the doubt. However, it could also precipitate a showdown should Iran hesitate or rebuff the offer. This plan evokes - without replicating - the 1994 Agreed Framework that the Clinton administration offered to North Korea, which delayed rather than stopped its nuclear program. However, the Kerry plan is even bolder because it seeks an end to the crisis. Bush, in turn, would impose sanctions because his basic policy assumption is that Iran is on its way to building nuclear weapons. Kerry would expose Iranian intentions first, and, if a nuclear weapons program is confirmed, proceed to enroll the international community in a vast effort to roll it back. The problem with both strategies is that they divorce the nuclear question from the larger issues at stake, thus ignoring the reasoning behind Tehran's security policy. By treating the Iranian nuclear issue as solely a security concern (albeit one that is crucial), the U.S. is avoiding the difficult task of defining a comprehensive and consistent policy toward Iran. It also ignores the matter of Iran's role in the region. However, Iran's now-evidenced interference in American efforts in Iraq, as well as its continued support for radical groups, makes it difficult for U.S. policymakers to reason in grand strategic terms. That said, the Washington policy debate is abuzz with new ideas on how to deal with Iran. The hawks might be counting the troops and equipment needed to deal a blow to Iran, but from "selective engagement" to a "grand bargain" an array of more pragmatic ideas is available. Their proponents include former high-level officials and regional experts who understand the danger of reducing the discussion to the nuclear issue. This inflates the value of Iran's nuclear program while obscuring other areas where progress can be made. Iran has several valid rationales, at least in its own eyes, for pursuing a military nuclear capability. For many Iranian decision-makers, the Iraq war suggests that a strong, credible deterrent is the best shield against American aggressiveness. Similarly, the North Korean negotiations suggest that the U.S. will come to the negotiation table and even explore deals that include security concessions when it is faced with complex challenges from nuclear states. If Iran's wager that the international community will be unable to formulate a common approach proves right, and if the Europeans refrain from imposing sanctions, the Iranians could reap substantial benefits. But if the U.S. pursues a policy of engagement, Tehran will be hard-pressed to respond positively to American overtures. Iran might prefer a grand bargain, but it should also accept incremental steps aimed at diffusing tensions. If it wavers, it will send a damaging message to the world and confirm the worst fears about its aims. A showdown with Iran will have grave repercussions on global affairs. From arms control and terrorism to stability in the Gulf and democracy, Iran is at the nexus of several major issues dominating the international agenda. If the U.S. can move beyond domestic considerations and its structural limitations in comprehending Iran, it could at least convince the world of its good intentions. Emile El-Hokayem is a researcher in Middle East security issues at the Henry L. Stimson Posted by: Mark Espinola 2004-09-30 |
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