|
Interview with Anthony Cordesman About Iraq
From Foreign Affairs, an interview conducted on November 22 by Bernard Gwertzman, consulting editor of the Council on Foreign Relations, with Anthony A. Cordesman, Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Question: With the elections set for January 30, 2005, and the Falluja operation in the mopping-up phase, how would you describe the situation in Iraq? I think Falluja was a distinct military success; the civilian casualties were low, and the U.S. and Iraqi casualties were low. There seems to have been a significant number of insurgent casualties, and a number of detainees were captured. The problem, however, is when we talk about military success in terms of Falluja, it is reasonably clear that a number of insurgents either left before the fighting began or escaped and were able to fade back into the population outside of Falluja. It is certainly all too clear that the insurgents successfully prepared attacks outside of Falluja: in Baghdad, Mosul, most of the Sunni Triangle, and in many other areas. So, in military terms, the success in the city is somewhat overshadowed by the fact that there has been no matching success in the country as a whole, and indeed, the insurgents were able to step up their attacks. The political dimension is far more uncertain. Even before the fighting began, the President of Iraq, Ghazi al-Yawer, who is a Sunni, opposed it. Many of the Sunnis inside the interim government, who support the government, opposed the offensive. The leading Sunni clerical group opposed it. Most of the media and the press opposed it. Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shiite [cleric] opposed it as well. Since that time, the impression being given in the Arab media is that of a devastated city to which the population cannot return; one in which heroic martyrs and insurgents are fighting to the last. A marine who kills an Iraqi prisoner and virtually every other kind of negative image that they can provide is aired. So not only do we face perhaps more problems with the Sunnis than we did before the fighting began, we face very negative images in the Arab and Islamic worlds. Question: Do you think the Sunnis will participate in the elections? I think it is very unclear. The organized Sunnis have so far said they won't. But it is a long time, in terms of the dynamics of Iraq, between now and the end of January. The problem for any kind of boycott is that the boycott would mean, essentially, that Iraq's first National Assembly is Shiite and Kurdish, with whatever Sunnis they choose to include. That is a dangerous problem for the Sunnis unless they are absolutely confident that the insurgents can block a [Shiite electoral] victory. It makes it very hard to negotiate over the constitution, over power-sharing, and the sharing of oil revenues and money. That is not exactly the ideal strategy for any person unless it is someone who believes that somehow he can make the current insurgency the springboard to some type of lasting political and military victory. The interview continues with the following questions: What does the insurgency see as a realistic goal for itself? How strong or weak is U.S. intelligence? In your recent study, you state that the odds for U.S. success in Iraq are only about even, and may be even less. Can you explain? What did you think about the war before it began? Did you predict this? Your recent paper also emphasizes the Arab-Israeli peace process. Can you elaborate on your thinking in this paper? Do you see parallels between the Iraq and other wars? Posted by: Mike Sylwester 2004-11-28 |
| http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php?ID=49945 |