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Zeihan: Turkey’s Growing Pains
American relations with Turkey got very interesting last week.An ongoing disagreement over the status of an American pastor, Andrew Craig Brunson, who thought it a good idea to proselytize in a country who officially, firmly, repeatedly warned him such actions were both unwelcome and unwise, has built up into a full-throated international incident. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s base is Islamist social conservatives while Donald Trump’s core coalition includes Christian social conservatives. The Turks arrested Brunson, the Trump administration wants Brunson released, the Turks said no, and here we are. Turkey’s currency, the lira, has been struggling for years in no small part due to the political pressure Erdogan and his supporters have placed on the central bank to keep interest rates artificially low. Rising inflation peaked over the weekend when the lira fell to record lows, with Erdogan still voicing support for interest rates to remain as low as possible. (High interest rates are typically anathema to construction firms, and much of Erdogan’s political machinery has been financed in the past by large Turkish firms who have benefitted from the infrastructure and construction boom since his time in office.) Fuel was added to the fire of monetary weakness from a once unthinkable source: the United States. On August 10 U.S. President Donald Trump announced a doubling of the United States’ tariffs on imports of Turkish steel and aluminum, expressly linking the new tariff levels to the Brunson dispute. This is hardly the first time the Americans have used economic sanctions to get their way. Sanctions against strategic rivals such as the Soviet Union or North Korea are a time-honored tradition, as are sanctions in preparation for military action such as in the months leading up to the pair of invasions of Iraq. Similarly, tariffs are a common tool in economic arguments and trade disputes. But to my recollection, this is the first time the Americans have ever used such tools in a political dispute against an ally. A few things come from this: First, the American-Turkish alliance is over. I’m not talking NATO here – NATO is already dead. I’m talking bilateral arrangements. The United States and Turkey have had a long and largely productive military relationship since the 1950s, with Turkish military bases proving central to American foreign policy goals as regards the Eastern Mediterranean, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, the former Yugoslavia, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus. The partnership has been built on a pair of unshakable facts. Turkey’s long history and relatively diversified, robust economy makes it the only power touching the Middle East that is capable, stable, reliable and whose assistance doesn’t generate more problems than it solves. Turkey’s location between Europe and Asia, between the former Soviet space and the Mediterranean, makes it the central clearinghouse for any out-of-region power that seeks to project power into all four zones. During the first Gulf War, the Turks allowed the US to use Incirlik airbase to attack Iraqi positions in exchange for financial aid. After Erdogan rose to power in 2003 and denied the Americans’ use of Incirlik due to concerns over Kurdish empowerment, the US military had to find longer, costlier workarounds to achieve their goals. Turkey lost out on the economic aid, but demonstrated its leverage. ... Posted by: 3dc 2018-08-14 |
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