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Strategy and Submarines
By Richard Fernandez[PJMedia] I wrote this paper on Australian naval strategy in August 2013 — eight years ago — but never got around to placing it. It’s interesting to see how well my thinking from 2013 held up. I think it clearly anticipates the actual debate that led to Australia’s present decision to go for nuclear SSNs. It is axiomatic that form follows function, which means insofar as navies are concerned that naval assets are acquired to fulfill a purpose. Once the purpose is determined, then the correct tools can be chosen for the job. Thus, every acquisition must be viewed in the context of “what is it for”. Unless the ends are defined, nothing can be said about the proposed means. Buying naval vessels is a means to an end. The determination of ends is usually called strategy. Unfortunately, the goals of Australian naval strategy are sometimes presented as a laundry list. The defense of Australia, meaning the ability to prevent an enemy from seizing its northern territories; Another way to restate strategy, as a report to the Australian Parliament did, is to break it down into elements.
The trouble with laundry lists is you cannot tell which is most important. But common sense tells us that Task 5 (Global Coalition Operations) is the sine qua non of a navy, comprising both “Sea Denial – the prevention of the use of the sea by another force against us” – and Sea Control, the ability to impose one’s will for a time on an opponent. If the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) can perform Task 5, it can do Tasks 1 through 4. But if the RAN cannot do Task 5, Tasks 1 through 4 are out of the question. Without sea denial and sea control, power projection is not possible. Because some of Australia’s potential opponents are potentially stronger than it could ever realistically be, China being a case in point, achieving sea denial and sea control against such a foe realistically requires the assistance of an ally. Hence the stated goal of White Paper Defence 2000 – “to defend Australia from any credible attack, without relying on help from the combat forces of any other country” – automatically put the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) on the horns of a dilemma. That was acceptable at the time, as Hugh White noted in The Monthly, because of the steadily improving security situation which culminated in the Fall of the Berlin Wall. Read the rest at the link Posted by: badanov 2021-09-21 |
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