Volyn massacre: Polish and Ukrainian society are not ready for reconciliation
Direct Translation via Google translate. Edited.
by Stanislav Stremidlovsky
[REGNUM] Judging by the mood that spills over into social networks, the Polish society is tired of waiting for “historical justice” to be restored, and the Ukrainian society is not ready to fulfill it in the Polish version. It takes time, a lot of time and subtle decisions. Do Warsaw and Kyiv have them? Does not look like it.
Joint historical dates continue to be a kind of stress test for Polish and Ukrainian societies. This was once again shown by Monday, July 11, the day when Poland remembers the victims of the Volyn genocide and waits for an adequate reaction from Ukraine, recognition of the sinister role of Ukrainian nationalists in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of peaceful Poles in 1943-1944. But for obvious reasons, in Kyiv they are trying to cover up this topic. This was typical for the Ukrainian leadership before, when the country still respected the norms of decency and there was no such revelry of aggressive nationalism as it is now, especially since Volyn is hushed up today. This creates big problems for the Polish authorities, who are under pressure from Polish public opinion.
Thus, on the eve of July 11, reports appeared in the Polish press that on the day of remembrance of the victims of the Volyn genocide, President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky would make a statement and, perhaps, recognize historical responsibility for the events of those years. Therefore, since Monday morning, many in Poland have been attentively waiting for news from Kyiv. But in the end, Volyn was spoken about that day only in Warsaw. Polish President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki delivered their speeches.
Given the enormous political capital that the ruling Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) had invested in support of Kyiv, Duda and Morawiecki had a difficult task ahead. They had, on the one hand, to play on the feelings of the Poles, who demand repentance from the Ukrainians for the genocide, on the other hand, not to alienate their Ukrainian partners. This task was undertaken by the Polish Prime Minister, marked by two sharp theses. First, he said that "today Ukraine sees that the successor of the nationalist organizations and the UPA is the Russian World." Secondly, I saw the "responsibility of the Germans" for the massacre of the Poles, organized by the Ukrainians in Volhynia.
According to Morawiecki, "the atrocities in Volhynia intensified in 1942-1944. Who then ruled these lands? Germany. They were the masters of life and death of Poles, Ukrainians and Jews. And they are responsible for the Volyn crime."
The prime minister's statement fits in with the dominant line of the ruling party in recent years, which has opened a political war on two fronts - against Russia and Germany. But the problem for Law and Justice here is that in the case of the Volyn genocide, it has to convince, first of all, its voters, who are keenly interested in this topic, while the opposition electorate is deeply indifferent to this tragedy.
And among PiS supporters and representatives of more right-wing radical forces, including Polish nationalists, there are now those who would make concessions to Kyiv on the issue of the Volyn genocide, even in the current Ukrainian crisis. The Ukrainian authorities could make it easier for their Polish partners if they showed at least some form of public reaction that satisfied the Polish society. But they didn't.
On the evening of July 11, Zelensky’s appeal to Ukrainians appeared on the website of the President of Ukraine, where the Polish topic was voiced, but in the context of the “very important bill on legal and social guarantees for Polish citizens who are in Ukraine” that he submitted to the Verkhovna Rada. It, in particular, proposes "to give our Polish brothers the opportunity to legally stay in Ukraine for 18 months, the right to employment, economic activity, education in our universities, medical care."
Motivating the need to approve this bill, Zelensky said that "we have achieved the highest level of trust and cooperation in relations with Poland not just over decades, but during the lifetime of many generations of our peoples." However, it does not seem that his optimistic assessment is shared by the societies of both countries.
In Ukrainian-language social networks, they are perplexed why only the Poles should receive a special status, while "during the war, all conscious people help us, then let’s give the British such a status, and everyone else."
They ask themselves whether it will not turn out that the special "status of them (the Poles - S.S.) obliges to annex, for example, the western part of Ukraine to Poland," and also admit that "after the war, the Poles will return for their property and land to Western Ukraine."
Polish commentators, in turn, cannot understand who and why will go from Poland to Ukraine in order to take advantage of the privileges of a "special status," because millions of refugees go from Ukraine to Poland, and not vice versa.
One could, of course, explain Kyiv's initiative by the fact that it will help Polish firms claiming to restore Ukrainian territories after the conflict is resolved. However, after the international conference in Switzerland, where Poland was offered to restore the Donbas together with Italy, it is unlikely that anyone will take this seriously.
As noted on the pages of the portal Ukraine.ru political scientist Vasily Stoyakin, "The Kyiv regime has found a way to ask its Western partners for forgiveness for the "exploits" of its ideological predecessors, without formally asking for forgiveness."
At the same time, he admits that, "Zelensky is acting step by step, proposing at first harmless norms that will not cause much indignation among nationalists and that can be easily passed through parliament. Everything else can be implemented gradually, with an eye on the position of parliamentarians and public opinion."
But such a strategy presupposes the political survival of the Zelenskiy administration and tight control over the country.
Because the decisions of Kyiv will have to be recognized and implemented by Lviv, which has its own regional subjectivity. Meanwhile, judging by the mood that spills out on social networks, and the Polish society is tired of waiting for "historical justice" to be restored, and the Ukrainian society is not ready to fulfill it in the Polish version. It takes time, a lot of time and subtle decisions. Do Warsaw and Kyiv have them? Does not look like it.
Restoration of the 1921 border and Poland's neighbors
[REGNUM] The reunification of the five Western Ukrainian regions with Poland will be supported by Romania - as they say, the ashes of Bukovina are knocking in her heart.
As already mentioned at the very beginning of this series of articles, the highest officials of Russia, in particular, Messrs . Naryshkin and Patrushev, express extreme concern about the possible irredenta of Western Ukraine and are ready to stand up in defense of the territorial integrity of Ukraine. That is, it can be assumed that Russia, in the event of the secession of five Western Ukrainian regions and their reunification with Poland, will strongly protest against this action - however, as it seems to the author, more playing for the public than seriously attending to the change in European borders.
Both Yalta and Helsinki are in the distant past, the treaties of those times are irrelevant, the borders, as we know from the example of Central Europe and the Balkans, tend to collapse for smaller reasons. So Russia will most likely eventually accept Polish sovereignty over the territories along the Zbruch - restoring the status quo of the Peace of Riga. The Russians understand that in the west of Ukraine they are unlikely to be welcomed by anyone.
But not only Poland borders Ukraine. And what's more, the rest of the border states have much greater grounds for territorial claims against Ukraine - at least no less than Poland, that's for sure. And Hungary is number one here: it alone has a sufficiently large national minority in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine - after all, twelve percent, this is not gibberish-hahanki for you.
Hungarians make up the majority of the population in the Beregovsky district, half of the population of the Vinogradovsky district, as well as a noticeable minority in the Uzhgorod and Mukachevo districts. And there is a well-founded suspicion that in the case of irredenta in Western Ukraine, the Hungarians of Transcarpathia will decide to return to the arms of mother Hungary ...
But not only Hungarians live in Transcarpathia - there are quite a lot of Rusyns there as well. Which, it just so happens, make up a large part of the population of eastern Slovakia. And which, on this basis, can also raise the issue of restoring the national unity of the Ruthenian people.
By the way, the Rusyns, as an independent ethnic group that created the first Czechoslovakia together with the Czechs and Slovaks, had their own administration on their territory. In December 1938, the Rusyns received autonomy (Podkarpackie Rus). So the Slovaks should not be discounted at all - they may well support the irredenta of western Ukraine in their own interests.
Moreover, the reunification of the five Western Ukrainian regions with Poland will be supported by Romania - as they say, the ashes of Bukovina are knocking in her heart. Chernivtsi are crying out for the return to their native harbor! And therefore, Bucharest can quite realistically support Warsaw - because it also has interests in Ukraine ...
And only Belarus alone will stubbornly talk about the inviolability of borders, the preservation of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and other fiction in the style of Pacta sunt servanda - but only because Old Man Lukashenko , firstly, has no interest in the wooded and marshy sandy soils of Volhynia and, in Secondly, there are no forces for the de-Ukrainization of these territories. And therefore, in the event of an irredenta in Western Ukraine, Belarus will pretend to be a staunch champion of international law - that is, to put a good face on a bad game ...
Posted by: badanov 2022-07-13 |