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Isaev: Zombie Defense
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.Most of the commentary by Russian military historian Alexey Isaev; Annotation by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin: [ColonelCassad] Military historian Alexei Isaev on how, in the conditions of devastation and civil war, the Bolsheviks solved the issues of organizing the military industry. Social cataclysms do not have the best effect on all spheres of public life, the defense industry is no exception. After the revolution of 1917, it would seem that the defense industry is not much needed.  From a formal point of view, in the fall of 1917, the stocks of weapons in the Russian army (both directly in the troops and in warehouses) were: approx. 18 thousand artillery pieces, up to 35 thousand machine guns, St. 5 million rifles, up to 33 million shells, approx. 2.1 billion rounds. Although in some works of the Soviet period these reserves were called "meager", everything is known in comparison. In the Red Army in April 1943, there were 53 thousand machine guns, 4.4 million rifles + ~ 250 thousand automatic ones. Comparable. It would seem that for the Civil War enough for the eyes. Moreover, it is often argued that the old army fought in 1918-1922. The real picture is somewhat more complicated. Firstly, who said that the legacy of the ancien regime went to the opponents in the Civil Code entirely? In the winter of 1917/18, as a result of a chain of events (the demobilization of the old army, the deep advance of the Austro-German troops, the formation of new states on the outskirts of the former empire, problems with the evacuation and storage of military property, etc.), a significant part of the weapons was lost. As a result, by July 1918, when the flames of civil war flared up in the east and south of the country, the central Soviet leadership had at its disposal: 4,600d artillery. guns (including 1,600 faulty ones), 12,000 (600) machine guns, 1.5 million (143,000) rifles, approx. seven million shells, approx. 800 million rounds. What was the elephant, what was the elephant! In the second half of 1918, the supply of the Red Army was released: approx. 2,000 artillery guns, ca. 2.5 million shells, 927,000 rifles, 8,100 machine guns, 563.3 million rounds of ammunition. Now stocks have really become "meager". By the end of October 1918, there were serviceable property in the warehouses: 1,332 artillery tools, ca. five million shells, 252,000 rifles, 3,231 machine guns, 310.4 million cartridges. At the beginning of January 1919, 53,000 rifles and 171 million cartridges remained in the warehouses of the Main Artillery Directorate (without the Tula factories). In addition, there were about 150,000 rifles of various foreign systems (mainly Japanese) and 265 million cartridges for them in the warehouses. As early as March 1, 1918, V.I. Ulyanov-Lenin, in his article “On Business Grounds,” acted as a cap and wrote: “The best army, the most devoted to the cause of the revolution, people will be immediately exterminated by the enemy if they are not sufficiently armed, supplied with food, and trained.” Those. understanding was present at the very top and it was then that key decisions were made. Secondly, a logical action like “Let's squeeze state-owned weapons back from those who left the front with rifles and machine guns” brought a very limited result. Requisitions from the population and organizations (according to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of December 10, 1918) by March 9, 1919 brought R.-K.K.A. 145,000 serviceable and St. 3 thousand faulty rifles of various systems, 280 serviceable machine guns of various systems, 100 artillery pieces, about 7 million rounds of ammunition and other property. You don't roam. Faced with the "meager" in key positions stocks left over from the anciennes regime, from May-June 1918, the Bolsheviks, simultaneously with the formation of the Red Army on a conscription basis, begin to make efforts to restore military production, which had fallen into decay due to the termination of participation in world war, and because of the general economic crisis. All this was aggravated by the evacuation, in particular, of Petrograd. Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission for the Supply of the Red Army L.B. Krasin frankly admitted already in December 1918 ( http://militera.lib.ru/research/melia_aa/03.html): "An even greater blow to industry [than its demobilization] was inflicted by the evacuation of Petrograd, which was decided suddenly ... and which actually amounted to almost complete destruction of Petrograd industry ...". Despite the fact that Petrograd was one of the key centers of military production of the Russian Empire. As of August 1918, only one of the three weapons factories was operating, three of the nine artillery factories, one of the five cartridge factories, none of the three capsule factories, and two of the five gunpowder factories. The rest were either evacuated, or demobilized, or were in the hands of the enemy. To increase the output of military products at the Tula factories, a third shift is being introduced. In addition, a bonus system of payment for overfulfillment of the plan and an increased rate of food supply are being introduced. Enthusiasm and the struggle for the happiness of mankind is good, but they knew how to stimulate the ruble today and now. All this begins to bring results quite quickly - by the end of the year. The output of cartridges increased from 5.2 million in August to 16.9 million in December 1918. The output of rifles increased from 11.2 thousand to 22.2 thousand, respectively. The problem of shortage of qualified workers at enterprises is solved in various ways, including reservations. To attract, the instruction of the commission of the Defense Council of December 5, 1918 is used: "to notify the population as widely as possible that those working at cartridge and weapons factories are exempt from conscription into the army." The following year, the central authorities repeatedly beat the hands of local trade union and military organizations in carrying out mobilizations at military factories, "because weapons and cartridges are most important" (from Lenin's telegram of August 26, 1919). In addition, there was a practice of redistribution, the maneuver of the workforce from closing enterprises to those operating on a city, district, even country scale. Of course, it could not do without the "whip". All defense enterprises were transferred to the category of militarized: the entire composition of workers and employees was declared mobilized, and unauthorized abandonment of work was equated with desertion. This, however, did not save workers from leaving in search of food, with which there were regular interruptions (in the Second World War, staff turnover was also a problem, if anything). In total, in 1919, the defense industry of the Republic produced 460 thousand rifles, 6,300 machine guns, 357 million cartridges, 366 field guns. For 1920: 427,000 rifles, 4,500 machine guns, 411 million rounds of ammunition, 279 field guns. Due to difficulties in organizing the production of new weapons, it was necessary to repair the old ones on a significant scale. In 1919, St. 500,000 rifles, St. 2,000 machine guns, approx. 800 guns. In 1920: ca. 400,000 rifles, 3,100 machine guns, 965 guns. Thus, the refurbishment was comparable to the annual output. The most interesting topic is artillery shells, ammunition has always been expensive both in terms of raw materials and resources. Release of completely new shots in 1919–1920. amounted to about 200,000 kopecks. Basically, the arsenals were equipped from existing ready-made elements. Due to them and the available stocks, R.-K.K.A received 5.5 million shells during this period. It can be said that if in artillery the Reds could mainly rely on the stocks of the Russian army, then in small arms and machine guns from the beginning of 1919 they had to rely only on current production. This feature was noticed back in the 1920s by A.M. Volpe ( http://militera.lib.ru/science/volpe_am01/index.html ): “... the civil war, unlike the world war, was not an “artillery” war. The Civil War was a machine-gun war. Her tactics were largely determined by this moment. The production of rifles and rifle cartridges was the "shverpunkt" of the military industry. The consumption of shells in the civil war was relatively small. So to speak, this was the "happiness" of the civil war. Who knows what tests our industry would have to endure if the need for shells was the same as during the world war. Schwerpunkt: a German word which means center of gravity, the main thing. We will answer comrade. Wolpe from the future: the industry would not have survived. I would run into tight spots. In the same alcohol, necessary for the production of pyroxylin gunpowder. Who came up with all this? You will not believe. Vladimir Ilyich, who pointed out as early as the beginning of 1918 (when everything was just flaring up): "Stop the production of heavy shells and guns, make light field artillery, machine guns, rifles." Just in case, I note: light field artillery is also armored trains. Historians see the personalities of the era in context and wider than in a school textbook or even general works. Whether we like it or not, the decision in early 1918 to focus on light weapons was visionary. There and then. Invisible, yes. The one who makes such decisions on time wins. After listening to specialists or with your own mind, this is no longer so important. (c) Alexey Isaev Posted by: badanov 2023-01-21 |
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