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According to the situation in the Alyoshek area (bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine opposite Kherson).
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.From the V Kontakte page of Igor Strelkov According to the situation in the Alyoshek area (bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine opposite Kherson).  When our troops left (according to Surovkin's "simple decision") Kherson and the bridgehead around it, I (and not only) noted that the enemy would certainly try to use the dominant right bank of the Dnieper to try to capture the bridgehead (s) on the left bank. The possibility of observation and shelling in the zone of direct visibility of our communications, as well as the positions themselves, is a guarantee of any successful operations for those units with which the enemy is trying to gain a foothold on the left bank. The bridgehead near Alyoshki on an island in the floodplain of the Dnieper is tactical. Simply because even having captured this island - the enemy - if he assumes further broader operations - will have to re-form channels and swamps in order to capture a bridgehead already on "solid ground" outside the floodplain. I believe that the enemy so stubbornly throws his fighters for slaughter (since he cannot change the landed units, he can only take the wounded out of the bridgehead) for reasons: a) the desire to achieve at least some success that can be "served" to the population as "major victory"; b) as part of the diversion of forces and means of the RF Armed Forces from other areas where strategic strikes are planned and carried out; c) purely out of the well-known "Khokhlyatsky" stubbornness, forcing them to cling to every piece of land, regardless of losses. The fact that our command understood the "minority" of the specified area is evidenced by the fact that in the Alyoshek area, "secondary" units equipped with "mobiles" are involved, while the divisions of the personnel of the 7th Airborne Division that previously occupied the site were sent to Zaporozhye, where enemy attacks pose the greatest danger. What, in this case, caused persistent attempts to throw the enemy into the river? Wouldn't it be better to leave the island gradually, with battles, trying only to inflict the greatest losses on the enemy? This question is "hanging in the air", but I personally do not have a definite answer to it. Since, having captured the island, the enemy, of course, will not stop there, will establish a pontoon or ferry crossing and impose battles on us directly for Alyoshka - in order to create a foothold already on "solid ground". Which can already carry a strategic threat. Frankly speaking, such a threat would not frighten me personally (if I were in the place of the Russian command), "from the word in any way." Just because if I were the commander (may the reader forgive me such liberties, since this opportunity “does not threaten me in any way from the word”), I would find non-linear responses to the actions of the enemy. But in conditions where: - the defense of the RF Armed Forces everywhere, except for the Donbass, is completely passive and does not provide for the possibility of conducting offensive operations outside the zone of current control; - it is headed by such "military geniuses" as General Makarevich, who is in charge in the indicated direction (one of the numerous galaxy of "brave, but impenetrable") - everything looks "not so simple." I really like historical analogies with the Civil War (probably because its battles took place in the same places, and I was once a relative specialist in the history of this particular war). So - in the summer of 1920, General Ya.A. Slashchev, who commanded the 2nd Corps of the Russian Army (Wrangel), was very frivolous about the possibility of creating bridgeheads on this very section of the Dnieper, which opposed him, the 13th Army of the Red Army. His concept was not to "substitute" the troops under artillery fire from the high right bank, to allow the "reds" to cross, concentrate and launch an offensive towards the Crimean isthmuses. And then - having defeated them in the depths of the steppe and "cutting" them with cavalry blows from the flanks - drive them to the Dnieper, capturing numerous trophies. This calculation was based on a significantly higher combat capability of the "whites" and the high professionalism of their command. And it even had its effect, until ... Until the advantage of the "Reds" in numbers became simply overwhelming, and the professionalism of their command did not begin to approach that of the "Whites". As a result, at one not perfect “for the “whites”) moment, the Kakhovka bridgehead arose, from which (after the failure of its liquidation) “the Reds delivered a devastating blow to the rear of the most powerful formations of the Russian Army connected by a heavy battle (suddenly - near Tokmak and Pologa). Further - a breakthrough to Perekop, huge losses retreating and almost complete death of them surrounded. Until the advantage of the "Reds" in numbers became simply overwhelming, and the professionalism of their command did not begin to approach that of the "Whites". As a result, at one not perfect “for the “whites”) moment, the Kakhovka bridgehead arose, from which (after the failure of its liquidation) “the Reds delivered a devastating blow to the rear of the most powerful formations of the Russian Army connected by a heavy battle (suddenly - near Tokmak and Pologa). What do we have now? - And now we have: - a very serious superiority of the enemy in "manpower". General and specifically on all directions chosen for the offensive; - the superiority of the enemy command over ours in terms of "ability to organize"; - the saturation of the enemy front with exactly those technical means of warfare that are needed on this front; - the almost complete absence of such funds at the disposal of our troops. And this means that even a small but strong foothold of the enemy near Alyoshki will become a serious threat, and if it cannot be eliminated now (at the moment when the enemy is holding a narrow strip of land near the coast), then when it grows seriously, then liquidation will be simple almost impossible and vice versa - the enemy will get the opportunity to expand the bridgehead. That is why our command is making significant efforts to eliminate the threat now - while it is at the tactical level. But it doesn't work. But it doesn't work because the concept of "creativity in the art of war" is familiar to very few of our military leaders, and General Makarevich, the commander here, is not familiar in particular. His style is frontal attacks over and over again in the same place, plus sending commandos "for slaughter" on "what they themselves must find." Here I am not unfounded - I know the facts of how the indicated general in the evening set tasks for the commanders of special forces "to land troops behind enemy lines" early in the morning of the next day, without allocating ANY crossing facilities for this. (And how the crossing attempt ended with the help of independently refined small-sized fishing boats - ukry have already been shown in the corresponding video, which can be viewed on YouTube). As a result, we have another "battle of attrition", which so far does not pose a serious threat to the stability of the front, but this is only for now. At the same time - such a battle is beneficial for the enemy - his numerical advantage is only growing, and the generals do not give a damn about the big losses of their own troops. The enemy placed mortars and artillery under the cover of Kherson urban development (surprising, right? But Surovikin received the Order of St. George 3rd degree (on his neck) for "difficult courageous decision"!) its bridgehead (I remind you that there is a swamp on both sides of the road). Plus, it fills up the road and all the surroundings with remotely installed minefields. That is, not only they have a bridgehead on the island, but we also have, in fact, the same, with almost the same difficulties. If the liquidation of the bridgehead is not now transferred to the category of primary (and not secondary) tasks, it will not be possible to destroy it, despite all the heroic bloody efforts of the "mobile" units, special forces and assault groups "Z". The solution can be very simple - a massive accurate strike with guided aerial bombs at once on all enemy strongholds and an assault carefully coordinated with this strike, equipped with all the necessary military equipment. In the near future we will see whether our command will be able to carry out these actions. More from the V Kontakte page of Tatyana Vasilyeva ‼⚡⚡⚡The Armed Forces of Ukraine again went on the offensive in Zaporozhye. What can be expected? The Armed Forces of Ukraine again launched an offensive against Zaporozhye. So far, their main efforts have been concentrated in the direction of the village of Rabotino, where units of the RF Armed Forces are holding the line, but the movement and accumulation of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in other sectors of the front are gradually being recorded. Kyiv cannot now stop the offensive on Zaporozhye and the South-Donetsk direction: its importance is too high, therefore, all the forces that they can find are being pulled to the front. They have been trying to attack the Armed Forces of Ukraine for a month now, but in the next few days, activity is likely to be significantly increased: ahead of the NATO summit, which will begin on July 11. By the beginning of the summit, the Ukrainian army must show at least a minimal result on the battlefield. If this does not happen, the scale and parameters of military assistance may be revised, and questions will arise for the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the country's top leadership. Despite heavy losses (they are estimated at 23,000 to 26,000 people) and the commissioning of a significant part of the strategic reserve, about six brigades remain in the unused asset of the Ukrainian army. Some units are removed from other directions - Krasnolimansky, Kherson, Kupyansky, etc. In parallel with the intensification of hostilities in a number of areas of the Zaporozhye region, during the last week, atypical activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in other sectors of the front. In particular, attacks by small groups in the area of Soledar and an attempt to land on the left bank of the Dnieper in the area of the Antonovsky bridge. Several attempts were unsuccessful and did not lead to any major changes at the front, although they attracted attention. Judging by the fact that no significant troop movements were recorded in either direction, most likely both episodes are distracting or could only develop if they were initially successful. The main task of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for the sake of which diversionary actions are being taken along the entire front line, may lie elsewhere. There is a possibility that units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will risk organizing a raid in the area of Energodar and the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. That is why a significant part of the efforts of the Armed Forces of Ukraine can be thrown into imitation of military operations for the sake of trying to carry out an operation that requires strict secrecy to start. "War Chronicle" Posted by: badanov 2023-07-03 |
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