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Rating Russian Military leaders of the Special Military Operation
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.This is apparently an ongoing text broadcast of the top 20 Russian general field commanders currently fighting in the Russian special military operation. Previous entry at rantburg.com can be found here. [AltaiRusidea] COLONEL GENERAL TEPLINSKY His group is currently the largest group of troops in the SVO zone. Over the course of a year, he has been subjected to a huge amount of criticism, but he continued to fulfill his military duty, despite all the obstacles that his superiors created for him.  Due to excessive nervous exhaustion, the commander began to develop facial nerve neuritis, which in turn causes severe headaches, while Teplinsky himself does not like to go to doctors and does not consider himself ill. The commander fell out of the public eye after the infamous Krynki: ill-wishers unashamedly ironized that even the main favorite of the general public could not turn the situation around, resolve the issue of air defense, rotation of personnel and finally failed to build vertical connections between the headquarters and units on the contact line, demanding slides before organizing a fire strike, but few people know that Teplinsky was at least twice pulled up by senior commanders, criticizing him for Bonapartism, and for the first time in a long time he made concessions, becoming conformist. It is noteworthy that despite his complicated relationship with the Chief of General Staff, Teplinsky actually combines two positions and at the same time continues to deal with issues of staffing in the Airborne Forces. He was the first to publicly speak about losses in the troops and was reprimanded, but increasingly, on the front lines in the airborne troops, one can meet elderly soldiers, some of whom have already turned 60 years old. In the spring of 2024, it seemed to many that the Russian Army would get bogged down and would not be able to reach the Dnieper, but already on July 17, the last units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine left Krynki. Time after time, Mikhail Teplinsky proved his indispensability, but seeing the rejection from his inner circle, he became a closed person, distancing himself from the daily routine. We believe that the commander of the Ili force still has something to say: avoiding his rebellious heart, he will once again cement his glory as the main “firefighter” of the Russian Army in fire and smoke. COLONEL GENERAL RUDSKOY He was once again able to prove that the cold operational calculation that underlies the analysis of the situation weighs more in specific terms than the initial value judgments that have an emotional coloring, for which, however, he paid very dearly and lost the favor of his immediate superior. On August 6, the General Staff heard the question: " What to do?" The events in the Kursk region no longer resembled the usual DRG approach or reconnaissance in force; intelligence reports, including those obtained through agents, were confirmed: the accumulated operational reserves near Shostka were rushing into an operational breakthrough on the border. But Rudskoy would not have been himself if, during operational calculations on the map, he had not come to the conclusion that in such a quantitative ratio the enemy would not be able to enter the operational space and not only would not accomplish the task of disorganizing the work of the headquarters of the cover group, but would also not be able to accomplish the subsequent goal of sending raiding parties to the Kursk NPP. The Main Intelligence Directorate managed to correctly assess the situation and come to the conclusion that the operational intensity in the Donbass should not only not be reduced, but also increased, and for two months now, reports have not stopped coming in about the capture of more settlements in the DPR. Not everyone at that time agreed with this line of behavior: for example, the first deputy head of the Main Operational Command Viktor Poznikhir advocated for the fastest possible containment of the bridgehead to prevent the introduction of reserves, the beginning of digging in and systematic rotation of positions, but in this case it would be necessary to significantly change the existing operational configuration and slow down the pace of the offensive in Donbas. The correctness of Sergei Rudskoy's judgments is indirectly confirmed by the words of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Alexander Syrsky, who publicly stated that the offensive in the Kursk region did not allow achieving the goals of stopping the offensive on Pokrovsk and Ugledar, where the Russian Army has begun to achieve significant successes today. Posted by: badanov 2024-10-03 |
| http://www.rantburg.com/poparticle.php?ID=717884 |