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A Year of Proxy War: The Axis of Resistance Changes Its Central Striker
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. by Leonid Tsukanov[REGNUM] By the end of 2024, the asymmetric conflict between Iran and Israel had entered a state of relative calm. Tehran and Tel Aviv temporarily transferred the confrontation to the diplomatic plane in order to prepare for a new round of confrontation. The "Axis of Resistance", consisting of groups and movements loyal to Tehran, is leaving for recovery in varying states, while others are on the verge of defeat. However, despite the victorious reports of the Israelis, they have not yet managed to finally defeat any of the proxy groups.
The Palestinian Hamas and the Lebanese Hezbollah bore the brunt of the confrontation with the Israelis in 2024. Both groups suffered heavy losses during the year: about 80% of the "old guard" (including top officials) were eliminated, and control over strategically important facilities was lost. High-ranking Iranian military advisers who coordinated the allies' actions "on the ground" were also killed. Nevertheless, both proxy forces retained their general outlines and core of supporters, and the reduction in the intensity of hostilities due to the conflict moving into the diplomatic realm made it possible to partially restore their previous combat effectiveness. However, Tel Aviv is unlikely to allow Hamas and Hezbollah to fully recover. The "second round" of the struggle is approaching, during which the Israelis will seek the complete defeat of the enemy. Preparations for the attack are underway: Israeli forces have invaded Syria and partially “cut off” the approaches to southern Lebanon from Syrian territory, effectively blocking the Iranian “transit corridor” through which weapons and volunteers were flowing to Lebanon. A wedge has been driven between Hezbollah and like-minded Lebanese parties. Similar work is being carried out against Hamas. Israel continues to strengthen its hold on the occupied territory of Gaza, while simultaneously encouraging neutral Palestinian factions to join efforts to push Hamas out of the enclave. On the other hand, Tel Aviv’s plans are being hindered by Arab countries and Türkiye, which have their own plans for the post-war structure of Gaza. Iran is well aware of the “rat fight” around the enclave and is trying to turn it to the advantage of the “Axis of Resistance” – albeit with varying success so far. HOUTHIS: CLOSER THAN THEY SEEM In 2024, the role of the Yemeni Ansar Allah (Houthis) movement in Iran's proxy group system increased significantly. It was one of the first to engage in a real fight against Israel, paralyzing shipping in the Red and (partly) Mediterranean Seas, and after neutralizing Hamas and Hezbollah, it became the main executor of attacks on the territory of the Jewish state. At the same time, unlike the missiles and UAVs launched by Iraqi and Lebanese proxies, Ansar Allah’s products were better at penetrating the Iron Dome system and reached their targets much more often.
The few Houthi leaders have also failed to be caught. The Israelis have attempted to locate the flagship command posts more than once, but to no avail. The lack of a common border with the Houthis has a negative impact on the effectiveness of Israeli operations. There are also no loyalists in Yemen on whom one could theoretically rely when conducting a combined operation. Tel Aviv's Arab allies (in particular, the UAE) are also not eager to use their own creature to solve Israeli military-political problems. Israel has some hopes for normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia, as rapprochement with Riyadh would open up opportunities for gradually moving closer to the Yemeni borders, or at least for increasing the efficiency of identifying targets for airstrikes.
Tehran also sees the zeal of its protégés and is ready to use the resources they have to the fullest. IRAQI PROXIES IN AMBUSH Throughout 2024, Iran used its Iraqi proxy forces in a fairly limited format - numerous but still fairly disparate groups were involved either in carrying out retaliatory operations (True Promise) or conducting harassing fire on American military bases in Iraq. However, during the time of being in the "ambush", the pro-Iranian formations have done a lot of work to build a new command structure. The disparate (and often small) groups are gradually being replaced by a "proxy confederation", in the center of which are concentrated the most numerous and combat-ready forces: "Kataib Hezbollah" and "Hashd al-Shaabi". At the same time, the Hashd al-Shaabi, being integrated into the country’s armed forces, also act as an instrument of influence on official Baghdad. The strengthening of Iranian proxies in Iraq is making Tel Aviv increasingly nervous. Israeli "hawks" have repeatedly hinted at their readiness to attack Iraq if the threat from it "exceeds the permissible level." The United States, acting as one of the guarantors of stability in Iraq, does not want an open conflict between partners and is trying to put pressure on the leaders of the Shiite militias through the Iraqi government. However, Tehran also takes advantage of the continuing divisions in Iraqi society (as well as official Baghdad’s dependence on economic relations with the Iranian side) to get its protégés out of harm’s way. By the end of 2024, the diplomatic game between Tehran and Washington had effectively reached a stalemate. Given that there is no way out of the diplomatic impasse yet, Iraq could well become the arena of confrontation between Iran and Israel in 2025.
Posted by: badanov 2024-12-30 |
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