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| Al-Qa'ida's Combat Doctrine |
| 2002-02-11 |
Al-Qa'ida's Combat Doctrine In 1989, some American military experts predicted a fundamental change in the future form of warfare... They predicted that the wars of the 21st century would be dominated by a kind of warfare they called 'the fourth generation of wars.' Others called it 'asymmetric warfare...' Impetus of course came from the Vietnam experience, observation (and participation by proxy) in Afghanistan, and the myriad guerrilla wars that were popping up world-wide. Fourth-generation warfare, the experts said, is a new type of war in which fighting will be mostly scattered. The battle will not be limited to destroying military targets and regular forces, but will include societies, and will [seek to] destroy popular support for the fighters within the enemy's society... They also noted that 'the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point...' The prototype was the Algerian civil war against France in the 50s, which was based in great part on the Viet Minh war against the French. The crucial tool was found to be splitting society into "us" and "them." The Fourth Generation war concept isn't new, but the thinking to cope with it is. This new type of war presents significant difficulties for the Western war machine, and it can be expected that [Western] armies will change fundamentally. This forecast did not arise in a vacuum ... [F]ourth-generation wars have already occurred and that the superiority of the theoretically weaker party has already been proven; in many instances, nation-states have been defeated by stateless nations. Actually, the Western armies have already changed fundamentally, and not in the way the writer expects. This is a process that started during the Vietnam war with the US Special Forces, Seals, LRRPs and other funny hat guys. They actually worked to good effect against the "Fourth Generation" Viet Cong, and the war was lost fairly conventionally. It was the near-annihilation of the Viet Cong which caused the large-scale North Vietnamese involvement. Oh, and let's not forget SAS, which has even more experience, and with whom the US regularly trades ideas and techniques. [T]he Islamic nation has chalked up the most victories in a short time, in a way it has not known since the rise of the Ottoman Empire. These victories were achieved during the past twenty years, against the best armed, best trained, and most experienced armies in the world (the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan, the U.S. in Somalia, Russia in Chechnya, and the Zionist entity in southern Lebanon) and in various arenas (mountains, deserts, hills, cities). In Afghanistan, the Mujahideen triumphed over the world's second most qualitative power at that time... Similarly, a single Somali tribe humiliated America and compelled it to remove its forces from Somalia. A short time later, the Chechen Mujahideen humiliated and defeated the Russian bear. After that, the Lebanese resistance [Hizbullah] expelled the Zionist army from southern Lebanon. Interesting points. The Muhahideen were nearly demolished by the Russians by the use of Mi-25 gunships, SpetsNaz and airborne infantry tactics, and the judicious use of the KhAD secret police. They also spent a certain amount of money buying off warlords. The process of collapse was well under way when the Russians withdrew - they couldn't afford to continue the war. The US Somalia experience started out as a humanitarian mission, was changed in mid-stream, and the debacle in Mogadishu wouldn't have been a debacle had the heavy weapons the Rangers requested been approved. That failure was political, just as ultimately the Soviet failure in Afghanistan and the US failure in Vietnam was. The Chechens managed to "humiliate and defeat the Russian bear" at a moment when the country was in chaos over the breakup of the Soviet Union. So add a line to the doctrine warning to attack only when the target is in the midst of internal political and economic chaos. Finally, the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon was driven more by political concerns than by military. It is true that all the victories of the past did not lead to the establishment of the winners' regime. But this is not the topic of our study. This article is aimed at investigating the purely military confrontation, due to claims regarding the imbalance between America and the Mujahideen - which makes, according to the defeatists, Jihad and victory impossible. In fact, none of these "victories" led to the establishment of a winner's regime, which is significant in itself. Examination of the states that result from these tactics suggests that they aren't viable - they're born failed. Algeria has been a failed state since its inception. Vietnam breaks the mold because it was a colonial war, with the north establishing its control over the south. Cambodia's fate was horrific. Afghanistan was unable to establish a stable government until the Taliban arrived, and then the "stability" was imposed at the cost of mass graves dotting the country. Chechnya was not only a failed state, but contributed to the failure of Dagestan by exporting its dysfunction. And Somalia hasn't even been able to establish a government. Lebanon is probably the closest to a stable state that can be produced - under Syrian hegemony. Pretty poor record. Technology did not help these great armies... The Mujahideen proved their superiority in fourth-generation warfare using only light weaponry. They are part of the people, and hide amongst the multitudes... "The guerrilla is the fish, the people are the sea," as Chairman Mao so famously said. But no superiority has been proven and in fact the use of increasingly specialized technology makes grouping into any kind of military formation more difficult all the time. Only by remaining dispersed can the 4th Generation Hero remain safe - and his military value is reduced to that of an irritant. Al-Qa'ida takes pride in that, on September 11, it destroyed the elements of America's strategic defense, which the former U.S.S.R. and every other hostile state could not harm. These elements are: early warning, preventive strike, and the principle of deterrence. This is the admission that al-Qaeda was responsible for 9-11. No surprise there. We have Binny on tape, despite the number of Muslim was deny its authenticity. Early warning: With the September 11 attacks, Al-Qa'ida entered the annals of successful surprise attacks, which are few in history - for example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the surprise Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R. in 1941, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the crossing of the Zionist Bar-Lev Line in 1973. Moreover: In the pain it caused, [Al-Qa'ida] surpassed these surprise attacks, because it put every individual in American society on [constant] alert for every possibility, whether emotionally or practically. This has an extremely high economic and psychological price, particularly in a society that has not been affected by war since the American Civil War. If the USS Cole incident could happen to the American army, which is assumed to be in perfect preparedness, then preparing an entire society for 'terrorist' attacks appears hard to achieve. This element of surprise is essential to any successful military operation, be it conventional or by spies, saboteurs and assassins, which is what al-Qaeda's mercenary "army" boils down to. But more important, any attack without an objective is a waste of resources. The sheer number of casualties - more than at Pearl Harbor - was staggering to the civilian population, but among uniformed forces of World War I or in the South Pacific in World War II would barely have been noticed. The high economic costs can be borne by the US economy - it's healthy enough - and assuming the terror networks are ever thoroughly dismantled the more odious provisions can be relaxed, as they were after the Second World War. The damage done was to self-confidence, which the nation is in the process of retrieving. Preventive strike: This element was also shaken on September 11. This element is subordinate to the first... Even assuming that there had been early warning, it is very difficult to launch a successful preventive strike at an organization that maneuvers and moves quickly, and has no permanent bases. Attack from this particular direction became much more difficult given their first use - there was only one round in the gun. And only three out of four of the aircraft managed to attack their objectives. The passengers took out number four. The paradign has shifted in that respect, and now every loon on a plane is going to be beaten up before he can accomplish any serious damage. Subsequent attacks will have to come from a different direction. As each attack comes, measures will be taken against it. Paradigms aren't set in stone. The other thing this series of attacks did was to cause money to be put back into intelligence. There were complaints about lack of language-qualified people and the availability of collection resources - these are faults that are being addressed. Deterrence: This principle is based on the assumption that there are two sides [fighting] that seek to survive and defend their interests - but it is completely eliminated when dealing with people who don't care about living but thirst for martyrdom. While the principle of deterrence works well [in warfare] between countries, it does not work at all for an organization with no permanent bases and with no capital in Western banks, that does not rely on aid from particular countries. As a result, it is completely independent in its decisions, and it seeks conflict from the outset. How can such people, who strive for death more than anything else, be deterred? Those truly desiring death can't be deterred. But there are only a limited number of them available, and as the 4th Generation forces are defeated the desirability of dying for the Lost Cause becomes less pronounced. The proper driver for this kind of conflict would be the war of attrition, the death by a thousand cuts, rather than the spectacular. As the tide turns, more Mujahedin start thinking about how nice it would be to see the old homestead rather than to buy a very small farm. In addition to the destruction of these three elements, Al-Qa'ida has dealt Americans the most severe blow ever to their morale: One of the Western strategies determined that the best means of bringing about a psychological defeat is to attack a place where the enemy feels safe and secure. This is exactly what the Mujahideen did in New York. Morale's the key to winning the war, for both sides. The Fifth Column is essential to the succes of the Muj because they can't win by force of arms. Every victory has been in the political arena after a successful extended war of attrition. It appears, therefore, that the imbalance between America and the Mujahideen... is exactly what is needed to confront the Western military machine, particularly the American. [America] is baffled by fourth-generation warfare that suits Jihad avant-garde - especially at a time when the Islamic peoples have re-espoused Jihad, after they had nothing left to lose because of the humiliation that is their daily lot. An invalid conclusion. America isn't baffled, it's gearing up and applying all the lessons learned in the past 50 years. The spectacular defeat of the Taliban has demoralized those whom the writer is counting on to be fired up by al-Qaeda successes. The only hope they have is that the Suzy Creamcheese set and the Euro handwringers will spike the war in the USA before they're demolished. The Americans and the West comprehend the nature of the new challenge, and acknowledge the difficulty of the task ahead of them... You betcha we do, Clem. And Bush intends to follow through. The time has come for the Islamic movements facing a general crusader offensive to internalize the rules of fourth-generation warfare. They must consolidate appropriate strategic thought, and make appropriate military preparations. They must increase interest in Da'wa [proselytizing], and recruit the peoples' public and political support. In addition to the religious obligation, this has become an integral part of the means to triumph in fourth-generation warfare. Old strategists, such as [von] Clausewitz and Mao Zedong, have already indicated this. Perhaps the best example is the phenomenon of the intifada, that wiped out the Zionist military's mighty superiority over the Muslim Palestinian people. Infantry officers, feel free to critique. A couple of points hit home |
| Posted by:Fred Pruitt |