THE LARGEST KASHMIRI MILITANT OUTFIT, Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), once again finds itself in the eye of the storm as reports of another split in its ranks have become widespread in the wake of intra-organisational clashes that left one of its leaders dead. However, party sources dismiss the reports as âintelligence leaksâ.
| If they're "intelligence leaks" does that mean they're wrong? |
Talking to TFT in Muzzaffarabad, an HM leader added that ârenegade party workersâ, who rallied around Majid Dar two years ago as reports of his âsurrenderâ to Indian government became rife, had met a dead end. Over 200 Kashmiri militants tried to raise their own faction called Hizbe Islami (HI) after Majid Dar was murdered in March this year.
| By Syed Salahuddin, we might add... |
Dar had seized the opportunity to establish contacts with New Delhi as soon as India announced the ceasefire in July 2000. His act annoyed party loyalists who believe he took the step without Sallahuddinâs consent. For the last six months, Darâs followers have been trying to seize HM offices in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi and Islamabad. This has sparked clashes among party workers, some of whom have also used automatic assault rifles that were previously used in skirmishes with Indian forces.
"Yar! Gimme dat office building!"
"Mine! Y'cant' have it!"
"Take THAT!"
"Oh, yeah? Well, take DAT! An' DAT!" |
Their bid to create a separate faction suffered a serious blow, however, when Majid Dar was murdered. Most of these workers have now joined Commander Masood Sarfarz — better known as the Lion of Peer Panjal. Sarfraz, it may be recalled, managed the HM wing in Azad Kashmir before creating Hizbe Islami in 2000 after he fell out with the Jamaat-e-Islami of Azad Kashmir.
| Didn't like being controlled by Qazi's front organization, I guess. Pound for pound (and there are a lotta pounds there) Qazi's probably got more ego than any two other Paks... |
At the time the Jamaat cadres faced a standoff with Sarfrazâ men in the town of Kotli and fire was exchanged between the two sides for days.
| "Yar! We be havin' a political discussion! Bring up more ammo!" |
A spokesman for Masoodâs party â Sikandar Rajaurvi â told TFT from Kotli that 467 loyalists of Majid Dar had already joined hands with them. The numbers, according to other Kashmiri sources, are not as high as the HI claims. âIt cannot be more than 250,â says a Kashmiri, familiar with the militant scene. He also disputes claims about split in the HM. âThere have been four splits since 1990,â he says. âAll of them aimed at removing Syed Sallahuddin. However, he has survived until now and fully controls the party.â
| Since he doesn't hesitate to have his rivals bumped off... |
The Jamiat ul- Mujahideen of General Abdullah, Muslim Mujahideen of Ahsan Dar, Hizbe Islami of Masood and Al-Badr of Bakht Zameen managed to break away from the HM. But the intricacy of the situation surrounding Kashmiri militantsâ operations from the Pakistani soil simply prevented the emergence of another splinter group. Sources say those in existence since early 1990s are already facing the crunch. Their funds have shrunk in the face of mounting international pressure on Pakistan to dismantle these groups. Analysts claim, however, that the merger of Dar-remnants into the Hizbe Islami of Commander Masood is the culmination of power struggle within the HM that has gone on since the summer of 2000.
| I'm not counting on hard times to wind down the jihadis. The money could start flowing again at any time. The fact that they're not out of business indicates there's still a trickle coming out of the pipe... |
This is not a new phenomenon. Other groups like Harkat-ul-Mujahideen have faced splits, the worst being the emergence of Jaish-e Mohammad after Masoud Azhar decided to part ways with Commander [Fazlur Rehman] Khalil of Harkat. Masoud not only split but went on to capture the Harkat assets in the Punjab and even got Harkat cadres to join his party. The split resulted in major disputes and even fire-fights at the time. And as one former intelligence official concedes, one of the tricks in the book is to not allow any one group to become too strong.
âThis is a tried and tested mode of keeping overall control of such groups. Whenever one group is seen as getting too strong or influential, the agencies try to split it and sometimes pit one against the other,â he says. It seems that the Kashmir jihad is no exception. |