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| STRATFOR: Geopolitical |
| 2004-02-19 |
| Last week we wrote about the attack in Al Fallujah against CENTCOM commander Gen. John Abizaid, "It also had a degree of sophistication: It was clearly driven by intelligence and had a degree of coordination among a small number of men. There have been several other effective guerrilla attacks on U.S. forces in the past 24 hours. There appears to be a hardening of guerrilla capabilities in the past few days." We added, "It will be interesting to see where the guerrillas -- and the jihadists -- are a week from now. It will be telling about the shape of the war, at least until the summer." We have not had to wait a week for another demonstration of the guerrillas’ prowess. On the morning of Feb. 14, a team of Iraqi guerrillas executed a complex assault against a police station in Al Fallujah, freeing a number of prisoners. It is unclear which prisoner or prisoners they wanted to free, but they certainly seem to have succeeded in their goal, whatever it was. Twenty-three were killed and more than 80 prisoners were released. What was most impressive about the attack was that it involved multiple groups executing carefully timed attacks on multiple targets in the city. (IIRC another article that i read spoke of the guerillas setting checkpoints on roads into the city). One group of about 25 struck at the police station, while another group of about the same number kept Iraqi Civil Defense Corps troops pinned at a nearby facility using rocket-propelled grenades and heavy machine guns. The first group moved systematically through the police station, gunning down defenders and freeing prisoners. There is some question about who the attackers were. Some witnesses said they were speaking Farsi -- Iran’s national language -- while some said they were speaking other languages (Chechen?). There were reports that Lebanese and Iranian passports were found on bodies, but passports are a commodity in the region and do not, by themselves, prove anything. Such reports are inherently unreliable, but they need to be kept in mind when considering the event. Clearly, the war has entered a new phase. As we argued last week, U.S. forces have failed to completely suppress the guerrilla forces west of Baghdad, although they have been quite successful to the north, where they concentrated efforts in December and January. However, this guerrilla operation is unlike others we have seen even to the west of the city. The number of troops involved, the coordination of the attacks, the fact that there was a purpose other than simply inflicting casualties, all represent a fairly startling new development. It is certainly true that the guerrillas did not engage American forces, which is probably a good idea on their part. The Iraqi defenders are neither well trained nor well armed. It is not bad strategy to go after softer targets. Moreover, the stated strategy -- of the jihadists at least -- has been to punish those who collaborate with the Americans, which this attack certainly did, along with demonstrating that the Iraqi forces were not ready for significant duty. It is more important, however, to understand who they are and where they came from. There are three possible theories. The first is that they are part of the original guerrilla force that has been operating in the region -- now seasoned, confident and operating more effectively. The second is that these are foreign jihadists -- working with or without Iraqis -- moving into the region to carry out operations. A third explanation is that the Iraqi guerrilla movement is even better organized than first thought: A cadre of dedicated but relatively untrained troops carried out the first wave of operations from May through December 2002. A second cadre of Baathist troops, drawn perhaps from the Special Republican Guards, has now been activated and is drawing on weapons caches pre-positioned for them. If the latter were the case, it would mean that the guerrilla movement had prepared for a long-term war. But the proof of this will be when other, similarly significant operations begin elsewhere in the country. If this activity is confined to the area west of the city, then this explanation is unlikely, and one of the first two explanations is more likely. However, we are just about ready to say that the guerrilla war is going into extra innings. The emergence of this new force indicates a new level of capability for the guerrillas and must be taken with utmost seriousness. It is difficult to imagine that this force was once organized but is now dispersed. It required substantial command, control and intelligence to bring this force together and conduct the assault. It would be very surprising if this operation were a one-off. The important question to watch is whether this happens only in this region, or whether other guerrilla combat teams are in place elsewhere. |
| Posted by:Evert Visser |
| #2 No problem. Easy to fix, and good article. |
| Posted by: Fred 2004-2-19 6:51:42 PM |
| #1 Apologies for the mess i made of the title of this piece, I'll consider it a lesson learned. |
| Posted by: Evert Visser 2004-2-19 5:58:09 AM |