| Submit your comments on this article |
| First Attack on WTC Today in 1993 |
| 2004-02-26 |
| Someone call the New York Times, tell them "Clinton Lied - People Died....." On 26th February 1993, at approximately 12.18 p.m., an improvised explosive device exploded on the second level of the World Trade Center parking basement. The resulting blast produced a crater, approximately 150 feet in diameter and five floors deep, in the parking basement. The structure consisted mainly of steel-reinforced concrete, twelve to fourteen inches thick. The epicenter of the blast was approximately eight feet from the south wall of Trade Tower Number One, near the support column K31/8. The device had been placed in the rear cargo portion of a one-ton Ford F350 Econoline van, owned by the Ryder Rental Agency, Jersey City, New Jersey. Approximately 6,800 tons of material were displaced by the blast. The main explosive charge consisted primarily of approximately 1,200 to 1,500 pounds of a home-made fertilizer-based explosive, urea nitrate. The fusing system consisted of two 20-minute lengths of a non-electric burning type fuse such as green hobby fuse. The hobby fuse terminated in the lead azide, as the initiator. Also incorporated in the device and placed under the main explosive charge were three large metal cylinders (tare weight 126 pounds) of compressed hydrogen gas. The crime scene and prosecution On 26th February 1993, at approximately 12.18 p.m., an explosion occurred under the World Trade Center complex in New York City. Early media reports and some telephone com-munications from law enforcement personnel in New York suggested that a generator had exploded. Bomb technician Special Agents from the New York FBI had responded as a first analysis team and their conclusion was that an improvised explosive device had exploded. Subsequent requests to the FBI Laboratory for field support were met with two Special Agent Examiners from the FBI Laboratory Explosives Unit who arrived in New York on 27th February. Initial analyses of the crime scene confirmed that the damage had been caused by an improvised explosive device. Within one week following the explosion, more than 300 law enforcement officers from around the country had sifted through more than 2,500 cubic yards of debris weighing in excess of 6,800 tons, and had pieced together evidence in the most significant international terrorist act ever committed on U.S. soil. The resulting explosion killed six people and injured more than a thousand. More than 50,000 people were evacuated from the Trade Center complex during the hours immediately following the blast. The initial inspection on 27th February was described as "a scene of massive devastation, almost surreal". It was like walking into a cave, with no lights other than flashlights flickering across the crater. There were small pockets of fire, electrical arcing from damaged wiring, and automobile alarms whistling, howling and honking. The explosion ruptured two of the main sewage lines from both Trade towers and the Vista Hotel and several water mains from the air conditioning system. In all, more than 2 million gallons of water and sewage were pumped out of the crime scene. After an initial inspection of the underground parking area, FBI explosive unit personnel were able to determine that a crater had been formed, measuring approximately 150 feet in diameter at its widest point and over five stories deep. The damage done to automobiles, concrete and structural steel, for example, suggested that the explosive had a velocity of detonation of around 14,000 to 15,500 feet per second. It is known that there are several commercial explosives that fall within that range of detonation, including some dynamites, water gels, slurries and fertilizer-based explosives. The explosive damage was more of a pushing and heaving type rather than the damage one would expect from a more brisant shattering and splitting explosive such as TNT or C-4. Also, by an initial assessment of the type of damage and the size of the crater, it was determined that the explosive main charge must have been between 1,200 and 1,500 pounds. When making this type of extrapolation, the explosive expert must consider external factors such as confinement by the target itself, witness materials and structural integrity of the building. Once the type and amount of explosive had been estimated, it was possible to surmise that the bomb had been too large to transport in a sedan-type automobile, while the ceiling clearance limited the height of the vehicle. By this method of reasonable deduction, the initial opinion was that the explosive device had to have been transported into the Trade Center parking area in either a pickup truck or a van. During the initial assessment of explosive damage to the complex, it became very clear that the structural integrity of Trade Tower Number One was at risk, and that the Vista Hotel would probably collapse within days if structural steel support was not in place as soon as possible. It was also apparent that structural problems were not the only safety hazard. The raw sewage present could present a biological hazard, as could the asbestos and mineral wool (a level 2 carcinogen), acid and fuel from the automobiles, and small fires caused by short circuits. Another concern was the possibility of pieces of concrete 14 inches thick and as large as a kitchen table falling from 70 feet above. And as one would expect at a bombing crime scene, there were a great many sharp metal fragments from both the building and the vehicles present during the blast. Before establishing a plan of attack to begin the collection of evidence, other concerns were important. The Port Authority Transportation system, PATH, which operates a train system from New Jersey into New York, a major commuter umbilicus, was damaged by the blast. If the system could not operate on the Monday morning, commuting would be a nightmare. Late on Saturday night, it was decided to evacuate the complex, place seismographic equipment around the damaged area and run a train through the system. Results of this test showed that with minimal structural support, the train could be allowed to run on Monday: one problem solved. Within hours of the blast, OSHA, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, advised that certain personal safety and breathing equipment must be used by crime scene personnel. OSHA personnel volunteered to conduct personal sessions with every individual and fit dust proof masks. They also provided numerous air quality monitors to determine if the crime scene effort disturbed any hazardous materials. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was concerned about the disposal of the unwanted debris from the crime scene. The co-operation provided by OSHA and the air analyses convinced EPA personnel that disposal would not be a problem. The vehicle frame fragment found on the site and the VIN which led to identification of the van used by the bombers. On 28th February, four FBI forensic chemists and four ATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms) chemists arrived to begin explosive residue collection. A transient chemistry explosive residue laboratory was put together in the already existing New York City Police Department Laboratory. Later that evening, six forensic chemists, two from each agency (FBI, ATF, NYPD) were dispatched to the crater area to collect explosive residues. A bomb technician from the NYPD and an ATF agent were also assigned to provide safety support for the chemists. During the early morning hours of this residue collection, the bomb technician discovered a fragment from a vehicle frame which displayed massive explosive damage. The ATF agent and bomb technician placed the 300 pound fragment on a litter and carried it to a police vehicle. The fragment was transported to the Laboratory for analysis. Due to sewage contamination, the piece was of no value for explosive residue analyses. A closer inspection of the fragment displayed a dot matrix number. The number was identified as the confidential vehicle identification number of a van reported stolen the day before the bombing. The vehicle was a 1990 Ford, F-350 Econoline van owned by the Ryder Rental Agency, rented in New Jersey and reported stolen in New Jersey. The frame fragment displayed explosive damage consistent with damage from a device exploding inside the vehicle. By Sunday morning a fully operational Evidence Control Center was established in the basement of the Merryl Lynch building across West Street. This evidence command post incorporated secure and non-secure telephones and facsimile, photocopiers, radio communication with the crime scene and FBI headquarters in New York, computers and data processors, phototelesis, and a scheduled meeting room. Merryl Lynch maintained security from the media until investigation of the crime scene was completed. On Monday morning three teams were assembled and the entrance and exit ramps to the parking basement were secured and cleaned while contract engineers were rapidly securing the structural support of the crime scene. By Tuesday morning approximately 200 law enforcement officers from at least eight different agencies were on hand to begin the monumental task of collecting evidence. Also by Tuesday, four Assistant United States Attorneys were assigned to the prosecution. It was fortunate that the attorneys were assigned at that time because late on Monday night the vehicle fragment was identified by the FBI Laboratory as having been a portion of the vehicle that contained the device and as having been reported stolen on 25th February 1993. FBI agents travelled to the Ryder Rental Agency in Jersey City, New Jersey, which had rented out the vehicle and began an interview of the station manager. While the interview was under way, an individual by the name of Mohammad Salameh telephoned Ryder and wanted his security deposit returned. A meeting was arranged so that Salameh would return to the Ryder Agency on 4th March. When he returned for the $400 deposit, FBI agents were on hand to place him under surveillance. As Salameh was leaving, numerous media personnel were observed outside, setting up their photography equipment. It was then decided that Salameh would be arrested on the spot. His arrest and the subsequent search of his personal property led to Nidel Ayyad, a chemist working for the Allied Signal Corporation in New Jersey. Ayyad was connected to Salameh through telephone toll records and joint bank accounts. At the time of Ayyad’s arrest his personal computer was seized from his office (more about that later). Also through toll records and receipts, a safe house or bomb factory was located on Pamrappo Avenue, in Jersey City. A search of this bomb factory revealed that acids and other chemicals had been used at that apartment to manufacture explosives. Traces of nitro-glycerine and urea nitrate were found on the carpet and embedded in the ceiling. It appeared that a chemical reaction involving acid had occurred in the apartment. At the same time, telephone toll records from Salameh and Ayyad showed that calls had been made to a self-storage center not too far from the bomb factory. An interview with the manager of the self-storage center indicated that Salameh had rented a space, and that four "Arab looking" individuals had been observed using a Ryder van several days before the bombing. The manager also said that the day before the bombing, AGL Welding Supply from Clifton, New Jersey, had delivered three large tanks of compressed hydrogen gas. The storage manager had told Salameh to remove them that day. During the search of the storage room rented by Salameh, many chemicals and items of laboratory equipment were located. Among the items seized was 300 pounds of urea, 250 pounds of sulfuric acid, numerous one-gallon containers, both empty and containing nitric acid and sodium cyanide, two 50-foot lengths of hobby fuse, a blue plastic trash can, and a bilge pump. While examining the trash can and bilge pump, a white crystalline substance was found. A chemical analysis identified urea nitrate. While inventorying the materials in the storage center, six 2-quart bottles of brown liquid were discovered. The liquid was identified as home-made nitro-glycerine, very unstable in the condition in which it was found. The nitro-glycerine was transported and destroyed by the New Jersey State Police Bomb Squad. On 3rd March, a type-written communication was received at the New York Times. The communique claimed respon-sibility for the bombing of the World Trade Center in the name of Allah. The letter was composed on a personal computer and printed on a laser printer. Very little can be identified as to the origin of the printer, but a search of the hidden files in Ayyad’s computer revealed wording identical to that of the text of the communique. Saliva samples from Salameh, Ayyad and a third man, Mahmud Abouhalima, were obtained and compared with the saliva on the envelope flap. A DNA Q Alpha examination concluded that Ayyad had licked the envelope on the communique received by the Times. Abuhalima, who was an integral part of the conspiracy, had fled the United States the day after the bombing, and had later been arrested in Egypt and extradited back to the United States. Meanwhile investigations at the crime scene continued. All items of potential evidence were documented on the sites, preserving the chain of evidence and the chain of custody. In less than one month, the crime scene investigations were completed. In all, approximately 3,000 pounds of debris were removed from the crime scene and transported to the FBI Laboratory in Washington, D.C. In September 1992, a man named Ahmad M. Ajaj had entered the United States from Pakistan at New York’s JFK airport. He was arrested on a passport violation. In his checked luggage, Ajaj had numerous manuals and video cassette tapes. These tapes and manuals described methods of manufacturing explosives, including urea nitrate, nitro-glycerine, lead azide, TNT and other high explosives. Interviews and latent fingerprint examinations identified two other individuals who were an integral part of the bombing conspiracy. The first, Ramzi Yousef, had entered the U.S. on the same flight as Ajaj, but had been deported immediately. Yousef was identified through fingerprints and photospreads as having been associating with Salameh immediately prior to the bombing. His fingerprints were also found in the explosive manuals located in Ajaj’s checked luggage. The second individual, known only as "Yassin", was identified in much the same manner and was probably involved in the packaging and delivery of the bomb on the morning of 26th February. The FBI Laboratory was under the gun to complete all scientific examinations by 7th July 1993 in compliance with the Speedy Trial Act. A trial date was established for 6th September 1993. During the examination of evidence in the Laboratory, the remains of 3 high-pressure gas cylinders belonging to the AGL Welding Company were identified. A small fragment of red paint with a grey primer was located on one of the metal fragments of the gas cylinder. This paint fragment was compared with the red paint used by AGL on their hydrogen tanks and was found to be the same. On one portion of a fragment of the Ryder truck bed, several fragments of blue plastic, the size of a pin head, were located. These fragments were compared with the plastic from the trash container at the self-storage center premises Salameh had rented and were found to be alike. Fragments of all four tyres were found at the crime scene and compared with the data on the maintenance scheduled at Ryder. All four tyres were accounted for. Prior to the trial, the FBI Laboratory’s Special Project Section constructed a scale model of the portion of the Trade Center that was damaged by the blast. The model incorporated push-button fiber optic lighting to depict the location at the crime scene where pertinent items of evidence were found. Once illuminated and described to the jury during the trial, the lights and the model told a very clear and precise story. During the six month trial, more than 200 witnesses introduced over 1000 exhibits. On 4th March 1994, exactly one year after Salameh’s arrest, the jury found Salameh, Ajaj, Abuhalima and Ayyad guilty on all thirty-eight counts. Abuhalima was identified during neighborhood investigations at the bomb factory and storage center through a photospread. It was later determined that he was an integral part of the conspiracy. He had fled the United States the day after the bombing and was arrested in Egypt. He was thereafter extradited to the United States. One can only speculate on how history would be different if Janet Reno and the rest of the Justice Department had taken this information to CIA and asked them to approach this information as a "threat to national security". which in restrospect, it clearly was. |
| Posted by: |
| #4 While the interview was under way, an individual by the name of Mohammad Salameh telephoned Ryder and wanted his security deposit returned. That always amazed me about this case. Because this cheap idiot prick wanted his 400 bucks back, they rolled up the whole crew. No wonder they do suicide jobs now. |
| Posted by: tu3031 2004-2-26 10:37:40 PM |
| #3 Is there a link to this article? I'm sorry to be so stupid, but I just don't see the link. (Just checking the stupidity meter...yah...mine) (...missing links? This isn't the anthropology section, nitwit-Ed) I've googled and found what I believe is the article at http://www.interpol.int/Public/Publications/ICPR/ICPR469_3.asp. And thanks for posting this...whoever you are. |
| Posted by: Quana 2004-2-26 9:28:25 PM |
| #2 Sadly, I think we all know the answer to that. |
| Posted by: JDB 2004-2-26 8:14:48 PM |
| #1 Anyone care to guess how many times Clinton visited the site? |
| Posted by: Robert Crawford 2004-2-26 1:28:19 PM |