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| Terror Networks |
| Suitcase Nukes - a primer |
| 2004-04-06 |
| EFL from Tech Central’s Ralph Kinney Bennett. Posted because as an unclassified confirmation of some previous RB discussions about the unlikelihood of an Islamo-nuke working effectively for a terrorist organization. ... The big question is the shelf-life and availability of nuclear artillery shells. The U.S. shells are apparently accounted for and secure. Whether all the Soviet era mini-warheads can be accounted for is another story. The shelf-life issue is important. If there is a nuclear munition or more than one "out there," its condition could be in question. A nuclear weapon involves the melding of a variety of materials in close proximity -- metals, plastics, ceramics, exotic high explosives and, of course plutonium and uranium. Things happen inside a nuclear weapon even when it is just sitting. The plutonium core gives off quite a bit of heat. This will warm the other parts of the weapon up to as much as 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Uranium "rusts" in much the same manner as steel when exposed to the air. And even though warheads are sealed in airtight metal containers, the materials inside -- the explosives and plastic, for instance -- give off trace amounts of oxygen, hydrogen and water vapor that can eventually cause oxidation and corrosion, both of which are abetted by the weapon’s intrinsic heat. The high explosives in the detonating "lenses" of a weapon also have been known to deteriorate. So, unless the purloined (or purchased) warhead was regularly monitored and, if necessary, refurbished by experts it might become dangerously unstable or perhaps not work at all. It’s conceivable that the conventional explosives might detonate incompletely and that the nuclear core might be scattered rather than being "assembled" to cause a nuclear explosion. Thus a "dirty bomb" incident, spreading radioactive material, would be the result. Of course a nuclear weapon gives off a significant signature in the form of both gamma rays and neutrons. A huge effort is being made to employ a variety of gamma and neutron spectrometry devices at ports of entry and the perimeters of potential targets. But these devices (and more sophisticated ones are now being worked on at the national laboratories) are not foolproof. Distance, shielding of various types (tungsten, lead, steel of a given thickness) and the problem of false positives and false negatives are some of the challenges now being wrestled with by detection experts. In the end, an atomic bomb in a suitcase is really just a metaphor, not only for the portability of nuclear weapons but for the new and ominous possibility of who might be carrying them. The fictional tweedy professor who terrorized London in "Seven Days to Noon" was a misguided idealist with a bomb in a satchel. Those who now seek to terrorize the West and particularly the United States are hate-filled killers who have glorified suicide as a virtue and are bending every effort to secure and use "the bomb," be it in a suitcase, a packing crate, a car or whatever will surreptitiously deliver it to target. "If" is not the question. Where and when are. The article is a good one. This serves as unclassified confirmation that shelf life and maintenance would be the stoppers preventing amateurs from venturing into proliferation. Al Zawahiri’s story appears to be bravado. |
| Posted by:Super Hose |
| #3 Ship- Actually, the point I was making is that it's damned near impossible - not completely, but close enough to it that we can be reasonably safe. We'll always have to be vigilant, but the chances are small at best. Mike |
| Posted by: Mike Kozlowski 2004-04-06 11:41:25 PM |
| #2 How many did ya bring thru Mike K. ? |
| Posted by: Shipman 2004-04-06 4:30:01 PM |
| #1 ....2o years ago, Jim Dunnigan (the man who now runs StrategyPage.com) called this "the suitcase from Allah." Mr. Bennett's article is dead solid on the money. Short of purchasing a brand new weapon right off the assembly line and maintaining it to US standards, all they have is a very expensive doorstop. The possibility of using it as a dirty bomb is a real one - but having served on a decon team that prepared for accidents involving weapons hundreds of times more powerful, believe me - decon will be comparatively easy. He's also off on his comments about US weapon sizes, but that's a moot point. Now, one other comment, regarding Mr Bennett's thoughts on smuggling a weapon into the US - if it was possible, why hasn't it been done? "I can say no more." Mike |
| Posted by: Mike Kozlowski 2004-04-06 1:46:12 PM |