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| Bolton: The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance |
| 2004-04-28 |
| exceprt from a Statement to the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons New York City April 27, 2004 - I opened this transcript hoping to find that Bolton had really gone off his nut in an entertaining fashion. Instead I found that there is an upcoming opportunity to strengthen this treaty which has proved to be, at best a worthless piece of paper and, at worst, a boondoggle for proliferators and their customers. I am encouraged that GW seems to have an improvement plan mapped out. The United States supports the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is committed to its goals. But despite our strong support, the support of many NPT countries and the best intentions of most of you here, at least four NPT non-nuclear member countries were or are using the NPT as cover for the development of nuclear weapons. States like Iran are actively violating their treaty obligations, and have gained access to technologies and materials for their nuclear weapons programs. North Korea violated its NPT obligations while a party, and then proved its strategic decision to seek nuclear weapons by withdrawing from the Treaty entirely. Two states in the past -- Iraq and Libya -- had also violated the NPT. Libya took the important decision to disclose and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction programs, a paradigm that other nations now seeking nuclear weapons should emulate. snip - continued intro President Bushâs Proposals The U.S. remains strongly committed to its Article VI obligations, and President Bush has made major contributions to the goals of Article VI. The transformation of our relationship with Russia led quickly to a commitment by President Bush to undertake reductions in deployed nuclear weapons to historically low levels. A similar pledge by President Putin soon followed, and both commitments were later codified in the Treaty of Moscow. There are many similar accomplishments, such as the establishment of the Global Partnership against the spread of WMD, which President Bush has proposed expanding, and which will accomplish much toward ridding the world of WMD materials and equipment. Overall, it is a very impressive record of action that is making the world a safer place. In order to address loopholes and the crisis of noncompliance with the NPT, President Bush announced four proposals that would strengthen the Treaty and the governance structures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (âIAEAâ). The first proposal would close the loophole in the Treaty that allows states such as Iran and North Korea to pursue fissile material for nuclear weapons under peaceful cover. Enrichment and reprocessing plants would be limited to those states that now possess them. Members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group would refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. Nuclear fuel supplier states would ensure a reliable supply of nuclear fuel at reasonable prices to all NPT parties in full compliance with the NPT that agreed to forego such facilities. In this way, nations could use peaceful nuclear power as anticipated by the Treaty, but not to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Treaty provides no right to such sensitive fuel cycle technologies. Second, President Bush proposed creating a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors, to âfocus intensively on safeguards and ⊠ensure that nations comply with their international obligations.â The Bush Administration is committed to working with the IAEA and its members to ensure that clandestine nuclear activity is uncovered and reported to the United Nations Security Council. As the President said when announcing these proposals, âFor international norms to be effective, they must be enforced.â As a third step, the President urged states that are serious about fighting proliferation to approve and implement the Additional Protocol and proposed that, as of the end of 2005, the Additional Protocol be a condition of supply for Nuclear-Suppliers Group-controlled items. While the Additional Protocol is not foolproof, if implemented and rigorously enforced, it would give the IAEA important new tools to detect undeclared nuclear activity. As President Bush said: âNations that are serious about fighting proliferation will approve and implement the Additional Protocol.â There are no excuses; if you wish to be considered a responsible partner and leader in strengthening nuclear nonproliferation, you must be willing to do your share by demonstrating a willingness to assume the obligations of this important new tool. The IAEA has demonstrated over the years that it is able to devise approaches that can protect sensitive or proprietary technology. I urge all states that have not concluded an Additional Protocol to do so at the earliest possible date. Fourth, the President proposed that we stop states under investigation for NPT and IAEA violations from holding seats on the IAEA Board of Governors or on the new IAEA special committee. As it now stands, states under investigation by the IAEA are allowed to sit in judgment of their own covert nuclear weapons programs as well as those of other rogue states. Violators thus can get a platform to impede effective IAEA action and enforcement against their own secret nuclear weapons efforts. It was outrageous that Iran actually was a member of the Board last year while that body was deliberating how to deal with Iranâs nuclear weapons effort. Ensuring that suspect states do not sit on the IAEA Board is particularly important given the Boardâs tradition of trying to reach decisions by consensus. As the President said, âThe integrity and mission of the IAEA depends on this simple principle: Those actively breaking the rules should not be entrusted with enforcing the rules. The Inherent Linkage Between Articles II & IV of the NPT The central bargain of the NPT is that if non-nuclear weapons states renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons, they may gain assistance in developing civilian nuclear power. This bargain is clearly set forth in Article IV of the Treaty, which states that the Treatyâs ârightâ to develop peaceful nuclear energy is clearly conditioned upon parties complying with Treaty Articles I & II. If a non-nuclear weapon state party seeks to acquire nuclear weapons and thus fails to conform with Article II, then under the Treaty that party forfeits its right to assistance in the development of peaceful nuclear energy. -snip- specifics to cases of Iran, North Korea and Lybiaâs circumventions of treat and concluding statement. Whether citizens agree that Bush has the right plan, the opportunity to improve the NPT is wasted at extreme hazard to our future safety. |
| Posted by:Super Hose |
| #1 I got mine. |
| Posted by: not tellin 2004-04-28 3:48:27 PM |