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| Terror Networks |
| Stephen Hayes Insists Iraq and al Qaeda Did Collaborate |
| 2004-06-19 |
| From The Weekly Standard, an article by Stephen F. Hayes .... Here in full is the relevant portion of Staff Statement 15: Bin Ladin also explored possible cooperation with Iraq during his time in Sudan, despite his opposition to Hussein’s secular regime. Bin Ladin had in fact at one time sponsored anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Sudanese, to protect their own ties with Iraq, reportedly persuaded bin Ladin to cease this support and arranged for contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. A senior Iraqi Intelligence officer reportedly made three visits to Sudan, finally meeting bin Ladin in 1994. Bin Ladin is said to have requested space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but Iraq apparently never responded. There have been reports that contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda also occurred after bin Ladin had returned to Afghanistan, but they do not appear to have resulted in a collaborative relationship. Two senior bin Ladin associates have adamantly denied that any ties existed between al Qaeda and Iraq. We have no credible evidence that Iraq and al Qaeda cooperated on attacks against the United States. .... bin Laden’s 1994 meeting with the "Iraqi intelligence officer" -- Farouk Hijazi -- is important. The U.S. intelligence community has long believed that Saddam was willing to use Islamic militants -- including al Qaeda -- to exact revenge on the United States for his humiliating defeat in the first Gulf War. ... Saddam played host to a wide range of Islamic militants through "Popular Islamic Conferences" his regime sponsored in Baghdad. He gradually Islamicized his rhetoric, incorporated harsh elements of Islamic law into the Iraqi legal code, and funded a variety of Islamic terrorist groups -- some quite openly, including Hamas. On August 27, 1998, Uday Hussein’s state-run newspaper, Babel, proclaimed bin Laden an "Arab and Islamic hero." Jabir Salim, an Iraqi intelligence agent stationed in Prague who defected in 1998, reported to British intelligence that he had received instructions from Baghdad, and $150,000, to recruit an Islamic militant to attack the broadcast headquarters of Radio Free Iraq in the Czech capital. And virtually no one disputes that Saddam offered bin Laden safe haven in Iraq in late 1998 or early 1999. The chief obstacle to Iraq-al Qaeda collaboration, according to this reasoning, was bin Laden’s presumed unwillingness to work with Hussein. Osama had, after all, publicly labeled the Iraqi dictator an "infidel." But in 1993 -- according to testimony provided by top al Qaeda terrorist Jamal Ahmed Al-Fadl and included in the Clinton administration’s formal indictment of bin Laden in the spring of 1998 -- the Iraqi regime and al Qaeda reached an "understanding," whereby al Qaeda would not agitate against the Iraqi regime and in exchange the Iraqis would provide assistance on "weapons development." The following year, according to Staff Statement 15, bin Laden took the Iraqis up on their pledge. Hijazi told his interrogators in May 2003 that bin Laden had specifically requested Chinese-manufactured antiship limpet mines as well as training camps in Iraq. .... It was the Iraqis, per the 9/11 Commission report, who were reluctant to work with al Qaeda. But were they? According to numerous intelligence reports dating back to the Clinton administration, Iraq provided chemical weapons training (and perhaps materials) to the Sudanese government-run Military Industrial Corporation -- which, along with Sudanese intelligence, also had a close relationship with al Qaeda. .... William Cohen, secretary of defense under Clinton, testified to this before the September 11 Commission ... about U.S. attacks on a Sudanese pharmaceutical factory ... 13 days after al Qaeda terrorists bombed U.S. embassies in East Africa. ... The Clinton administration, in its efforts to justify the strikes, told reporters that the plant had strong links to Iraq’s chemical weapons program. No fewer than six top Clinton administration officials -- on the record -- cited the Iraq connection to justify its strikes in response to the al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. embassies. .... Here is Cohen’s response to the 9/11 Commission in its entirety: ... this particular facility ... had been constructed under extraordinary security circumstances, even with some surface-to-air missile capability or defense capabilities ... the plant had been funded in part by the so-called Military Industrial Corporation; bin Laden had put [money] into this Military Industrial Corporation; the owner of the plant had traveled to Baghdad to meet with the father of the VX program; and the CIA had found traces of EMPTA nearby the facility itself. According to all the intelligence, there was no other known use for EMPTA at that time other than as a precursor to VX. ... Given this intelligence -- and telephone intercepts cited by unnamed Clinton officials between the plant manager and Emad al-Ani, the head of Iraq’s chemical weapons program -- one wonders why the Iraq war did not take place in the wake of the embassy bombings in 1998. .... Staff Statement 16 briefly assesses the alleged meeting between 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague in April 2001. It says, "Based on the evidence available -- including investigation by Czech and U.S. authorities plus detainee reporting -- we do not believe that such a meeting occurred." The report makes no mention of the fact that five senior Czech officials are on record confirming the meeting. In private conversations, some of these officials are less emphatic than their public statements would suggest. Yet when reporters ask about the meeting, the Czechs refer them to their previous public statements confirming the meeting. And what is the evidence upon which the commission staff bases its conclusion? Articles in the New York Times, Newsweek, and the Washington Post had reported that the U.S. intelligence community has rental car records and hotel receipts that place Atta in the United States at the time of the alleged meeting. According to senior Bush administration officials, no such records exist, and the commission’s report mentions no such documentation. "The FBI’s investigation," it says, "places [Atta] in Virginia as of April 4, as evidenced by this bank surveillance camera shot of Atta withdrawing $8,000 from his account. Atta was back in Florida by April 11, if not before. Indeed, investigation has established that on April 6, 9, 10, and 11, Atta’s cellular telephone was used numerous times to call Florida phone numbers from cell sites within Florida. We have seen no evidence that Atta ventured overseas again or reentered the United States before July, when he traveled to Spain and back under his true name." So contrary to previous reporting, Atta cannot be definitively placed in the United States at the time of the alleged meeting. Cell phone records are interesting, but hardly conclusive. It is entirely possible that Atta would leave his cell phone behind if he left the country. In any case, the hijackers are known to have shared cell phones. More disturbing, however, is what the commission staff left out. Staff Statement 16, which purportedly provides the "Outline of the 9/11 Plot," offers a painstakingly detailed account of Atta’s whereabouts in the months leading up to 9/11. But it contains a notable gap: The report makes no mention of a confirmed trip -- technically, two trips -- that Atta made to Prague. .... Atta applied for a Czech visa in Bonn, Germany, on May 26, 2000. He was apparently one day late. His subsequent behavior suggests that he needed the visa for a trip scheduled for May 30, 2000. Although his visa wasn’t ready by that date, Atta took a Lufthansa flight to Prague Ruzyne Airport anyway. Without a visa, Atta could go no farther than the arrival/departure terminal; he remained in this section of the airport for nearly six hours. After returning to Germany, Atta picked up his new visa in Bonn and on June 2, 2000, boarded a bus in Frankfurt bound for Prague. After the approximately seven-hour trip, Atta disappeared in Prague for almost 24 hours. Czech officials cannot find evidence of his staying in a hotel under his own name, suggesting he registered under an assumed name or stayed in a private home. Atta flew from Prague to Newark, New Jersey, on June 3, 2000. .... Ahmed Hikmat Shakir ... is an Iraqi who was present at the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. U.S. intelligence officials do not know whether Shakir was an active participant in the meeting, but there is little doubt he was there. In August 1999, Shakir began working as a VIP greeter for Malaysian Airlines. He told associates he had gotten the job through a contact at the Iraqi embassy. In fact, Shakir’s embassy contact controlled his schedule -- told him when to report to work and when to take a day off. The contact apparently told Shakir to report to work on January 5, 2000, the same day September 11 hijacker Khalid al Mihdhar arrived in Kuala Lumpur. Shakir escorted al Mihdhar to a waiting car and then, rather than bid his guest farewell, jumped in the car with him. The meeting lasted from January 5 to January 8. Shakir reported to work twice after the meeting broke up and then disappeared. He was arrested in Doha, Qatar, on September 17, 2001. Authorities found both on his body and in his apartment contact information for a number of high-ranking al Qaeda terrorists. They included the brother of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Abu Hajer al Iraqi, described by one detainee as Osama bin Laden’s "best friend." Despite this, Shakir was released from custody. He was detained again on October 21, 2001, in Amman, Jordan, where he was to have caught a flight to Baghdad. The Jordanians held Shakir for three months. The Iraqi regime contacted the Jordanian government and either requested or demanded -- depending on who you ask -- his release. The Jordanians, with the apparent acquiescence of the CIA, set him free in late January 2002, at which point he returned to Baghdad. Then earlier this spring, Shakir’s name was found on three lists of the officers of Saddam’s Fedayeen. It’s possible, of course, that there is more than one Ahmed Hikmat Shakir. And even if the Shakir listed as an officer of the Saddam Fedayeen is the same Shakir who was present at the 9/11 planning meeting, it does not mean that the Iraqi regime helped plan or even had foreknowledge of those attacks. But how can the 9/11 Commission staffers dismiss any potential Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks without even a mention of Ahmed Hikmat Shakir? By week’s end, several 9/11 panel commissioners sought to clarify the muddled report. According to commissioner John Lehman on Fox News, "What our report said really supports what the administration, in its straight presentations, has said: that there were numerous contacts; there’s evidence of collaboration on weapons. And we found earlier, we reported earlier, that there was VX gas that was clearly from Iraq in the Sudan site that President Clinton hit. And we have significant evidence that there were contacts over the years and cooperation, although nothing that would be operational." .... |
| Posted by:Mike Sylwester |
| #4 Has The Weekly Standard site been hacked? I've been unable to access for two days ... |
| Posted by: Anonymous5297 2004-06-20 11:43:53 AM |
| #3 that's cute Comment Top |
| Posted by: Frank G 2004-06-19 10:43:59 PM |
| #2 The links and shared duties of O'soddom and O'soma are analagous to the congress going on in the paris hilton video |
| Posted by: Comment Top 2004-06-19 10:34:27 PM |
| #1 Doesn't matter; the "media" have already decided what the story will be. No matter what the story really is. |
| Posted by: Barbara Skolaut 2004-06-19 10:01:04 PM |