... And even where we have apparently clear examples of success, it isn't clear that what works, say, for a car manufacturer or finance firm is going to work for the CIA and the FBI.
| I'd just about guarantee it wouldn't... |
In the world of intelligence, the kind of information that, in less-clandestine businesses, tends to flow along informal social networks must necessarily be subject to greater constraints. So harnessing the power of social networks for innovation, creativity, and rapid adaptation is a trickier business for intelligence organizations than arguably for any other kind.
| Intel collection, analysis and reporting goes beyond the mere division of labor requirement that causes an auto company to build engines in one place, brake systems in another, and bodies in yet another. Collection is actually done using different methods and skill sets: the mathematician analyzing codes would be lost having to develop an agent network. And the guy working with the agents would be lost having to analyze satellite pictures. All, to one extent or another, are further limited by their experience with a geographical area. Operations by their nature have to work within the constraints of the available skill sets. And "need to know" rules further limit the kind of informal exchanges that can add value — that's a cost-benefit tradeoff, because it prevents inadvertent compromise of sources and methods. |
What should be clear, however, is that combining the many different agencies involved in intelligence gathering and analysis at a single point—that of the director of intelligence—is almost certain not to succeed in delivering the kind of ambiguous yet essential functionality that everyone wants. So, some other kind of connectivity, along with a more creative approach, is required—one that incorporates not only the sharing of information across agency boundaries (a recommendation of the commission's that has received relatively little attention), but active collaboration, joint training, and the development of long term personal relationships between agencies as well. Creative intelligence analysis has a lot in common with other kinds of problem-solving activities: thinking outside the box, challenging deeply held assumptions, and combining different, often seemingly unrelated, kinds of expertise and knowledge.
| At the risk of inventing a new layer of bureaucracy in the intelligence community, the answer probably lies in an all-source intelligence center that synthesizes the production of all agencies. It's an approach that's been used in the past and that has its value, as well as its own pitfalls. Chief among them is that the all-source center can develop its own insularity and stifle flexibility on the part of agencies it regards as subordinate (whether they are on paper or not). |
By understanding how innovative and successful organizations have been able to solve large-scale, complex problems, without anyone "at the top" having to micromanage the process, the intelligence community could learn some valuable lessons that might help it escape the mistakes of the past.
When I left the government we were going through the latest management fad, as we'd gone through previous management fads — zero-based budgeting, management by objectives, Theory Z, and all the rest. The current buzzwords involved being "proactive" and "customer driven," and we were all In Search of Excellence. I think there was even something called "just in time tasking." The intel business is by its nature reactive, though — you can't collect, analyze or report on something that hasn't happened, with the caveat that it can also be predictive, telling you where to look next or what to look for next. It represents a pretty unique management problem that won't be solved by applying theory and won't stay solved even when what's applied today works. If it did, the OSS and the American Black Chamber would all still be ticking along productively. The people who're drivers — senior management within agencies — can't, for the most part, be brought from outside (which is something the business world could learn from them). They've got to be from technical backgrounds, otherwise they don't know what they're managing. But that strength is also their weakness, and virtually all would acknowledge it.
The problem of managing and coordinating the various agencies, some of which don't want to be managed or coordinated, is going to be complicated and not subject to facile fixes suggested by the writers at Slate. Because we're living in a touchy-feely world, the preference is always toward the Theory Y approach, with lots of input from the people on the front lines, "participative management," and all those other horse maneuvers. The "dictatorial," top-down approach is frowned upon. It's not as much fun to work in a Theory X organization. But anybody who's looking for fun should bypass the intel world and get a job at an amusement park. Firm direction works in crisis periods and start-up situations. If you're in maintenance mode (what the Boston Group would have called a cash cow) then Theory Y is acceptable, even preferable. You're working to optimize productivity. On 9-11 virtually all the intell community was in that mode, with lots of staff work and lots of committees. But if you really want to get something done, pick someone, give him (or her, I don't care) an objective, and make them responsible for achieving it. Staff it and set up a blue-ribbon panel to discuss it, and it'll never get done, at least not in a recognizable form. Sometimes "stakeholders" just have to adjust. |
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