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Iraq-Jordan
Report Faults Military Technology in Iraq War
2004-10-13
Rolled up the entire Iraqi army in ten days, with minimal casualties — so let the nay-saying and fault-finding begin...
Front-line U.S. troops often lacked access to surveillance and intelligence data during the invasion of Iraq because of computer glitches, Technology Review magazine reported on Tuesday, citing a largely classified report by Rand Corp.
I think I'll go bang my head against the wall for awhile. It'll feel so good when I stop. We had tighter integration of intel and recon than any army's ever had before, but it wasn't perfect, so there must be fault to be found...
One battalion commander told the magazine he had almost no information on the strength and position of Iraqi forces after his division took control of a key bridge south of Baghdad on April 2, 2003. Lt. Col. Ernest Marcone said he was told to expect one Iraqi brigade advancing south from the Baghdad airport, but instead was forced to battle three separate Iraqi brigades advancing from three directions, the magazine reported. What ensued was the largest counterattack of the Iraq war. U.S. troops won because of their superior weapons, greater firepower and air support, but not because they had any real insight into enemy positions through new technology, the magazine said. "Next to the fall of Baghdad, that bridge was the most important piece of terrain in the theater, and no one can tell me what's defending it," Marcone told the magazine. "Not how many troops, what units, what tanks, anything. There's zero information getting to me." Marcone's experience was typical, according to a largely classified report being prepared for the Pentagon by the Rand Corp, which concludes that front-line commanders often did not benefit from cutting-edge technologies. These were aimed at moving toward a smaller, smarter fighting force connected by advanced communications systems.
... and he apparently didn't have them. But he did have other communications, that went two ways. So older-fashioned means were used to save his bacon...
Walter Perry, a senior Rand researcher, told the magazine the report uncovered a "digital divide" that allowed division commanders to get a good view of the battlefield, but left front-line commanders basically in the dark. The problems preventing effective relaying of crucial data included lengthy download times, software failures and lack of access to high-bandwidth communications. Pentagon officials highlighted the success of networked forces during the Iraq war, including the case of a U.S. radar plane detecting Iraqi troops during a blinding sandstorm and ordering in bombers using satellite-guided bombs. But the report found that ground forces had serious problems getting access to vital intelligence and surveillance data. In three cases, U.S. vehicles were attacked when they stopped to receive data on enemy positions, it said.
Look hard enough and you can always find something to criticize. I imagine the problems are being worked out.
Posted by:Fred

#14  Didn't read any of these particular articles in question but since I have to write how our guys use this stuff for a living, this is my two cents worth. We do tend to dig the peanuts out of our crap to the point of over reacting in the wrong direction, that being said, we could not have fought this war to the level we did without the same systems that are being criticized. That was a major part of the problem was that because we outperformed the old fashioned stuff so well, we didn't have any choice but to overload the systems to get the job done.
As far as the patrolling aspect mentioned most of these units were running to fast to conduct recon in the traditional fashion. There are far too many cases of us over running units before they could stand to as they got word of our approach.
Take all this with a grain of salt, we got it, we are working it.
Posted by: TopMac   2004-10-13 10:07:22 PM  

#13  Hell, they're not even mentioning the failure of the WRQ-549 aka Cloud/Herder the HAARP follow on. Near as I can tell a complete no-go.
Posted by: Shipman   2004-10-13 5:34:35 PM  

#12   Altho I find it disturbing that a lack of recon info getting to the sharp end has persisted from the Gulf War to the Iraq War.(I found it astonishing how often written accounts of Gulf War stated US troops encountered Iraqi forces unexpectantly-considering we had complete control of air and @ 10% world's helos in theatre.)Hopefully the US Army is in midst of changing recon data going directly to Div.HQ,then being dispersed downstream,to data being collected by combat battalion assests and then being sent to higher HQs.I suppose the Army may prefer the data being sent to everyone at once,but I would rather the local recon assets be at Batt. level.

The basic problem in battlefield reconnaisence is the concept of space and time. You can get a complete picture of a battlefield from a variety of means, and develop faster and better ways of conveying the information to battalion commanders, but after that process is done, the only thing you have is a snap shot of the battlefield. It may be accurate at the time it was taken, but computers cannot mesh through the acquired the data, and humans are required to sort through and make the assessments. You will have errors in either case.

You add to that passing the information amoungst command levels, from a theatre recon team to an army/corps command to operational HQs and then getting the info to the warfighters, company and platoon commanders, and it all may be information they just don't need to win a fight.

I suspect this electronic recon is best applied to logisticians making sure combat units get the fuel, beans and bullets they need to win a fight, Doctrine, training and battalion-acquired recon will win the tactical battles.
Posted by: badanov   2004-10-13 2:00:48 PM  

#11   The first step in learning from mistakes is to acknowledge mistakes were made.From there you can try to figure out how to fix the problem.
Which is something Kerry is unable to see.The US military learned from its experience in Viet Nam and the Soviets' in Afghanistan how not to fight a lightly armed foe in difficult ground.Evidently Kerry wanted the US to line up the Army shoulder to shoulder and march thru the Afghan hills while the First Armored Div. cruised the streets of Kabul.
Altho I find it disturbing that a lack of recon info getting to the sharp end has persisted from the Gulf War to the Iraq War.(I found it astonishing how often written accounts of Gulf War stated US troops encountered Iraqi forces unexpectantly-considering we had complete control of air and @ 10% world's helos in theatre.)Hopefully the US Army is in midst of changing recon data going directly to Div.HQ,then being dispersed downstream,to data being collected by combat battalion assests and then being sent to higher HQs.I suppose the Army may prefer the data being sent to everyone at once,but I would rather the local recon assets be at Batt. level.
Posted by: Stephen   2004-10-13 1:00:01 PM  

#10  PH--Wow--great link! Thanks--the history in this alone is fascinating. Very encouraging for a civvie like me to see yet another demonstration of how professional our professional military is.
Posted by: Dar   2004-10-13 11:20:32 AM  

#9  Read "On Point".
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/onpoint/index.html

Lt. Col. Ernest Marcone is mentioned quite a bit in the paper as is an analysis of tech used in the conflict. I find the Army to be one of the few very large organizations willing to show public displays of introspection. Which is one of the reasons they are so damn good.
Posted by: Psycho Hillbilly   2004-10-13 11:01:35 AM  

#8  I just want to know how they manage to keep any computerized units functioning in that environment without overheating or gunked up by that powdery sand.
Posted by: Dar   2004-10-13 10:33:55 AM  

#7  LH is right. The benefits of free speech vastly outweigh its costs. And there are costs; the curent drumbeat of negativity being one of them. But the boomers will soon be gone from power in the unacountable estates like the press and academe.
Posted by: Mrs. Davis   2004-10-13 9:28:56 AM  

#6  "the press" didnt do the postmortem. Rand did. And was quoted in Technology review, where the concern of readers is probably less with Bush vs Kerry than with "are there procurement opportunities for my systems integrations business?". Rooters headline may be a bit overdone, but its hardly a scapegoat hunt. Some folks need to thicken their skins just a bit.
Posted by: Liberalhawk   2004-10-13 9:23:01 AM  

#5  There's a difference between doing a post-mortem to improve your process and conducting a hunt for a scapegoat. The press is incapable of doing the former, and will simply treat any attempt at it as the latter.

I'd think you'd have realized that by now, LH. The press is not on our side.
Posted by: Robert Crawford   2004-10-13 9:19:30 AM  

#4  Fault finding and lesson learning is why we have the best military in the world likely to increase its qualitative superiority against its challengers. It's also the way contractors sell more goods and services to the DOD. Private vice becomes a public virtue.
Posted by: Mrs. Davis   2004-10-13 9:12:00 AM  

#3  Yeah we won easy. against a third world army subject to years of sanctions, and largely unwilling to fight. This is NOT to disparage the courage or efficiency of our troops, or the qualities of weapons, intell, etc. But IF we go to war with a "worthy adversary", say China, its gonna be too late to do post-mortems then. This is the chance after a real war to nit pick ANYTHING that might have gone wrong. Seems like a good thing to do.
Posted by: Liberalhawk   2004-10-13 9:04:24 AM  

#2  Stole my thoughts, Fred.

Two related comments.

Following Gulf War I (you know, the one with the "grand coalition" in which the US performed exactly the same percentage -- most -- of the actual fighting as the recent Iraq war, but which was largely paid for by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and a few others -- for which the elder Bush's admin. was admonished for going "cup in hand" to the world in an unseemly way ...) the WaPo had a front-page article on bomb accuracy. The story basically tried to build itself on the hook that post-war BDA assessments had shown direct hit percentages less than the public must have believed from viewing the dramatic video of smart bombs hitting targets. Can't recall the figures, but the story presented the preliminary stats as showing that the hit percentage was "only" such-and-such -- a number that was multiples of any hit percentage achieved in any previous war since the invention of the aircraft.

Perhaps others here will be able to confirm/debunk this, but I also recall the post-Gulf War non-story to follow up on literally years and years of negative reporting on the Maverick missile. I believe "whistle-blowing" stories on that system were a staple of 60 Minutes and even the defense press for eons. But in Kuwait, there was this odd phenomenon of Iraqi (Soviet design, mostly) armored vehicles/tanks being found flipped upside down (or their turrets popped off). With a shallow crater along side. Seems the over-budget, over-schedule, seriously flawed, hopelessly ineffective Mavericks had achieved kinetic kills on the vehicles (their penetration was so good) and the warheads had exploded underneath when they hit the ground, flipping some of the vehicles over.

And of course we all knew the Abrams couldn't operate in the desert, because the dust would screw up the turbines, right? I do recall taunting a few deserving types after the Gulf War by asking them if they thought the Iraqi generals were believers in the US hardware that had been maligned and nitpicked to death during the 80s buildup ....
Posted by: Verlaine   2004-10-13 12:35:43 AM  

#1  One battalion commander told the magazine he had almost no information on the strength and position of Iraqi forces after his division took control of a key bridge south of Baghdad on April 2, 2003.

Isn't that what patrols are for? And isn't it a manuever battalion commander's duty to see to it intel is gathered in this time honored way? Are operational commanders now relying solely on information they are given from above?

Lt. Col. Ernest Marcone said he was told to expect one Iraqi brigade advancing south from the Baghdad airport, but instead was forced to battle three separate Iraqi brigades advancing from three directions, the magazine reported.

Sounds like at least one of the briagdes were found, the other began movement later. The Iraqi commander controlling those units must have staggered their movement.

What ensued was the largest counterattack of the Iraq war. U.S. troops won because of their superior weapons, greater firepower and air support, but not because they had any real insight into enemy positions through new technology, the magazine said.

I guess you can sit and become knowledgable about the enemy's intentions as they manuver closer to you up to point but sooner or later you gotta fight.

"Next to the fall of Baghdad, that bridge was the most important piece of terrain in the theater, and no one can tell me what's defending it," Marcone told the magazine. "Not how many troops, what units, what tanks, anything. There's zero information getting to me."

This doesn't sound like a US commander talking. It seems to me this guy may have been grossly misquoted to make this article work. Every battalion commander in every army worldwide knows the best intel is from patrols. You may have satellites and you may have STARS, but when its time to fight, the best info is obtained through patrols and scouts.
Posted by: badanov   2004-10-13 12:28:12 AM  

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