| Submit your comments on this article |
| Iraq-Jordan |
| Mom, Apple Pie and Truck Armor |
| 2004-12-10 |
| December 10, 2004: American Secretary of Defense was holding one of his frequent "town hall" meetings with troops this week. This meeting was in Iraq, and one of the soldiers, at the urging of an imbedded reporter, asked why there wasn't more armor and bulletproof glass for trucks. Rumsfeld said, in effect, that the stuff is being produced as fast as possible. The subject of unarmored trucks in Iraq is an old one, as is the massive effort the army has made to armor its vehicles and protect the troops from ambush and roadside bombs. But for whatever reason, the media jumped on this old story and turned it into a politicians nightmare. You cannot be "against" providing the maximum possible protection for American troops in combat. For the soldiers themselves, protection is a "too much ain't enough" issue. It's literally a life and death matter. But there's more to it than that. The story that has not made the headlines is the casualty rate in Iraq compared to previous wars. Iraq has the lowest casualty rates of any war in American history. There's no mystery to that. Better protection, in the form of bullet proof vests, protective goggles, UAVs for spotting ambushes and robots for dealing with roadside bombs, better tactics, leadership and training, have all combined to keep the casualties down. But not down to zero. American troops are still getting killed over there. And if you just drove a truck through an ambush, or near a roadside bomb, your answer to; "do you need more protection?" would be "yes." So why isn't there more protection? There is no correct answer. It's the perfect situation for a journalist. No matter what the Pentagon has done, is doing or promises to do, they don't really have an answer. But after a few weeks, the media and politicians will find another target and move on. Meanwhile, there are some interesting angles to this that won't get much, or any, attention. One is the fact that non-combat troops, for the first time in history, are taking nearly half the casualties. Normally, the combat troops (mostly the infantry) take 90 percent of the casualties. Even in Vietnam, where there were a lot of places where you had to run convoys through "bandit country," the infantry still took over 80 percent of the casualties. The main reason for the big change in Iraq is that the infantry are much better trained and equipped than they were in Vietnam, while the non-combat troops are not as well prepared for combat as they were in Vietnam. The all-volunteer army led to a bunch of reforms that created the current crew of high performance combat troops. That means that American infantry do their work very well, killing more of the enemy and taking fewer casualties. But for the non-combat troops, the situation is worse. In the 1990s, responding to Congressional demands that women be given more opportunities in the army, men and women began doing their basic training together. Traditionally, basic training, in addition to the training, was used to see who could not handle the stress, and, if need be, get them out of the military. Troops who break down in the chaos of combat get themselves, and others, killed. In the days of the draft, this process often led to some interesting games played by people who didn't want to be there in the first place. But anyone who went through basic remembers seeing one or two guys who didn't finish because they, well, couldn't handle it. The army knew they were in trouble with basic training watered down so women could handle it, but they came up with a solution. Recruits who signed up for combat jobs went to a special, all male, basic training. This version was old school, and strived to make sure only people who could handle the combat stress, went on to become infantry. Meanwhile, the mixed basic ("basic lite") was composed of non-combat troops. But many others who should have stayed civilians, instead went into an army job. The real problem here was that "basic lite" also failed to instill an appreciation for the importance of discipline. By the last 1990s, company commanders in non-combat units were going nuts with the growth of disciplinary problems. This extended beyond people not showing up for work on time or not following orders. Rifles were not cleaned, or fired accurately during annual weapons training. People didn't take convoy training seriously. For the brass, it wasn't a high priority problem, and the captains were told to cope as best they could. And they did, until 2003. All of a sudden, thousands of non-combat troops were in a combat zone, and they made a lot of mistakes. The possibility of death tends to get people's attention, it always does. The non-combat troops got more training and more equipment. Companies that made gear for armoring a few hundred BMWs a year suddenly got orders for thousands of kits to armor hummers. Troops in Iraq scrounged armor and did it themselves. It was the old American "can-do" attitude, helped along by the risk of getting killed if you don't. But there as another problem. A large number of reserve troops were called up for Iraq duty. Now the reservists had joined with the understanding that they would go to active duty in the event of a major emergency, and would stay on active duty, along with everyone else, until the war was over. But Iraq was not World War 3. It was a "little war," and reservists went over to Iraq for a year or so and went back to being civilians. But because Iraq was a dangerous place for non-combat troops, the army had to provide months of additional training to make sure the reservists had a fighting chance. Additional training centers were set up in Kuwait. Sometimes reservists were rushed over without the additional training, but the army knew that was dangerous, not just for the reservists, but for the careers of any officer caught doing that too often. Many of the reservists were proud to serve, but some, reflecting the electorate back home, did not agree with the war and didn't believe they should be there at all. Journalists loved these guys, as they were a constant source of good tips on stories the brass could not defend themselves on. That just kept the officers on their toes. Meanwhile, basic training was beefed up, and thousands of trucks were armored, even though this meant that many of them wore out prematurely (usually suspensions and engines) because of all the additional weight in places the vehicles were not designed to handle it. In Iraq, most of the danger was concentrated on a few roads and areas. Units operating there got priority for armored trucks and escorts. There were casualties, but many, many more were avoided because of all the protective measures. Moreover, some of the "safe" areas occasionally got unsafe. If you were driving through the well protected Green Zone of Baghdad, in an unarmored hummer, and a mortar shell landed next to your vehicle, you would get hurt. If you had been in an armored hummer, you probably would not have been hurt. But the regularly attacked routes get priority for the armored hummers. Most troops understand that. In a combat zone, it's usually bad luck or inattention that will get you into trouble, more so than lack of equipment. Out on the road, you are taught that sharp eyes and quick reflexes are more likely to keep you safe than just piling on more armor. Most roadside bombs are discovered before they are set off. Most ambushes do more damage to the ambushers than to their targets. But ask a G.I. driving down those roads regularly how much protection he needs, and he will say "more." You can't defend the soldiers commander, or Secretary Rumsfeld, in a situation like this. However, we're not talking warfare here, but media relations and politics. So when you get asked a question for which there is no correct answer, the only alternative is to admit you're wrong, proclaim that you will do better, and wait for it all to blow over. |
| Posted by:ed |
| #4 The DemLeft didn't want the USA under Dubya to obey the UNO Resolutions [oobey the UNO]and go to war because it would bust their sacred sancrosant "Clinton balance budget/surplus", the one that Bill himself now disavows any responsibility for. As was indic on the "MY WORD" show vv FOXNEWS, nothing will keep the ordinary combat soldier from upping his equipment no matter how protected or armored it is. DEATH STAR(S) to the M113, nuthing is ever enuff, nor will be enuff. |
| Posted by: JosephMendiola 2004-12-10 9:01:02 PM |
| #3 Ditto, Frank G in #2. In principle a valid question. In execution, a typical bit of ambush journalism. |
| Posted by: eLarson 2004-12-10 10:43:36 AM |
| #2 really, my only gripe with the embedded reporter's "trick" yesterday was the "gotcha" aspect and the obvious delight he showed in his email of putting one over on Rumsfeld |
| Posted by: Frank G 2004-12-10 10:17:21 AM |
| #1 There are combat, combat support and combat service support elements in the Army. The transportation, maintenance, and medical personnel make up a part of the CSS element. The CSS has never been given the field and combat training the combat and CS elements receive back in garrison. The division and brigade commanders are rated on how well their maneuver units, largely composed of the combat elements, perform. The CSS elements spend most of their time supporting that training. The unit and personnel inventory are designed such that there are no extra units to pick up the support responsibilities for the combat elements if their organic or dedicated CSS units are deployed for focused training. As divisions are given fixed amounts of training resources [dollars, range and field time, etc], they have been traditionally distributed to the combat/maneuver elements. The CSS and to a lesser extent the CS elements are the ones who do not receive significant combat environment training. Basic training is not enough, the training has to be continuously reinforced for all elements, not just for the combat elements. This is the pathology of the beast. To properly address it will require a significant expansion of the forces, not just 24K Congress just approved. The service also has to ignor the critics who alway harp about the tooth to tail ratio of our force. No other Army operates a half a world away with as much of its forces as the US does, requiring a much higher level of CSS than most other armies. Back in GW1, the regular Army was 750K. Both parties cut that down to under 500K in the following years. The most expensive item in the military inventory is the cost of personnel, so don't expect anyone with serious influence to start pumping 100K or more back into the force structure. |
| Posted by: Don 2004-12-10 10:04:16 AM |