"The decision to extend President Emile Lahoud's term was taken by the Asad family itself." So said a smart diplomat when we met yesterday to discuss the crisis. "We know that," he said. "Vice President Khaddam and Interior Minister Canaan — Syria's most knowledgeable Lebanon hands who long handled the Lebanon portfolio — recommended against extending Lahoud's term and manipulating the Lebanese constitution as if it were the Syrian constitution. They were over-ruled by the Asad family itself." The decision turned out to be a fateful one, for it set Syria on its recent collision course with Lebanon. Why the young Asad brother and cousins decided they could do without the advice of "the Old Guard" is where conjecture and speculation begin. The diplomat I spoke with believes the reason the Asad family overruled the older generation of experienced Lebanon hands was that family members such as Bashar's brother Maher and his cousin Rami Makhlouf had important business dealings in Lebanon which depended on Lahoud. "They needed Lahoud to stay for their own interests," he said. "The family members were pushing for his retention. Perhaps they were trying to create their own Lebanon policy and side-line the 'old guard,'" he added. "Maybe Bashar went along because he is trying to create his own base of power?"
This is where the speculation within the diplomatic community begins to veer off into a number of directions. The diplomat, then concluded, "There doesn't seem to be anyone at the top with a real sense of long-term strategy for Syria's foreign policy. It is being patched together for reasons which are hard to figure. In the past, Hafiz al-Asad was the strategist. He had a clear vision of what Syrias ultimate goals should be. Today, it is not clear where Syria is headed or why decisions are being made."
The theory that the Asad family made the decision to extend Lahoud's presidency at the last minute jives with Hariri's own version of events. The Daily Star yesterday ran an interview with Hariri given to a Lebanese reporter the day before his death. He had spoken off the record on a number of topics, but the reporter broke with journalistic protocol because of Hariri's assassination and wrote up the entire conversation. Hariri explained that he had "gone into opposition the moment Lahoud's term was extended." He explained how he had been completely blind-sided by the decision. Bashar al-Asad himself had called Hariri to a meeting in Damascus and told him that Lahoud's term would be extended and effectively ordered him to ease the passage through parliament. Hariri said that Bashar did not consult him beforehand or ask his opinion on the matter. He was told what to do. The meeting lasted only 10 minutes. For Hariri, this was a Rubicon.
Undoubtedly, Hariri's friends in Damascus, such as Khaddam, had not prepared him for the Asad meeting. Hariri was understandably incensed to be taken so off-guard and cut out of the decision-making process. From what the diplomat explained to me, we can conclude that the reason Khaddam could not warn him or bring him into the decision-making process was because Khaddam himself did not believe that Lahoud would be kept on. Perhaps he and other "old guard" advisors had assured Hariri that Syria would do no such thing. The Syrian government had, after all, announced only weeks before the elections were to take place that it would not interfere. In all likelihood, Hariri had been assured by his "old guard" Syrian friends that the presidential election would go forward without Lahoud. Clearly, Hariri was used to knowing and being consulted about such momentous decisions before the fact. The Asad overrule and disarray within the Syrian chain of command drove Hariri into the opposition. Eventual, it led to his death. But could the Syrian President have ordered Hariri's assassination? No one here will say that, and I don't think they believe it. It is not consistent with his character or policies. The consequences of Hariri's murder are too devastating for Syria for such a decision to make sense.