Moments after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in Beirut last week, Al-Manar, the satellite television channel operated by Hizbullah, came out with its theory about who might have been responsible. "This was the work of Mossad," cried a newscaster in a shrill voice. "The Zionist enemy ordered this crime to divide Lebanon and weaken Arab resistance." Hours later Muhammad-Hussein Fadlallah, a mullah who casts himself as the spiritual leader of Hizbullah, made a similar claim. Next it was the turn of Nabih Berri, leader of the Shi'ite Amal movement and speaker of the Lebanese National Assembly, to echo the accusations. Like the editors of Al-Manar, both Fadlallah and Berri had been prompted by their Pavlovian reflex to blame Israel for every evil in the world.
But then something unexpected happened. The message of the leadership failed to seep down to the grassroots and, within hours, thousands of Shi'ites were joining their compatriots from other faiths in a unified Lebanese expression of grief at Hariri's murder. More importantly, the Shi'ites shared the belief of other Lebanese communities that Syria was the likeliest suspect in the Hariri murder case. A poll conducted by Al-Jazeera, the hard-line anti-American satellite TV channel, last week highlighted this by showing that over 73 percent of Lebanese blamed Syria and wanted it to withdraw from Lebanon.
The Syrians started their occupation of Lebanon by relying on Sunni Muslims and part of the Maronite Christian community. Soon, however, they identified the Shi'ites, especially Hizbullah, as their principal allies in Lebanon. Hizbullah's support was even more precious because it came in the context of Syria's strategic alliance with the Khomeinist regime in Teheran that regards Lebanon and Syria as a glacis for the Islamic Republic. It was no surprise that, immediately after Hariri's murder, Syria should dispatch its prime minister to Teheran to beef up "the strategic alliance" and ask Teheran to order Hizbullah not to rock the boat. A week after Hariri's death, however, a growing number of Shi'ites, especially in Hizbullah, are beginning to wonder whether it is in the interests of their community to be isolated as the main pillar of support for Syria's unpopular presence.
In a series of conversations this week in Beirut with several leading Shi'ites, including some with ties to Hizbullah, I was persuaded of a possible need to revise the assumption that the Lebanese Shi'ites are determined to sink or swim with Syria. Shi'ites, including Hizbullah, may well be pondering what could amount to a strategic switch from a policy of supporting the status quo to one of democratic change. "Hizbullah is not what it was 20 years ago," says a Shi'ite publisher with ties to the movement. "Lebanon has changed, and the world has changed. There is no reason why Lebanese Shi'ites should not adapt." Another prominent Shi'ite, a businessman and contributor to Hizbullah, claims that the assumption that the party is nothing but a tool in the hands of Teheran "no longer reflects reality."
"There was a time when Hizbullah was nothing but a branch of the Iranian services in Lebanon," he says. "But things have changed. Over the past decade Hizbullah has developed into a Lebanese movement primarily concerned about the interests of its constituents rather than the mullahs of Teheran." To back the claim he cites three "facts" as evidence of change in Hizbullah's position. Hizbullah has publicly rejected Teheran's demand to recognize Ali Khamenei, the Iranian Supreme Guide, as the Marjaa al-Taqlid or "Source of Emulation," the highest rank in the Shi'ite clerical hierarchy. Instead, Hizbullah, along with Amal, a smaller Shi'ite party, acknowledge Grand Ayatollah Ali-Muhammad Sistani, who lives in Najaf, as Marjaa.
While Hizbullah continues to receive financial support, estimated at $100 million a year, from Teheran, it has been able to diversify its funding, especially from Lebanese Shi'ite business interests. A decade ago virtually all of Hizbullah's income came from Teheran. Today, the Iranian contribution, which includes the value of arms shipments, represents less than a quarter of what Hizbullah spends on social, educational, and health services in Beirut and southern Lebanon.
According to our interlocutor, Hizbullah has "noticed changes in the region." It has seen how Shi'ites have benefited from US-led military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, the Hazara Shi'ites, some 15 per cent of the population, have secured places in parliament and the council of ministers for the first time. In Iraq, the Shi'ites, some 60 per cent of the population, have won a leading position within a democratically elected parliament and government, ending eight decades of exclusion from power. In Lebanon itself, the Shi'ites, which with 40 per cent of the population represent the largest community, are allowed only a fifth of the seats in the parliament and are excluded from the positions of president of the republic and prime minister. A Syrian-sponsored electoral law, designed to gerrymander the constituencies, would, if approved, deprive the Shi'ites of four of their 27 seats in parliament.
"A fresh look at Hizbullah is overdue," says Judith Kipper, an American specialist in the Middle East. "The Hizbullah is the most nationalistic force in Lebanon, and thus inherently opposed to the Syrian occupation." In the crucial weeks leading up to the next Lebanese general election, to be held in April, every effort must be made to help Hizbullah make the strategic switch its friends in Beirut claim it is ready for.