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Iraq-Jordan
Kurdish-Turkomen Plan to Grab Kirkuk`s Oil Revenues
2005-03-07
Debka, salt according to your palate.

Iraq's newly-elected National Assembly holds its first session in Baghdad in nine days time, to embark on the road to democratic institutins - a new president, deputy presidents, prime minister, government and constitution. However, Iraq's Kurds and their Turkomen neighbors have been moving forward with plans of their own, as DEBKA-Net-Weekly disclosed in an exclusive report on February 25.

Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Massoud Barzani termed a proposition put before them recently by the heads of the Turkomen community " extremely interesting and worth pursuing." The pursuit has gained headlong momentum.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly's sources reveal that Saad e-Din al-Kidj, chairman of the Turkmen Supreme Council essentially proposed the introduction of self-rule for the Turkoman homeland of Turkmeneli which abuts and often overlaps the Kurdish region and the oil-rich lands of northern Iraq (See attached DEBKAfile Special Map) and promises it will act as a buffer between Kurdistan and other parts of Iraq.

The Turkomen, predominantly a Muslim Turkic nation, represent Iraq's third ethnic minority, whose interests and safety are closely protected by Ankara.

The plan for Turkomen autonomy has come up before. In 2002, about a year before the US-led invasion of Iraq, CIA agents and undercover US troops floated the proposal while preparing the military and intelligence infrastructure for the war in the autonomous Kurdish region. The heads of the far larger and more powerful Kurdish community angrily rejected the plan as a political and security threat to their interests.

But much has changed in three years. Suddenly an autonomous Turkoman belt along their southern border looks to the Kurds like an asset to be welcomed - a shield against any Arab military threat from the south and east and a better-than-good insurance policy against Turkish military steps to stop the Kurds' advance toward independence and domination of the mixed town of Kirkuk. Irbil is already rubbing its hands at the prospect of bilateral economic and military cooperation with Ankara.

So keen are Talabani and Barzani on the Turkomen independence scheme that they have counter-offered the Turkomens a 25% share in the oil revenues of Kirkuk. This offer was made without a by-your-leave from the interim government in Baghdad headed by Iyad Allawi and certainly not from the post-election administration due to rise.

Most Iraqis in high places find the notion of the Kurdish-Turkomen oil grab hard to believe..

But the momentum is hard to stop. Ankara has been informed that the Kurds will pocket 75% of the northern oil revenues and grant the Turkomen 25% to support their self-ruling enclave.

This deal augurs a reshaping of the map of northern Iraq. The Turkomen strip runs transversely from Tel Afar near the Syrian border in the west up to a point south of Kurdish Halabja near the Iranian border to the east. Its population, estimated at between two and three million, centers on the two main towns of Tel Afar and Kuz-Khrumatu.

The oil receipts will finance a new army whose Turkish officers will supply the weapons and training.

This will be the first time in modern history that the Turks will have gained a military foothold in northern Iraq in a region that commands the Sunni Triangle north of Baghdad.

Ankara will have no more need to establish a military presence in northern Iraq. It will have under its command 50-60,000 Turkomen troops, which the Turks and the Kurds are certain will be fully trained and combat-ready much sooner than the Iraqi army the Americans are building further south. This army will be backed by the 100,000-strong Kurdish army.

This signal development should not only dispel Ankara's fears of a Kurdish independent state but bring forth is firm support.

By the end of this year or early 2006, the central government in Baghdad may therefore find itself staring at an army of 160,000 trained soldiers to the north. This force, not subject to the federal government's orders, will be the best trained and disciplined of any force in the country.

The Turkomen-Kurdish deal has an important ethnic aspect.

Their coalition in the new national assembly, 102-105 deputies strong, is committed to voting against the new constitution proclaiming Iraq an Arab republic. Sections of the dominant 140-member Shiite United Iraqi Alliance may go along with this position. It is therefore very possible that, for the first time in two centuries, a democratically-elected majority will take a former Arab state out of the Arab bloc.

DEBKA-Net-Weekly's sources in Kurdistan report that Kurdish leaders have been showering lavish concessions on the Turkomens to make sure they do not have a change of heart. Areas once hotly contested are now opened up to them — and not entirely out of the kindness of Kurdish hearts; they reckon that if the Turkomen expand into all parts of Kurdistan and are awarded equal rights, they will sink a part of their share of oil profits in Kurdistan and so invest in independent Kurdistan's development and prosperity.

This week, therefore, Kurdish leaders invited all the Turkomen driven out of Kirkuk (where they used to account for one-third of the population) to return and reclaim their property with Kurdish government's guarantees for their safety.

In a few short weeks, the seedlings of two independent non-Arab Iraqi states have begun sending out strong shoots.
Posted by:Sobiesky

#16  Just found this negotiating paper prepared by American lawyers for the Turkomen. It was written pre-election and rather foolishly assumes Turkomen would get a majority in Kirkuk. However, it did remind me that in a federal state, the states (provinces) control natural resources.

Here is a good map of Iraqi ethnic groups. It shows the Turkomen in 5 or 6 separate pockets. I very much doubt you could create a contiguous territory from them.
Posted by: phil_b   2005-03-07 10:42:59 PM  

#15  Sobiesky: There may not be a Turkish presence in NE Syria, but there is a Kurdish one there. Mostly along the border with Turkey, where the old RR line ran (runs?). If that area gets pulled off, I think I know who is going to claim it.
Posted by: jackal   2005-03-07 10:21:39 PM  

#14  The Kurds wouldn't want the Turkomen involved directly with the Turks. That would inevitably result in their trying to grab the Kurds' oil. If the Turkomen and the Turks are separate, then the Turks are motivated to be nice to the Kurds, and the Kurds are motivated to be nice to the Turkomen. The Turks would even have to guarantee Kurdistan from Arab invasion, because that would have to cross the enclave to get there. That is why, if Syria changes hands to be ruled by the majority Sunni, there is a bit of a problem, in that the Kurds will have to choose which they dislike more, exposure to a Sunni threat, or exposure to a united Turkey and Turkoman threat. I would guess they would feel less threatened by Syrian Sunni than Iraqi Sunni. N.B.: The Iraqi Sunni and the Syrian Sunni might kiss and make up, creating a third problem...
Posted by: Anonymoose   2005-03-07 8:16:07 PM  

#13  Phil, Baluchis, 'f course, forgotten'em.
Posted by: Sobiesky   2005-03-07 7:50:50 PM  

#12  Steve, ye'r probably right that Turks may try to connect the Turkoman areas to Turkey. The question is how that would resonate with EUros (Turkey's membership in Holy EU Empire). I think they may be ambivalent as there is really no Turkish minority to speak of in Syria.
Posted by: Sobiesky   2005-03-07 7:41:05 PM  

#11  My scenario for an Iranian breakup starts with Iraqi Shiias invading Khuzestan (formerly called Arabistan) to protect their Shiia Arab kin. Oman exercising its historic claim to the north shore of the Straits of Hormuz would be an unlikely but very nice bonus. Then of course there are the Baluchis.
Posted by: phil_b   2005-03-07 7:25:47 PM  

#10  Phil, the portion of the coast that would fall into Kurdish sphere is rather narrow (25km, north of Lakatia) and underdeveloped, just beaches. Turks probably have nothing to worry about, and as the pipelines go, they are already routed through north.

Anonymoose, yes, Iran is an unknown. Azeris and Kurds have some claim beef, Azeris would gain an especially big chunk. The other minorities are fragmented except Pashtun on the eastern frontier, so it would be a bit harder for them to have some leverage.
Posted by: Sobiesky   2005-03-07 7:03:04 PM  

#9  If a Turkish enclave in Iraq is to have any viability and security, it has to link physically with Turkey.

So take the west end of the Turkmen enclave on that map, and punch it northwest to Turkey. Oops, that goes through Syria. Wotta shame. The northeast of Syria goes to the Kurds, the north central to the Turkomens (mebbe to the Med), the Damascenes keep their part of Syria, and maybe the Turks decide to be real gents and let the Turkish Kurds join an independent Kurdistan.

Well okay that last part doesn't happen, but the rest is intersting speculation.
Posted by: Steve White   2005-03-07 6:50:25 PM  

#8  Sobiesky: Okay, let's throw the deck of cards up in the air. If Syria collapses, I can well imagine a northern slice becoming part of Kurdistan, along with the assumption of power by the Sunni majority over the Alawite. Lebanon almost has to purge its foreign-backed radical element, Hizbullah, or it will become a divided nation. However, the BIG issue is Iran. If Iran becomes unstable, for whatever reason, there is a large chunk that is ethnically Kurdish (see ethnic map http://tinyurl.com/6tpmp), and would be irresistable to a greater Kurdistan, if the Iranians could not protect it. However, if any partitioning of Iran happens, the whole country could be Balkanized overnight, much like what happened to Yugoslavia.
Posted by: Anonymoose   2005-03-07 6:37:42 PM  

#7  I doubt in a Syrian carve up that the Kurds will get access to the sea but they will get north east Syria. Kurdish direct access to the sea lessens their dependence on Turkey and not in Turkey's interest.
Posted by: phil_b   2005-03-07 6:19:23 PM  

#6  Anonymoose, let's say that at the moment it is in a process of fermentation.

It can be, though, probably separated in phased elements.

1. Kurds and Turkomans will join forces in the federal context. In other words, the Kurdish area would be expanded to include the Turkoman areas.
In return, Turkomans would have their representation guaranteed in the Kurdish local government.

2. I do not want to peer in a crystal ball, but some major shifts are likely to happen in ME in the near future. Syria may not survive in its current incarnation and I tend to believe that Turks may go along with some scheme of split up where Kurds may get a nice strip reaching from the current Iraq-Syria border to Mediterranean. It would be a good exchange for Turkish territorial integrity. This may happen gradually, there is still issue of Iran and until that is resolved, any sudden moves may make the region highly volatile.

3. In the post-ME-shakeup, Kurds will gain independence. Their state would include the current Kurdish Iraq, the northern Syrian strip and less likely--some parts of north-western Iran.
This would be underwriten by Turks with a provision that any Kurdish claims on the Turkish territory are invalid. As for Iraqi Turkomans, they may be better off to tie their future with Kurds than opt for independence, because their strip has little to offer as resources go. It is also possible that some degree of population exchange would be arranged between Turks and Kurds, it would make a good sense.

As a consequence, the rest of the Iraq is likely split as well, along sunni and shi'a lines, albeit sunnis would be smarter not to let that happen--they would be a snack for anyone, unless they form some alliance with either Jordan or whatever is left over from Syria.
Posted by: Sobiesky   2005-03-07 5:57:35 PM  

#5  That this is even being discussed neatly defangs Turkey's posturing. After all, their original position was based on protecting their tribal cousins, and if they push the Kurds too hard, the turkmen will lose Kurdish protection. Well done -- it this is indeed real. ;-)
Posted by: trailing wife   2005-03-07 5:40:58 PM  

#4  Questions that need to be answered: would this mean that Kurdistan and the Turkomen enclave would remain in Iraq? And if so, would it just be the Kurds recognizing the Turkomen enclave, or would they be a separate federal district recognized by the central government? Second, I suspect there being no direct land route between the enclave and Turkey is very intentional. But at the same time, there is a Syria to Iran connection. Is this solely to act as a buffer against the Arabs of the South, or do the Turkomen share interests in these two countries too? Third, does this so totally disconnect northern Iraq from the South that it creates two separate nations? If the central government has no influence left in the North, and the Kurds no longer fear the threat of Turkey, what compels them to continue to be part of Iraq?
Posted by: Anonymoose   2005-03-07 5:13:41 PM  

#3  I regularly check out the Turkish press, and while there is a fair amount of seething over the Kurdish issue, there is also a strong real-politik thread that says Turkey should have friendly relations with the Kurds. Turkey may even be quietly pushing this.
Posted by: phil_b   2005-03-07 5:02:04 PM  

#2  Phil, well, if I were a Turkoman, I would have been indoctrinated since I barely crawled about lazy, no-good arabic scum. Sooo ... despite some misgivings about Kurds as well (troublemakers), I think my choice would be somewhat predetermined.
Posted by: Sobiesky   2005-03-07 4:42:26 PM  

#1  I wouldn't entirely discount this. If you had Sunni Arabs on one side of you and Kurds on the other, who would you ally with?
Posted by: phil_b   2005-03-07 4:35:03 PM  

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