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| Iraq-Jordan | |
| Combat Commanders In Charge | |
| 2005-06-14 | |
| June 14, 2005: The U.S. Army is adding "Peacekeeping 101" to the training it gives company and battalion commanders headed for Iraq. Over there, American combat troops are getting lots of peacekeeping experience, when they aren't engaged in combat operations. Actually, company and battalion commanders are getting lots of peacekeeping jobs, mainly because they tend to be the "go-to guys" in the areas where their units operate. Most foreign NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) are staying out of Iraq because of the terrorism. Al Qaeda is hostile to non-Moslems, and most NGOs are run by Christians, or non-Moslems. The terrorists are also hostile to foreigners of any nationality, unless they are al Qaeda members. Thus American commanders find themselves the logical people military reconstruction and Civil Affairs personnel will turn to. In addition, local Iraqis looking for help, as well as whatever NGOs in the area. So far, the commanders have been improvising. Their division or brigade staffs sometimes create short documents giving tips and guidelines for how to handle peacekeeping duties. And these officers also make use of Internet resources, especially army controlled bulletin boards and download sites for material, and advice, on what to do. Now the army is going to develop some more systematic training. American combat commanders have found themselves in this kind of situation for over a century. When the American Civil War ended, it was officers in command of units occupying the southern states that were often called upon to sort out "peacekeeping" situations. This meant getting involved with local government, or lack of same. Officers had to improvise and use their imaginations. It happened as recently as the U.S. Army operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the late 1990s. As much as the army tries to provide military Civil Affairs units, and civilian operators (either U.S. government, local government, or NGOs) for this sort of thing, power tends to devolve to American combat commanders. In situations where there are still a lot of armed hostiles running around, it's the nearest American combat commander who has the most options. People looking for peace, and some relief, regard the American commanders as the people most likely to get the job done. So far, these officers have been successful, although the degree of success varied according to individual talent for this sort of thing, and how intense the combat situation was. In the past year, more and more "hot zones" in central Iraq have calmed down. This has allowed combat commanders, who are still running patrols and raids, to spend more time on the reconstruction and government aspects of peacekeeping. In addition to more peacekeeping training for commanders, the army is also adding more people, especially at the battalion level (the smallest unit that has a staff for the commander), who can take care of some of the peacekeeping details. But in Iraq and Afghanistan, the local leaders (tribal or religious), often want to see the local "American Amir" (commander) to discuss, and resolve problems. It's been that way for over a century, and is not likely to change in the future.
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| Posted by:Steve |
| #11 "BTW, my dad was there." My kind of guy. A (now deceased) friend of mine was there, as well. His name was Dr Richard Johnson. He served on the economics team (of Mac's staff) that helped rebuild them into an economic powerhouse. Dr Johnson went on to become a major player in the US banking industry, founding the Southwestern Graduate School of Banking, SWGSB - "swigsbee" to most of the bankers in America. He told me that "emperor" Mac was a very quick study and usually pointed out the hows to them when they were working with their Japanese counterparts - how to communicate with them to make sure they understood the reasons behind the reforms, because then they would enthusiastically implement them. Apparently, he was more detail oriented than his legend implies, and definitely more involved than the revisionists have asserted. FWIW. |
| Posted by: .com 2005-06-14 15:49 |
| #10 "Bureaucrats to the ramparts!" LH - you're biting today |
| Posted by: Frank G 2005-06-14 15:40 |
| #9 Hey, you've got your hands full, today, defending All Things Liberal. So it's no biggie, you just posted a common, though incorrect, off-hand Mac was anything but perfect, as are all of us, but he knew the Japanese very well and was no figurehead. Hell, even PBS acknowledges it. So go fight the good fight on those other fronts. It's cool. |
| Posted by: .com 2005-06-14 15:38 |
| #8 whatever. Like I said, IIUC. Ok, mac had more influence than a figurehead emperor. The new dealers had much influence as well. Certainly this was NOT an occupation primarily of military folks. BTW, my dad was there. Very briefly, before his ship went back to California. |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2005-06-14 15:37 |
| #7 Re #5 - Dismissing him proves dick. He was there, you weren't. I'll take his account, thanks. Re #6 - You didn't cite your source. Authoritative, is it? You might find this Sgt Stryker post interesting. Somehow I don't think he shares your view. |
| Posted by: .com 2005-06-14 15:33 |
| #6 "any of the most interesting parts of the book discuss how, after the early punitive phase of the Occupation, the reform process was a collaborative one in which progressive Japanese academics and civil servants worked closely with New Deal Americans to revolutionize thinking on such issues as womenâs rights, in the face of resistance from the defenders of the Old Order often with surprising results. In October 1947, for example, Japanese legislators abolished the crime of adultery when SCAP insisted that the law, which had previously only applied to women, be enforced for men as well. " |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2005-06-14 15:25 |
| #5 a translator on Mac's staff gives credit to Mac. Big surprise. |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2005-06-14 15:20 |
| #4 Sheesh, Lh, methinks you understand incorrectly, and I won't insinuate you'd make shit up to support your thoughts, nay, but that only took 15 seconds to disprove. There are hundreds of links, of course, but one that particularly grabbed my attention did so because it was first-hand knowledge. Y'know, someone who was actually there, on the scene, knew the players, etc? I know first-hand experience is something you've derided in the past, but I found it rather more compelling than your dismissive forty-eighth-hand view. JRPI - Japan Policy Research Institute: "Writing a new Constitution was supposed to have been undertaken by the Japanese themselves. However, as is well known, this aspect of Japanâs âregime changeâ became GovSecâs most impressive and lasting achievement. Although it was written during one tumultuous week in February, 1946, some seven months before I arrived, work on it continued because debates in the House of Peers resulted in certain amendments, as well as because of some difficulties in the Japanese translation of the document itself. Two factors played an important role in convincing MacArthur to ignore the Far Eastern Advisory Commissionâs (FEAC) [your New Deal Doods] purely hortatory edict that any constitutional change needed its imprimatur. [Sound like typical bureaucratic power gamers, no?] First, all of the Japanese drafts amending the existing Constitution were deemed to be badly flawed and insufficient. Second, the FEAC was going to be replaced by the FECâthe Far Eastern Commissionâwhich was intended to project a greater international voice in supervising Occupation policy. SCAP was most concerned that possible Soviet intervention might threaten its goal of the new Constitutionâs early completion." Not only was it the case that the New Deal Bureaucrats were the ones ignored, especially in the single-most important aspect of the occupation, but they were summarily sideline by the guy you imply was a mere figurehead. Sheesh, who'da thunk it, eh? |
| Posted by: .com 2005-06-14 15:14 |
| #3 "One of the reasons our occupation of Japan went so well was that Gen Douglas MacArther filled the role of Emperor" the other reason is that the New Deal bureaucrats who actually ran the occupation pretty much ignored MacArthur, IIUC. although that was pretty close to the old Japanese system too. |
| Posted by: liberalhawk 2005-06-14 13:49 |
| #2 Anonymoose, this was bad why? ("full blooded Indians were being trained as Reserve Officers") And this is good news! A heckuva lot more of the world is in the stages of warlordism than we'd like to admit, so I agree that this is a good improvement. Ever hear of "battationcommandersonline.mil"? ;) (It's the name of a StrategyPage article about the rise of battalions as the smallest, yet vital strategic unit.) Reminds me of how the Special Forces do things back in Afghanistan ... |
| Posted by: Edward Yee 2005-06-14 13:25 |
| #1 This is a very good sign. I am reminded of how the military was a superb peacemaking force after the Indian Wars, post Civil War. Their reports of the time show them to be skilled negotiators, involved in inter- and intra-tribal disputes, Indian and settler disputes, and Indian and military disputes. One of their more effective tools was hiring many "braves" not just as liasons, but as scouts "blueshirts", and eventually soldiers. All too soon, full blooded Indians were being trained as Reserve Officers. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2005-06-14 11:35 |