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Europe |
Assessing Spain's al-Qaeda network |
2005-07-16 |
The Commission investigating the March 11, 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid recently concluded that since the late 1990s, foreign radical Islamists have been using Spain for jihadist activities in support of al-Qaedaâs terrorist operations, particularly al-Zarqawiâs anti-Coalition attacks in Iraq. [1] On-going counter-terrorism investigations reveal that Salafist Islamists traveled to Spain in the late 1990s to early 2000s to organize a network of cells for recruiting suicide bombers for operations in Iraq, Bosnia, and elsewhere and, for terrorist training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Indonesia. These foreign jihadists played a significant role in creating and organizing the cells that were involved in 9/11, conducted the Madrid attacks (11-M), and planned to bomb the National High Court. Moreover, the National Center of Intelligence (NCI) has identified numerous Muslim immigrants who have recently left Spain to join the insurgency in Iraq. The 11-M Commission details that senior cell members were connected in one way or another to the 2003 Casablanca attacks in Morocco and had relations with other Islamic terrorist organizations such as Ansar al-Islam and al-Qaeda. Cell members were connected to Ansar al-Islam, Algerian and Moroccan Salafist groups, to Zarqawiâs âal-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Riversâ and to al-Qaeda proper. A significant majority of the 104 Muslims connected to the 11-M attacks are Moroccan. For example, the Imam of the Mosque in El Portillo, Toledo, Tensamani Jad, regularly called for jihad in his sermons; among those attending were various Muslims implicated in the 11-M attacks. Jad was detained in Morocco due to his ties to the Casablanca attacks. [2] Spanish terrorism experts have identified Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas aka Abu Dahdah (of Syrian origin) as head of a presumed al-Qaeda cell with members tied to the 9/11 and 11-M attacks. His 2001 arrest in Granada in âOperacion Datilâ resulted in the dismemberment of his cell. [3] Abu Dahdahâs cell was involved in recruiting mujahideen to fight in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq. [4] This recruitment activity ââŠwas happening in our homes, our towns, in Spain â and he even sent Spaniards.â [5] For example, Sais Bahaji, who lived in Hamburg with Mohamed Atta, had Dahdahâs telephone number. When Bajaji left Germany, he accompanied Mohamed Belfatmi, who lived in Tarragona, and whom Spanish police confidently believe was a member of Dahdahâs cell. Another member of Dahdahâs cell, Amer Azizi, participated in the March train attacks and had direct links to Belfatmi. [6] Another member of Dahdahâs Spanish cell and his associate, Yusuf Galan, also traveled to the Indonesian al-Qaeda camp for military training. [7] Intelligence uncovered in the November 2001 âOperacion Datilâ confirms a conversation between Farid Hilali aka âShakurâ, a member of a cell that was involved in the planning of 9/11, with Abu Dahdah. [8] Separately, the 11-M Commission report identified Rabei Osman Ahmed, (better known as Mohamed the Egyptian), a presumed head of an al-Qaeda cell and one of the planners of the 11-M attacks. Confusingly some press reports instead identify Allekema Lamari â an associate of the Egyptian and the explosives expert â as the head but it is likely that he was the overall emir of the networks that planned and executed the 11-M attacks. [9] The Egyptian was detained in Italy after Italian authorities intercepted a conversation wherein he bragged about the Madrid bombings. [10] Surprisingly no direct connection has been established between the Egyptian and Dahdah, but this could be due to their counter-intelligence practices. In a related case, a Spanish judge in April 2005 accused 11 Pakistani citizens of forming a terrorist cell in Barcelona to support global terrorism and having connections to the cells involved in planning for 11-M. The head of the group, Mohammad Azaal, is linked to Mohamed the Egyptian. One of the more pernicious personalities to emerge from counter-terrorist operations is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, also known as Abu Musaab al-Suri, a 46 year-old Syrian of Spanish nationality with allegedly close connections to Osama Bin Laden. Spanish authorities believe he founded the first al-Qaeda cell in Spain. Al-Suri recently revealed that he is working on a manifesto for designing the future of jihad. In his vision, he calls for a new holy war that employs nuclear, chemical and âbacteriologicalâ (biological) weapons, and dirty bombs. [11] Abu Dahdah and several of the 24 al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamists currently on trial in Spain maintained contact with al-Suri up until their arrest in 2001. In mid-June, Spanish authorities conducted âOperacion Tigris,â arresting sixteen Islamists in Madrid, Cataluna, Valencia, and Cadiz because of their alleged ties to Islamic terrorism: 11 are allegedly linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq headed by al-Zarqawi. [12] Currently, five men are in jail because of their collaboration in Mohamed Afallahâs escape in April 2004. Widely believed to have been involved in 11-M, Allafah recently perished in a suicide attack against Coalition Forces in Iraq, according to the Spanish Police and the Ministry of Interior. [13] The cellâs headquarters was in Syria, from where the two senior recruiters and financiers â Muhsin Khaybar, alias Abdelmajid Al Libi or Abdelmajid Al Yasser, and Abdel Hay Assas, alias Abdalla â managed the activities in Spain. The 11-M Commission notes that Spanish authorities failed to understand the nature and extent of radical Islamists in-country and therefore, undervalued the terrorist threat to Spaniards. In a November 2003 Spanish terrorist threat report, the authors note that, âIt is clearâŠthat Spain already figures as a declared target for al-QaedaâŠdeduce that Spain could be a target, either in our land, or against Spanish interests overseas, in the near future.â The Commission notes that this âthreat alertâ was issued just a few months before March 11, 2004. [14] Although many of the individuals were picked up for petty crimes, Spanish Police and other security organs had not identified any terrorist-related activity by the cell members. The Spanish governmentâs recent counter-terrorism operations illustrate the depth and breadth of radical Islamic operations in Spain in support of al-Qaedaâs operations overseas, particularly in Iraq. Over the last decade, militant Islamists in Spain organized themselves into distinct cells for specific jihadist activities. This âbee-hiveâ organizational infrastructure â which replicates the activity of other jihadist networks in Europe â became increasingly sophisticated in terms of recruiting individuals in Spanish prisons and mosques for overseas terrorist operations. The Muslims involved in jihadist activities in Spain were not necessarily members of al-Qaeda. Instead, they were religious activists that either individually or in groups or cells, decided to act locally in support of al-Qaedaâs global jihad ideology. The international activities of the militants identified in the Commissionâs year-long investigation, strengthens the notion that the âal-Qaeda methodâ became a roadmap and strategy for the foreign fighters who came to Spain and for local Spanish Muslims. Sociologist Manuel Castells, in his appearance before the Commission, argued that Muslims in Europe â who feel disenfranchised due to a variety of sociological and religious reasons â believe the myths and disinformation put forth by bin Laden and his organization. Consequently, the âal-Qaeda Ideaâ becomes a precept, a maxim, a cause, and ultimately a strategy for engaging in jihad. Insofar as countering this threat in the future is concerned, the most pressing issue is the chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological (CBRN) threat from non-state actors; al-Suriâs âcall to martyrsâ and the legitimization of CBRN as a legitimate tool in jihad. Another area of concern to the Ministry of Interior and Spanish intelligence is the increasing presence of Moroccans in al-Qaeda cells. The apparent ease with which foreign jihadists motivated Spanish Muslims to radicalize their religious beliefs and recruit them for suicide operations in Iraq illustrates a demographic and ideological shift among Spanish Muslims. The apparent specialization of recruitment and indoctrination techniques by Salafist Islamists now emphasizes a return to their home countries to continue the jihad in the name of al-Qaeda. Moreover, Spain and other European countries are increasingly becoming more than just a transit area for mujahideen who travel to conflict zones in the Middle East and beyond. Indeed it is particularly worrying that cities all over Spain have been converted into recruiting platforms for suicide operations. Detecting and dismantling radical Islamist cells will challenge the Spanish intelligence and investigative agencies for some time to come. The Commissionâs reportârich in facts, observations, and recommendations for dealing with militant Islamâis an excellent platform for devising a preemptive counter-terrorism strategy. The Spanish security services should focus on opening regional CT offices, which would combine police, intelligence, and other state services under one authority to monitor terrorist networks. The government needs to quickly increase the number of counter-terrorist police officers for the National Intelligence Center, National Police Corps and other security elements and train them in Arabic, cultural intelligence and other pressing terrorism issues. Furthermore, Spanish counter-terrorism agents have to be trained in analytical, targeting, and operational activities in order to identify, pursue, and apprehend the leadership, personnel facilities, and operational capabilities of those seeking to attack Spanish and broader western interests. |
Posted by:Dan Darling |