Dr Ayesha Siddiqa
Partnering extremist religious groups was an acceptable policy framework until 9/11. It started with the US-led effort through the use of Islamist proxies to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
| Actually, it began with the Soviets and the Chinese using guerrilla armies to subvert the rest of the world. Greece, Malaysia, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Congo, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and a host of others would come to mind given a moment's thought. The Soviets were merely getting some of their own back in Afghanistan. I'd also add that these were guerrilla movements and not terrorist movements. While there were acts of terrorism associated with most of them, they didn't rely on terrorism as a primary tool. Contrast the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong with Algeria's FLN, which did run their war using primarily terrorist tactics and in fact perfected them. |
Most governments have used terrorist groups for achieving policy ends. The US, Britain and Pakistan – states that are today central to the terrorism debate – are known for keeping company with the terrorists.
| We're not. See the above, re the difference between guerrilla and terrorist movements. Counter-guerrilla movements like the Contras fall under the same heading. |
The general perception is that these groups can be used and ditched, as and when required. In other words that they are controllable or that their use is unlikely to change the character of a society or state. This is a total misperception.
| The purpose of a guerrilla movement is usually to hold territory. Terrorism is used to influence state decisions. The FLN didn't so much take power as cause the French to leave, at which point power fell to them by default. The Viet Minh and Viet Cong, along with many other guerrilla operations, established shadow governments and attempted to administer the territory they controlled. |
The recent bomb blasts in London require that all states that have employed violent non-state actors reconsider their approach. As the use of such actors in West and South Asia shows, it is difficult to completely control these elements. Their use in sub-conventional warfare is, therefore, not cost-efficient. Seen particularly in the India-Pakistan context, the sub-conventional warfare option has, in the long run, escalated Pakistan’s cost rather than India’s. Furthermore, the use of non-state actors as strategic reserve is not a viable option in the nuclear or the post-nuclear scenario. In case of a nuclear exchange – if the conflict escalates from the sub-conventional to the conventional and the nuclear – no one would live to tell the tale. In any case, it would mean the failure of deterrence.
| In the event nuclear weapons are actually used, no one is going to care whether their use was initiated by the government or the government's proxy, or even if they were used by intrusive actors. The results will demand retaliation in kind. |
Over the long term, the jihadi option has not only increased the cost for Pakistan but also shown the policy objective of acquiring strategic depth to be flawed. That is if strategic depth is not just measured in terms of territory but as a sum total of territory and resources. The fact that India today has greater financial resources, military hardware, knowledgebase and purchasing power means Pakistan’s strategic depth has steadily been eroded...
| The policy has returned suboptimal results, to say the least. Obviously the guys pushing it aren't big on cost-benefit analysis. Either that or the benefits don't resemble anything the rest of us would recognize as such. |
The opportunity cost of using non-state actors or, in a larger context, ideology is extremely high. This is a lesson one learns from the extremely readable and thrilling book by Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan – Between Mosque and Military . While claiming to discuss the relationship between the military and the mosque, the book actually analyses the larger structure of the state’s use of religious ideology and ideologues to fulfil its interests. However, the book aught to be read along with Vali Nasr’s 2001 publication on the Islamic states of Malaysia and Pakistan. Haqqani’s excellent case study on Pakistan provides clothing to Nasr’s theory that in the two above-mentioned Muslim countries the state itself was party to manipulating and using religious ideology to further its political goals... Vali Nasr argues that the state, which may have some secular character or might not be an outright theocracy, could still adopt religious principles since these are not opposed to state’s hegemony. He focuses on General Zia-ul Haq’s period to elaborate his point. However, the relationship between religious forces and the state is not new to Pakistan.
| They've been in place since the country's foundation. It was founded as a Muslim majority state and has evolved into an Islamic state. The next step in its evolution will probably into an Islamist state, which will mean that the jihadis are actually running things. This will be the result of 60 years of somewhat less than brilliant policies on the part of Pakland's military and civilian governments. |
The nexus began soon after the country’s independence in 1947. Haqqani’s work explains both the cause and effect of the state using religious ideology strategically. The author’s basic argument is that soon after its birth the Pakistani state used religious ideology to sustain itself against the Indian threat. Although the civil-military establishment was keen to develop contacts with the US as well, this connection did not necessarily make the state secular. The military, both Vali Nasr and Haqqani argue, tailored the ideological bearings and the alignments to meet the organisation’s strategic objectives rather than anything else.
| Maybe they know more about it than I do, but I'd suggest they tailored things to meet a series of tactical objectives, rather than working toward a strategic objective. This state of affairs has been aggravated by the funhouse mirror view of the outside world that appears to be common in Pakistan. They're a lot longer on guile than they are on comprehension. |
This policy had its adverse consequences. It was ideology rather than alignment that had an impact on the minds of the people and the larger civil society.
| Yeah. It aggravated their pre-existing condition, y'might say... |
Unfortunately, during the process of the tactical use of ideology, the character and chemistry of the state changed as well. Pakistan today is at greater risk of becoming a theocracy than it ever was before... States have, in the past, eagerly surrendered their monopoly over violence to non-state actors for military gains. Other than reaping short-term dividends, this approach has not benefited any party. The times have indeed changed and the non-state actors of today are more focused on and sure about their role as a player in global and regional geo-politics and geo-strategy.
| The non-state actors, and not only al-Qaeda and the Pak jihadis, are able to command greater resources today than they did when they were dependent on the Soviet Union, which tried to spread itself all over the world. The price of oil, paid in petrodollars, hit $66 a barrel today, which is a lot more money to flow from Soddy Arabia into international subversion. |
So, Pakistan is currently facing the problem of keeping or abandoning the jihadi elements.
| My guess is that the decision hasn't yet been made to dump them. Until it is, they're stuck with them. Once it's been taken, there's going to be a fight to shut them down. The Paks have plotted themselves into a corner. |
The anger and frustration of the world with Islamabad, especially after the 7/7 attacks in London is very obvious.
| I think that after the London booms it's turned from frustration into impatience edging into open contempt. Unless the Western attention span kicks in even faster than usual, Perv might actually have to do something. If he gets out of doing something this time, the reaction next time might be more than simply impatience. |
The desperation to see Pakistan pack up the jihadi venture is accompanied with the understanding that the link has been there for too long to be severed in a day or a few months. But there is also an understanding that the jihadi elements are not exactly running on autopilot and their links with the Pakistani state are too deep for the outside world not to notice them.
| It's not only Hafiz Saeed who needs to be shut down, but the people running him, which means the ISI, which means the military itself has to be brought under control. |
Clearly, Islamabad needs to look carefully at the comparative cost of maintaining the jihadi option as opposed to abandoning it. Pakistan and other states have, in the past, engaged in destroying self-created threats. Eliminating this one would be of a different nature. However, the government’s ability and will to clean up the house and the kind of reaction from the society at large would determine the extent to which the society’s face has changed by years of engagement with an ideology.
Dr Siddiqa is currently a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington DC |