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| Iraq |
| Iraqi Sergeants and the Fate of the Nation |
| 2005-09-27 |
| September 27, 2005: One of the major problems in the Iraqi army, and most Arab armies, is the low status of NCOs. In the West, sergeants were originally, literally, ânon-commissionedâ officers. That is, they had leadership and management responsibilities, but were not of the same status as the aristocratic officers. Commissioned officers were, back in the day, from a higher social class (often the nobility), literate, and used to giving orders. Those nations with a more educated population, were able to build a more effective NCO corps. But in areas with low literacy rates, and much class consciousness, the sergeants were not given much responsibility, or authority. As a result of this, the American and Iraqi armies are opposites in the way they treat, and use, their NCOs. All American sergeants are well educated. Many of them have college degrees. In the Iraqi army, centuries of low literacy rates has led to sergeants who are given little respect, or authority. Officers typically supervise the most mundane tasks the troops perform. Despite relatively high literacy (over 70 percent for males) in Iraq, being an NCO is not seen as a very respectable job. Long years of training by Russian instructors did not improve the situation, because the Russians also had a bad attitude towards NCOs. However, now the Iraqis have seen, up close, how effective well trained and respected sergeants can be. So American efforts to convince Iraqi officers and troops to adopt the Western type of NCO is showing results. But itâs slow going. For generations, Iraqis have gotten by with sergeants who got no respect, or authority. And not much additional pay, either. As with the officers, the young troops are more willing, and able, to accept these new ideas than the older NCOs who served in Saddamâs army. Another advantage the Iraqis have is the willingness of Jordan to help train NCOs. Jordan, which enthusiastically adopted the British model of what an NCO should be, have the best NCO corps in the Middle East. So the senior Jordanian NCOs can talk directly to their Iraqi counterparts, and convince them that they can make the change (from officerâs lackey to the guy-in-charge.) But building an effective NCO corps will take at least a decade. The young sergeants, especially the ones getting combat experience, are proving their worth right now. But it will take years for them to acquire the experience and wisdom to become platoon and company sergeants. The platoon sergeants will be particularly valuable, because a major weakness in the Iraqi army was having young lieutenants in charge of platoons, without the assistance of an older and more experienced platoon sergeant. The Iraqis need a strong NCO corps, because the Iraqi armed forces have long been the most ineffective in the Arab world. Thatâs saying something, because Arab armies in general have been pretty bad for a long time. Well trained officers and NCOs will make a big difference in the combat capabilities of the Iraqi forces. Unfortunately, that wonât solve the problem of the military taking over the government. Saddam ruled as the result of a military takeover in the 1960s, and put down dozens of subsequent attempts by the military to overthrow him. Throughout the Arab world, power is maintained by dictators of kings who know how to keep the troops loyal, or too afraid to attempt a coup. This approach makes combat effectiveness less important than loyalty, and is part of the reason for the dismal battlefield record of Arab troops. |
| Posted by:Steve |
| #4 In 1970 Jordanians were busy with the Palestinians, so Israel sent a flight of four F4 Phantoms to overfly a Syrian column. The Syrians understaood the hint and withdrew. I haven't heard about Jordanians and Syrians firing at one another but I could be wrong. Anyway we weren't talking about if the Jordanian Army was strong enough to cope with Syria because size is a factor, but who had the best quality. Just as the 1940 Finnish Army wasn't strong enough to defeat the Red Army but would have made mincemeat of it if sizes had been comparable. |
| Posted by: JFM 2005-09-27 16:00 |
| #3 Well, the Jordanians used to have the best force in the region. They haven't seen combat in thirty-five years now, so it's all hypothetical, I suppose. But a certain degree of degradation in the Jordanian force has been noted since the days of the Arab Legion. Ken Pollack claims that the removal of the British officer cadres in the early Sixties had a significant effect on the Jordanian armed forces. They certainly didn't do so well against the Syrians in 1970 when Syria tried to intervene in favor of the Palestinian revolt. As for the Iraqis being the worst in the region, the Iraqi corps on the Golan Heights admittedly did worse than the Syrians did in '73, who weren't any shining beacon of competence themselves. However, the extended warfare of the Iran-Iraq War knocked a lot of the stupid out of the Iraqi Army, and Iraq's twenty-five years of near-continuous war has given everyone involved more experience than anyone really needs. The Syrians haven't had any real combat experience since the Israelis pulped them in the Bekaa over twenty years ago, and their brand of bootleg Soviet doctrine doesn't age well in peacetime. I'd hand the hypothetical laurel of ineptitude to the modern Syrian army. |
| Posted by: Mitch H. 2005-09-27 14:11 |
| #2 For some reason, why do I think it won't be terribly hard to convince Saddam-era NCOs that they are far more important, responsible and respectable than they thought. NCOs just *hate* the idea of being important and valuable. /extreme sarcasm |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2005-09-27 14:03 |
| #1 During the Six Days War Israel suffered more casualties at the hands of the Jordanian Army than in the Egyptian and Syrian fronts put together. But Jordania's NCOs are NOT the best of the Middle west (cf what Ralph Peters said about the skill, or lack of it of an elite Jordanian unit during the crushing of Palestinian rebellion). |
| Posted by: JFM 2005-09-27 10:44 |