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| Terror Networks |
| Al Qaeda: Targeting Guidance and Timing |
| 2005-12-09 |
| Previously unpublicized segments of an al Qaeda videotape made in September hit the news media early Dec. 7, when the tape (featuring Ayman al-Zawahiri) was posted in its entirety on a jihadist Web site. The statements being aired struck an industrial nerve center: For the first time, a senior al Qaeda leader was heard to be calling specifically -- and offering ideological justification -- for strikes against energy infrastructure in the Persian Gulf region. Because the region's oil wealth is considered to be the patrimony of the Muslim world, it long has been believed that attacks of this sort would be anathema to al Qaeda and its long-term political goals in the region. The group's leaders, including Osama bin Laden, have made remarks about the need to halt the theft of Muslim oil many times in the past, but no one of al-Zawahiri's stature before has been known to discuss so directly the value of striking at energy targets in the Middle East. The rationale for doing so is clear enough. As al-Zawahiri says in the tape: "I call on mujahideen to concentrate their attacks on Muslims' stolen oil, from which most of the revenues go to the enemies of Islam, while most of what they leave is seized by the thieves who rule our countries." It is important to note the audience for this statement: Al-Zawahiri is not issuing a warning to the oil industry or the West, but rather is giving targeting guidance to al Qaeda's supporters in the Middle East. In other portions of the 40-minute videotape, he emphasizes that bin Laden is alive and continues to lead the jihadist war, claims credit in al Qaeda's name for the July 7 train bombings in London and rails against Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. It is, if you will, a motivational speech al-Zawahiri is making -- but the strategy he espouses is one with inherent risks. Considering that oil is viewed by al Qaeda as the blessing of Allah upon Arabs and Muslims, the jihadist leadership does not seem to be in any danger of committing ideological cannibalism, provided attacks are staged in a way that cripples export infrastructure and the economies of specific countries -- rather than, for example, setting fire to oil wells -- since the oil would remain in Muslim hands under the strategy being urged. Al-Zawahiri's statement plays on long-standing divisions within the Arab world, where those from non-oil states might refer to the wealthy Gulf countries (and their frequently well-off citizens) as "Khaleejis" -- a word that technically means "from the Gulf" but has come to connote, in common slang, something more along the lines of "rich, lazy and spoiled." And any attacks that cause instability in countries with hated regimes, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, are in al Qaeda's interest. The problem is that, if there should be follow-through, the effects of such strikes might not be easily contained. Poor Arab countries like Yemen and Jordan could feel the pinch long before the United States did -- and while that still might bring about the sought-after political instability, it also could hurt al Qaeda's standing among the masses, as other attacks waged on Arab soil have before. That is no small consideration; al-Zawahiri himself has urged other leaders, notably Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, to avoid operations that would needlessly alienate other members of the ummah (such as the Shia). Clearly, the leadership is well aware of the risks involved -- but given the way al-Zawahiri's statement came to light this week, it seems equally clear that al Qaeda places a great deal of emphasis on ensuring this guidance is heard and heeded. The issue of how the statements came to light made news itself, since initial reports from wire services and broadcast agencies on Dec. 6 mistakenly said the al Qaeda tape was new. It was, in fact, recorded and released in mid-September, marking the fourth anniversary of the World Trade Center attacks. Arab satellite television broadcaster Al Jazeera was the first to receive the tape, and aired segments of it on Sept. 19. But it was not until another Web site, one known to be used by Islamist militants, made the video available Dec. 7 that the targeting guidance -- among the final statements made in the 40-minute recording -- was picked up by world media (including, in a circular fashion, Al Jazeera). In explaining the discrepancy, Al Jazeera said it had aired all the portions of the tape the editorial staff believed to be significant upon its receipt in September -- having judged statements about the oil sector "not newsworthy" at the time. Though perfectly logical, this explanation raises more questions than answers. For one thing, the video was released shortly after Hurricane Katrina struck in the United States and world attention was focused on record-high energy prices -- something that would tend to raise the news value of any threats to Persian Gulf oil assets. Moreover, Al Jazeera is known worldwide as the primary distribution point for key al Qaeda statements; we would not expect any statements made in a videotape of this sort to be considered lightly. That said, of course, the news media are peopled with humans, and human error -- a lapse of news judgment or an editorial oversight -- is always a possibility. Another explanation is that Al Jazeera's editorial decision-makers indeed were aware of the call to action but chose not to broadcast it, having weighed several issues of which news value is merely one. Several factors, including ethics and politics, play into the editorial process. It must be remembered that the Qatar-based satellite channel's privileged source-media relationship with al Qaeda has given Al Jazeera considerable cachet in the media industry. It also has made Al Jazeera an object of interest for intelligence agencies hoping to trace the locations of al Qaeda leaders or gather forensic evidence, such as fingerprints, from the tapes themselves. And it has brought considerable political pressure to bear on some editorial decisions, such as whether to broadcast graphic footage of beheadings and other material that -- in addition to being newsworthy -- was viewed as fueling the risks of violence to Westerners or otherwise aiding al Qaeda's cause. At each juncture, there were ethical issues at stake and nuanced business decisions to be made. But while it is one thing to air sensational footage of violence that already has been carried out against foreigners or to broadcast statements warning of possible attacks abroad, it can be quite another to carry the rallying cry that urges attacks against the economic backbone of one's own country, region or primary commercial market. For an editorial decision-maker serving a certain geographic market, the political and economic consequences could make this a very different decision indeed. Whatever led to it, the situation at the end of the day is this: Al Jazeera had an opportunity to air al-Zawahiri's targeting guidance in September, and did not -- nor was the message made widely known through other venues. An alternative Web site believed to be used by Islamist militant groups -- which could thus be surmised to have links to al Qaeda and access to its materials -- brought matters to a head after a significant time lag. The targeting call then was covered almost as a matter of routine by other media outlets in response, and oil markets spasmed predictably. In the classic whodunit sense, it seems that someone was keenly interested in making sure the targeting guidance was distributed -- and the list of suspects is extremely short. Since Al Jazeera did not oblige by broadcasting the statement initially, al Qaeda chose another outlet -- and possibly the timing of the release as well. The key question is why. It has been noted that the scare to the oil markets came only days before an OPEC meeting, scheduled to take place Dec. 12 -- enough time for cartel members to consider the threat and adjust production strategies accordingly. Al Qaeda is well aware of the economic repercussions of its statements and actions, and oil prices recently have dropped again. Making sure the threats were made public at this juncture -- when cold weather and heating fuel are also concerns for Western buyers -- theoretically would be one way of reinflating prices and thus harming al Qaeda's main enemies. Upon closer examination, however, there are deeper implications to al-Zawahiri's exhortations. Al Qaeda in the past has made only vague references to striking at oil infrastructure; with al-Zawahiri's statements, that changed. There have been indications that al Qaeda is in financial difficulties -- to the point that the leadership might be having to divert funds from some areas to sustain key operations in others. Historically, the bulk of al Qaeda's funding is believed to have come from Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The financial downturn could be the result of donor fatigue or other factors; however, not striking at oil infrastructure in the region has been a way of protecting major donors' interests. Thus, the shift in al Qaeda's rhetoric -- which has been hinted for some time but takes on an emphatic note when clearly stated by a top strategist -- might be a way to either punish former donors for their laxity, or otherwise achieve significant goals. It is in the areas where financial support for the group has been greatest that ideological sympathies also tend to run quite high -- even from those without the means to contribute funds -- so al-Zawahiri in essence could be calling on core supporters to "act locally" under the operational guidance. And this underscores yet another significant implication: If al Qaeda's leadership knows it retains a serious ability to strike within the United States or other Western countries, logic dictates that it would marshal those forces and draw attention to key targets in those places. With the Sept. 11 attacks, al Qaeda took its war against "crusaders" into the enemy camp -- a strategy intended to demonstrate its strength and build support and morale among the oppressed Muslim masses. Ordering strikes against the patrimony of the Muslim world -- even as a way of crippling the West and wounding the "apostate" regimes that al Qaeda opposes in the Middle East -- is doing almost the exact opposite, and is so controversial that even sympathizers might be expected to balk. In all likelihood, that is why al Qaeda statements have only hit around the edges of this issue up to this point. The guidance is tactically efficient, in the sense that it is viable guidance concerning a region where both high-value targets and al Qaeda supporters are numerous -- but strategically and politically, this is an option of last resort. |
| Posted by:Steve |