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| Iraq |
| Why the Future is Fallujah |
| 2006-03-27 |
| March 27, 2006: The battle of Fallujah, in late 2004, is still being studied by U.S. Army and Marine historians and doctrine ("how to fight") experts. The Fallujah fighting was quite intense, even by historical standards, something that the media missed. What was noticed was how quickly the army and marine troops blitzed through the city, clearing out the 4,000 very determined defenders. The speed and efficiency of the American attack was the result of some unique, in the history of warfare, factors. But the principal reason for the success in Fallujah was the high degree of training the troops had. Many also had months of combat experience in Iraq. These factors (training and combat experience) have long been key factors in combat success. But the American troops in Fallujah had some relatively new advantages, that were used aggressively. These included massive amounts of information on the enemy, and robotic weapons. The standard gear of the 5,000 attacking troops was also exceptionally good by historical standards. Especially notable was the improved body armor and communications gear. The end result of all this was a two week campaign that resulted in some 500 American and Iraqi casualties, but the obliteration of the defending force (1,200, 1,500 captured, the rest either got out, or were buried in bombed buildings). While the enemy were not, compared to the U.S. troops, well trained, they were motivated, and often refused to surrender. But the speed and violence of the American assault prevented any coordinated defense. The U.S. troops quickly cut the city into sectors, that were then methodically cleared out. The terrorists that got out, later all repeated the same story. Once the Americans were on to you, it was like being stalked by a machine. The often petrified defender could only remember the footsteps of the approaching American troops inside a building, the gunfire and grenade blasts as rooms were cleared, and the shouted commands that accompanied it. If a building was so well defended that the American infantry could not get in, they would just obliterate it with a smart bomb. They used smaller weapons, like AT-4 rocket launchers, many of which fuel-air explosive (thermobaric) warheads. These would use an explosive mist to create a lethal blast, capable of clearing several rooms at once. The defenders could occasionally kill or wound the advancing Americans, but could not stop them. Nothing the defenders did worked, and the American tactics developers want to keep it that way. The speed with which intelligence information (from troops, electronic intercepts, and constant live video via UAVs and gunships overhead) was processed enabled commanders to keep the battle going 24/7. The defenders were not ready to deal with this, and many of them died while groggy from lack of sleep. When in that condition, you are more prone to make mistakes, and the attackers were ready to take advantage. Compared to earlier wars, there has never been anything quite like Fallujah. The Pentagon is still sorting out what it all means for the future of warfare. What they do know is that future battles are likely to continue being different that anything in the past. |
| Posted by:Steve |
| #13 sounds like the all-weekend hazing during initiation in y SDSU fraternity - no sleep = a different reality |
| Posted by: Frank G 2006-03-27 23:31 |
| #12 Just thought of something; when tired, they make mistakes. Therefore, start probes days before the actual attack, moving from place to place with a lot of fanfare, armor, air cover, vehicles, but few troops. When the attack actually starts, the enemy is dog tired and prone to sit rather than respond to calls and shots, never being sure it's the real thing. |
| Posted by: wxjames 2006-03-27 21:09 |
| #11 I'm a little ticked / non-plussed by this article since we are developing assault armor. I'd have killed for this stuff in RVN. Weight is one thing, absolute (ex-.50-.51 cal.) survivability is another. |
| Posted by: Whiskey Mike 2006-03-27 20:58 |
| #10 Listen to Dogs; where does your name originate? I'll tell you mine if you choose to tell us from whence you come. Not much of a trade, but something I can offer. |
| Posted by: Whiskey Mike 2006-03-27 20:32 |
| #9 of course, the fiery clerics slinked off - too valuable to die for Allan. To incite |
| Posted by: Frank G 2006-03-27 19:30 |
| #8 Once the Americans were on to you, it was like being stalked by a machine. I knew our guys were impressive, but still! I was proud of them when we read about their activities then, and I am proud again today. |
| Posted by: trailing wife 2006-03-27 17:40 |
| #7 Just another Nakba. |
| Posted by: 6 2006-03-27 16:55 |
| #6 US Commanders treated Fallujah somewhat like Hiroshima and Nagasaki, prior to the spectacular VJ termination: militarized to the extent that they were not civil entities. That consideration enabled use of short range artillery/mortar cover for blitz movement by the infantry. In most cases, once an enemy perceives overwhelming force, they either surrender or retreat. Having secured both sniper positions and with ground controlled air support, retreating elements were cut down. A factor in quick defeat is: captives blame leadership and turn against their commanders. Hence, there is ripe picking for intelligence. Information gathered led to quick attacks on command structures, which would have caused jihadis to believe that resistance was futile. The elements who chose to fight to the death did so in easily renderible pockets. The least publicized aspect of the Fallujah Operation was the fact that most arms caches were found in mosques. Prior to the capture of Fallujah, jihadi websites spoke of the city's nominal invinciability. They wrote freely about the place of Medina, the last Muslim defensive battle (Batle of the Trench) led by Mohammad. The fact that it was crushed so quickly under conditions where morale collapsed, would discredit the clerical class that is perpetuating terrorism. Perhaps, US Defense doesn't want to tempt further terror by treating the Fallujah Operation with triumphalism, but I think the value of exploding cleric bravado overweighs the decision not to tell the story. Heroes win wars because they inspire other heroes. What was achieved at Fallujah was more than a footnote in a history book. |
| Posted by: Listen to Dogs 2006-03-27 14:50 |
| #5 Moose- They obviously didn't watch those great shows on the island campaigns in the pacific on the History Channel. |
| Posted by: Penguin 2006-03-27 13:20 |
| #4 Somehow I just knew this wasn't a New York Times article. |
| Posted by: Darrell 2006-03-27 12:28 |
| #3 I would assume so. Keep up the pressure on the enemy, don't let him sleep, while rotating your troops around. |
| Posted by: gromky 2006-03-27 12:19 |
| #2 I find the sleep issue to be interesting. Did our folks fight "in shifts" to get sleep? |
| Posted by: Nimble Spemble 2006-03-27 09:52 |
| #1 No mention of one of our best tricks, how we first created killzones away from the residence areas, in the industrial district, then lured the more aggressive fighters into the KZ. This excised almost all of the "offense" fighters, leaving only "defense" fighters to systematically root out. This meant that from that point on, we didn't have to keep our "gloves up" as much, spending much of our resources on defense, and to totally commit to offense. |
| Posted by: Anonymoose 2006-03-27 09:44 |